Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
411 detections
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Detects specific malicious activity patterns associated with the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud campaign targeting GitHub repositories. The rule monitors for unauthorized workflow creation, specific suspicious commit messages, and the use of orphan branches that impersonate dependabot or mimic specific campaign indicators.
Detects the creation of GitHub Actions workflow files within the .github/workflows/ directory that mimic Dependabot naming conventions while containing suspicious indicators associated with the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. Indicators include hardcoded secret references, specific operational markers like 'RevokeAndItGoesKaboom', and unauthorized OIDC token permissions.
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Detects suspicious activity within GitHub Actions, identifying potential exfiltration or malicious automation by correlating signals such as masquerading actors (e.g., bots like dependabot), specific IronWorm-associated commit message patterns, usage of secrets-related JSON expressions in logs, and the use of innocuous file names for artifact uploads.
Monitors GitHub audit logs for suspicious or high-risk activities within CI/CD pipelines, including actions triggered by forks, workflow approvals, branch policy overrides, self-hosted runner registration, and sensitive secret access.
Detects the use of weaponized GitHub Actions workflows (e.g., impersonating 'Run Copilot' or 'Dependabot Updates') designed to exfiltrate CI/CD secrets via artifacts, as observed in the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain campaign.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to GitHub Actions workflows, including the creation or modification of workflow configuration files, the placement of suspicious JavaScript files in the repository's .github directory, the execution of the 'Bun' runtime within an Actions runner environment, and cloud-based events indicating workflow modification containing 'Run Copilot' strings. These patterns are often associated with CI/CD pipeline compromise, malicious automation, or unauthorized code execution within build environments.
Detects suspicious activities within GitHub repository logs that indicate potential supply chain attacks, including the use of unauthorized workflow names, the creation of orphan snapshot branches, dependabot impersonation attempts, commit messages containing known campaign markers, exposure of internal secrets (HAS_GCR_TOKEN), and the push of suspicious files or configuration modifications.
Detects unauthorized access or modification to common CI/CD credential files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, jenkins credentials.xml) and CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml). The rule monitors both file system activities by non-standard processes and the execution of command-line tools that reference these sensitive files.
Detects unauthorized access or modification to common CI/CD credential files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, jenkins credentials.xml) and CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml). The rule monitors both file system activities by non-standard processes and the execution of command-line tools that reference these sensitive files.
This rule monitors GitHub repository activity (git.push, git.clone, repo.contents) to identify specific activity patterns associated with known GitHub usernames, email addresses, or specific repository paths (e.g., tools/setup, .github/scripts/precheck) and commit messages. It flags potentially significant actions such as forced pushes to default branches for review.
Detects malicious npm package propagation indicative of the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud worm. The rule identifies suspicious patterns in AuditLogs, specifically burst npm publishes by known malicious actors or involving known malicious package names, as well as the use of weaponized GitHub Actions workflows or unauthorized snapshot branches.
Detects the Miasma worm propagating through CI/CD pipelines by identifying unauthorized updates to GitHub Actions workflow files. Specifically monitors for modifications to workflows under the LeoPlatform or LeoInsights projects by the compromised user 'czirker', with signs of weaponization such as the addition of OIDC id-token write permissions and npm-publish capabilities.
Detects malicious GitHub Actions workflow activity characteristic of the Miasma worm. The rule monitors for the creation or update of workflows named 'Dependabot Updates' (masquerading), which utilize OIDC token write permissions and execute scripts using 'bun run _index.js', often on suspicious snapshot branches.
Detects instances where a GitHub Actions runner requests an OIDC token and subsequently executes an npm publish command within 5 minutes. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized package deployment, potentially exploiting GitHub's OIDC 'trusted publishing' mechanism, as observed in the Miasma worm campaign.
Detects GitHub Actions workflow files that include 'id-token: write' permissions in conjunction with 'npm publish' or 'yarn publish' commands. This pattern is indicative of the Miasma worm (also known as the wshu.net campaign) which abuses OIDC trusted publishing to facilitate unauthorized npm package propagation. The rule also identifies workflows that attempt to fallback on legacy NPM_TOKEN secrets.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of operations related to GitHub Enterprise repositories, such as adding users, creating teams, pushing to repositories, or changing permissions, within a short timeframe. This could indicate a compromised account or automated malicious activity targeting source code repositories.
This rule detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with malicious activities in GitHub Actions environments, specifically flagging the use of JavaScript runtimes (node, bun) to execute malicious payloads, git operations related to pull request data exfiltration (pwn-request), and the creation of orphan branches characteristic of the Miasma campaign.
This rule monitors GitHub audit logs for potentially malicious activities in repository management and CI/CD workflows. It detects suspicious commits by specific maintainers, impersonation of the Dependabot bot, usage of non-standard snapshot branch naming conventions, execution of unauthorized workflows, and specific commit message patterns indicative of unauthorized system modifications or testing.
Detects an anomalous volume of NPM package publications by specific users associated with internal naming conventions (leo-*, @leoplatform/*, verana-blockchain*). The rule identifies potential supply chain compromise attempts by monitoring for burst activity (3+ publishes or 3+ unique packages within a 10-second window).
This rule looks for sensitive-looking values appearing in a publicly visible Claude workflow summary on GitHub. Public summaries can be indexed and copied quickly. Revoke any exposed credentials and restrict summary visibility. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
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