Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
539 detections
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Detects execution of a 'setup.mjs' preinstall lifecycle hook, the stage-1 loader used in the
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
Detects potential credential theft attempts targeting macOS Keychain. It identifies the use of the 'security' utility with commands like 'dump-keychain' or 'find-generic-password' and monitors for unauthorized processes accessing files within the 'Library/Keychains' directory.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the modification of file attributes on macOS, specifically targeting the removal of the 'com.apple.quarantine' extended attribute and the manipulation of files associated with 'com.apple.trustd'. Such actions are indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Gatekeeper security controls or execute masqueraded payloads by stripping quarantine flags or modifying execution permissions.
Detects dropper/staging scripts that curl-fetch a second-stage Mach-O payload to /tmp/helper or /tmp/update, chmod +x it immediately afterward in the same command sequence, ad-hoc/unsigned sign it, and strip quarantine attributes, while excluding scripts that verify a legitimate Developer ID signature
This rule detects the potential replacement of legitimate cryptocurrency wallet applications (Ledger, Trezor, Exodus) by monitoring for the download of zip archives from suspicious paths containing 'zxc' using curl, followed by the creation or modification of files within known wallet application directories. This activity is indicative of a trojanized application delivery mechanism, often associated with info-stealer campaigns.
This rule detects macOS infostealer activity, such as AMOS, MacSync, or SHub, by identifying suspicious, correlated access to sensitive credential stores including the macOS Keychain, web browser credential databases (Chrome), SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallet configuration files. It uses a combination of path/command-line strings and generic indicators of credential harvesting behavior.
This rule detects potential persistence attempts on macOS by monitoring 'launchctl' commands used to bootstrap LaunchAgents or modify configuration files related to Apple's software update mechanisms. It also flags file events involving the 'com.apple.softwareupdate' cache directory, which could indicate an adversary attempting to stage or replace update-related files.
This rule detects potential credential theft activity where a process spawning a command-line interpreter (bash, sh, zsh) using 'curl' simultaneously accesses sensitive browser configuration or credential directories on MacOS, such as Chrome, Firefox, or Safari application support paths. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate browser-stored secrets.
Detects the creation and configuration of suspicious LaunchAgent and LaunchDaemon plist files on macOS. It identifies files masquerading as legitimate system components (e.g., com.finder.helper, .mainhelper, .agent) or exhibiting common patterns of persistent agent names (random 10+ character names). It also monitors for the use of 'launchctl load' to activate these suspicious configuration files.
This rule detects potential malware sandbox/virtualization evasion behavior on macOS. It identifies processes that execute 'system_profiler' with hardware-identifying keywords (e.g., QEMU, VMware, KVM) and correlates this with either immediate process self-termination within 5 seconds or the presence of a 'cis_blocked' signal, which is indicative of a kill-switch mechanism often used by malicious actors to avoid analysis.
This rule detects activities associated with the SHub Stealer malware on macOS, specifically identifying the creation of staging directories in /tmp (named /tmp/shub_<id>/*), the presence of a 'FileGrabber' sub-directory, and unauthorized file access to common cryptocurrency wallet applications like Electrum, Exodus, Trezor Suite, Ledger Live, Sparrow, and Guarda. It filters out common administrative or installer tools to reduce noise.
Detects the creation and subsequent execution of AppleScript files (.scpt) using the 'osascript' command-line utility on macOS. This pattern is commonly used to automate tasks, but can be leveraged by attackers for malicious payload execution or system interaction.
Detects the deletion of files or archives associated with the SHub Stealer malware (specifically /tmp/shub_ directories or /tmp/out.zip) immediately following staging or exfiltration activity within the same process lineage, which is characteristic of anti-forensic cleanup behaviors.
Detects the use of 'curl' to perform a network request (likely for a remote script) and immediately piping that output to 'osascript' for execution in memory. This pattern is often used to execute malicious AppleScript payloads directly without writing to the disk, a technique seen in recent macOS infostealer campaigns.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious command-line patterns (involving base64 decoding, pipes to sh/zsh, and network-fetching utilities like curl) within Terminal.app processes on macOS. It correlates these command executions with prior web browser activity within a 5-minute window, effectively identifying potential 'ClickFix' social engineering lures where users are coerced into copying and pasting malicious instructions into their shell.
Detects potential malicious activity related to the XCSSET macOS malware, which leverages Xcode projects to execute malicious payloads. The rule monitors for suspicious process execution (e.g., curl, osascript, zsh) initiated by Xcode-related processes, and unusual modifications to .zshrc files by processes other than standard shells or editors.
Detects potential malicious activity related to the XCSSET macOS malware, which leverages Xcode projects to execute malicious payloads. The rule monitors for suspicious process execution (e.g., curl, osascript, zsh) initiated by Xcode-related processes, and unusual modifications to .zshrc files by processes other than standard shells or editors.
This rule detects the use of 'osascript' on macOS to execute commands that interact with the 'AccountsHelper' process, specifically using 'stat' to probe /dev/console and 'sudo -u' for privilege elevation or user context switching. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized attempts to interact with system account management utilities or sensitive user processes.
Detects macOS persistence via launchctl loading a LaunchAgent plist within 300 seconds of that plist file being created in /Library/LaunchAgents/, a technique associated with the DOUBLECUP loader delivering CountLoader and DeviceManager RATs.
Detects file creation, modification, or rename activity targeting known directory paths and files used by the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) to stage exfiltrated credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and browser data. It identifies staging activity by looking for patterns associated with the stealer's data-collection routines.
Detects unauthorized credential validation attempts on macOS using the 'dscl -authonly' command. The rule identifies instances where suspicious interpreter processes (like bash, zsh, python, or curl) or their derivatives attempt to validate credentials via the Directory Service Command Line tool, while excluding known legitimate system and management processes.
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