Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Microsoft Entra audit activity where a service principal is granted high-impact application permissions, such as directory, application, group, mail, file, or role-management write access. This activity is significant as compromised applications can leverage these permissions to perform actions without requiring an interactive user.
Detects the creation of a new inbox rule that performs email manipulation actions (forward, redirect, delete, move, or stop processing) shortly after a user account has logged in with a high or medium risk score, or an unusual result type. This pattern is commonly indicative of account compromise where an attacker establishes persistence or data exfiltration via mailbox rules.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins (refresh-token usage) for Microsoft Purview Communication Compliance reviewer accounts (Administrator, Analyst, or Investigator roles) that originate from IP addresses not observed for the user in the previous 21 days. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins (refresh-token usage) for Microsoft Purview Communication Compliance reviewer accounts (Administrator, Analyst, or Investigator roles) that originate from IP addresses not observed for the user in the previous 21 days. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects a potential account takeover scenario where a user receives a password reset notification email followed within 10 minutes by a non-SSO application password change from the same IP address. This sequence is characteristic of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing or vishing campaigns where an attacker intercepts session tokens or uses social engineering to force a password reset and immediately secures the account for persistent access.
Detects the creation of a new inbox rule that performs email manipulation actions (forward, redirect, delete, move, or stop processing) shortly after a user account has logged in with a high or medium risk score, or an unusual result type. This pattern is commonly indicative of account compromise where an attacker establishes persistence or data exfiltration via mailbox rules.
This rule identifies potential post-Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking by correlating suspicious initial authentication events (e.g., AiTM indicators, unusual behavioral flags) with subsequent successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxies or anonymization VPN providers within a 24-hour window.
Proofpoint has observed OAuth client ID spoofing emerging as a novel technique, increasingly leveraged in cloud campaigns. Microsoft Entra ID returns different responses depending on whether a supplied OAuth client ID is valid and whether it corresponds to a registered application. This behavior enables account enumeration without a registered OAuth application and allows attackers to infer password validity or account state without generating a successful sign‑in event. Researchers observed multiple campaigns at scale abusing spoofed OAuth application identifiers, with distinct tooling, infrastructure, and execution patterns indicating independent adoption by multiple threat actors.
To detect similar activity, defenders should monitor sign-in logs for events without an application name, which may indicate spoofed client IDs.
To detect similar activity, defenders should monitor sign-in logs for events without an application name, which may indicate spoofed client IDs.
This rule serves as an investigation framework for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in events. It enables security analysts to filter, normalize, and inspect user authentication activities, including sign-in types (interactive/non-interactive), device management status, user risk levels, and conditional access status. The query is designed for incident response and forensic analysis rather than automated alerting.
Detects high-frequency Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) authentication requests targeting the OAuth token endpoint. Attackers use ROPC for brute-forcing, credential stuffing, or bypassing security controls by directly passing user credentials to the OAuth flow.
Detects potentially malicious use of the device code authentication flow in Entra ID sign-in logs. The rule correlates device code usage with indicators of suspicious activity, such as rare User-Agent strings (e.g., 'python-requests') often used in phishing/relay toolkits, or sign-ins flagged by Azure AD Identity Protection as risky. It includes exclusions for known first-party Azure CLI and PowerShell clients to minimize noise from legitimate administrative activity.
Detects Entra ID users with active medium-to-high identity risk events who perform Microsoft Copilot actions in cloud applications while simultaneously exhibiting impossible travel indicators — successful sign-ins from multiple geographic locations using unmanaged (non-registered) devices within a one-hour window. This triple-signal correlation (identity risk + impossible travel on unmanaged device + Copilot usage) is a strong indicator of account compromise where an adversary has taken over a legitimate identity and is leveraging AI-powered tools to accelerate reconnaissance, data access, or exfiltration against Microsoft 365 resources.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain originating from OAuth device code phishing. It tracks the sequence of events starting from device code authentication, followed by the registration of a new device or Primary Refresh Token (PRT) manipulation, potential password resets, and the creation of malicious inbox rules (e.g., auto-forwarding). The rule correlates these events within a 1-hour window to identify malicious intent, with critical alerts triggered if persistence mechanisms survive a password reset.
KQL Query from file: The Hunt for QR Phisher
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain originating from OAuth device code phishing. It tracks the sequence of events starting from device code authentication, followed by the registration of a new device or Primary Refresh Token (PRT) manipulation, potential password resets, and the creation of malicious inbox rules (e.g., auto-forwarding). The rule correlates these events within a 1-hour window to identify malicious intent, with critical alerts triggered if persistence mechanisms survive a password reset.
This rule detects potential device code phishing attempts by correlating URL click events with sign-in logs using the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol. It specifically looks for successful or failed sign-ins (result types 0, 50074, 50076, 500121) that occur after a user clicks on a URL.
This rule detects instances where a user clicks on a URL identified as potentially malicious (phishing-related) and subsequently has a risky sign-in event in Azure AD. The rule correlates URL click events from email with Azure AD sign-in logs, specifically looking for sign-ins marked as risky or originating from suspicious user agents (e.g., specific axios versions). The phishing URLs are identified by keywords such as 'azureapplicationregistration.pages.dev', 'chrnobinson.com', 'workers.dev', '.pages.dev', '.web.core.windows.net', '/oauth2/v2.0/authorize', 'client_id=', and 'scope=openid'.
This rule detects suspicious sign-in attempts to Microsoft services (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, outlook.office365.com) that occur within 30 minutes of a user clicking on a URL associated with these services. The sign-in is considered suspicious if it originates from a user agent commonly used by automated tools (e.g., axios, curl, python-requests, httpclient, Go-http-client) and is flagged with a 'atRisk' or 'high' risk level by Azure AD. This combination suggests a potential credential compromise following a phishing attempt, where an attacker might be using automated tools to leverage stolen credentials.
Detects OAuth consent grants or permission additions in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) audit logs that occur in conjunction with device login flow artifacts. This pattern is indicative of 'ConsentFix' or device code phishing attacks, where users are manipulated into authorizing malicious applications, potentially bypassing MFA requirements by using the device code flow.
This rule detects potential device code phishing attempts by correlating URL click events with sign-in logs using the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol. It specifically looks for successful or failed sign-ins (result types 0, 50074, 50076, 500121) that occur after a user clicks on a URL.
This rule detects potential session token theft or replay attacks by identifying non-interactive sign-in events that occur from a different IP or geographic location than the user's most recent successful MFA-authenticated interactive session. It flags cases where a non-interactive token is used within a short timeframe (1 hour) of an interactive session from a different location, which may indicate the exfiltration and subsequent use of session cookies or OAuth tokens.
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