Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a sequence of events within a 30-minute window for a single user, specifically capturing MFA configuration changes (reset/enrollment), authentication, and device registration, occurring outside of typical business hours (20:00 - 06:00). This behavioral pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or account takeover after gaining access to a valid account.
This rule detects potentially malicious OAuth activity in Azure AD where a user performs a device code authentication flow, followed by a refresh token request from a different, anomalous IP address or geographical location. This behavior is indicative of an attacker who has successfully phished a device code from a user and is now attempting to maintain persistent access to the account via a stolen refresh token.
Device Code Phishing Attempt
Cortex XDR
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged, non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary is trying to steal application access tokens.
This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Azure AD accounts by identifying users with 10 or more failed sign-in attempts due to invalid credentials within a 5-minute window. It summarizes the failure count and associated IP addresses for each user.
This rule detects suspicious application consent activity in Azure AD. It identifies instances where a user successfully grants consent to three or more applications within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to resources by tricking users into consenting to malicious applications.
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID application configurations, specifically updating the 'RedirectUri' or 'ReplyUrls' to point to potentially external or unauthorized domains. This technique is often used in OAuth-based application-consent phishing campaigns to redirect authorization codes to adversary-controlled servers.
Detects signs of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing where a login attempt produces a reprocess error (50199) or result code 90014, immediately followed by suspicious activity using specific Firefox user-agent versions known to be associated with Tycoon 2FA reverse proxy session token capture tools.
Detects potential path traversal attempts in web server and gateway logs, specifically targeting URL parameters like 'url' or 'path'. The rule identifies suspicious URI sequences (e.g., dot-dot-slash) followed by large HTTP responses, which may indicate successful file retrieval or sensitive data access.
This rule detects successful or failed logon attempts originating from IP addresses identified by threat intelligence as associated with botnets, command and control (C2) infrastructure, or proxies. The rule specifically looks for 'LogOn' or 'FailedLogOn' activity types where the source IP's threat intelligence indicator type is 'Botnet', 'C2', or 'Proxy', and where activity insights are available.
Detects the addition of users to specific high-value or sensitive groups in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), which could indicate potential unauthorized privilege escalation or persistence attempts by an attacker.
This rule detects suspicious activity within Microsoft Graph API where an account is querying mailbox contents for sensitive payroll and HR-related keywords. This pattern is often observed following an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session compromise, where threat actors (such as those associated with the Payroll Pirate campaign) leverage stolen session tokens to exfiltrate sensitive employee information by searching for specific financial and payroll keywords across multiple mailboxes.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in activity consistent with the Payroll Pirate campaign. This rule monitors for successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxy ASN providers (IPRoyal, Bright Data, Oxylabs) or instances where a successful sign-in occurs with a suspicious browser fingerprint (Firefox 131.0/142.0) during a Microsoft Graph OAuth2 token request, indicating session-token replay.
Detects processes attempting to connect to the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address (169.254.169.254) or referencing it in the command line. This behavior is often associated with credential theft or reconnaissance on cloud instances.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to GitHub Actions workflows, including the creation or modification of workflow configuration files, the placement of suspicious JavaScript files in the repository's .github directory, the execution of the 'Bun' runtime within an Actions runner environment, and cloud-based events indicating workflow modification containing 'Run Copilot' strings. These patterns are often associated with CI/CD pipeline compromise, malicious automation, or unauthorized code execution within build environments.
Identifies anomalous session cookie replays where a user token logs in without interactive MFA from an entirely different geographic location within minutes. This rule specifically looks for non-interactive sessions (IsInteractive == false) where a single AccountUpn (user) has IP addresses from two or more distinct geographic locations within a 30-minute window.
Detects processes attempting to connect to the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address (169.254.169.254) or referencing it in the command line. This behavior is often associated with credential theft or reconnaissance on cloud instances.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to GitHub Actions workflows, including the creation or modification of workflow configuration files, the placement of suspicious JavaScript files in the repository's .github directory, the execution of the 'Bun' runtime within an Actions runner environment, and cloud-based events indicating workflow modification containing 'Run Copilot' strings. These patterns are often associated with CI/CD pipeline compromise, malicious automation, or unauthorized code execution within build environments.
Detects users who modify their MFA settings (registration/update/delete) and subsequently perform privileged actions (such as adding role members or service principal credentials) within a short timeframe, while simultaneously observed active in communication applications like Teams, Zoom, or Webex. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary modifies authentication methods to gain persistent access, followed by privilege escalation.
Detects a successful authentication event (including MFA success) immediately followed by another successful authentication for the same user account from a different IP address or user agent, within a 10-minute window. This behavioral pattern is often indicative of session hijacking or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where an attacker reuses a session token obtained from a victim.
This rule detects multiple attempts (10 or more within an hour) from a single IP address to access administrative interfaces on a web server. It specifically looks for URI queries containing keywords like 'admin', 'wp-admin', or 'administrator' in W3CIISLog data. Such activity often indicates a brute-force attack or scanning for administrative login pages.
Detects an unusually high volume (100 or more within an hour) of API calls (POST, DELETE, PUT methods to URIs containing 'api') originating from a single IP address. This activity could indicate various malicious behaviors such as brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, web application attacks, or a denial-of-service attempt against the API endpoint.
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