Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,057 detections
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Detects a multi-stage exfiltration sequence consisting of: (1) bulk file archival/compression using common utilities, (2) suspicious OAuth grant or service principal authorization, and (3) abnormal network egress volume to common ports. This pattern suggests an adversary is preparing data, establishing or leveraging an identity/application for cloud access, and subsequently exfiltrating data.
This rule performs a point-in-time sweep for known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the NeedyMantis threat actor group. The detection logic searches for specific file, process, and image-load SHA256 hashes, communication with a known C2 domain (tripswithengine.com), and the use of a hard-coded user-agent string (Firefox/21.0) across various telemetry sources within the last 30 days.
Detects activity associated with Everest ransomware by matching known file hashes (in DeviceFileEvents/DeviceProcessEvents) and known C2/leak-site domains (in DeviceNetworkEvents).
Detects activity associated with Everest ransomware by matching known file hashes (in DeviceFileEvents/DeviceProcessEvents) and known C2/leak-site domains (in DeviceNetworkEvents).
Detects activity associated with Everest ransomware by matching known file hashes (in DeviceFileEvents/DeviceProcessEvents) and known C2/leak-site domains (in DeviceNetworkEvents).
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects a behavioral fingerprint associated with the NeedyMantis group, characterized by the creation of a DLL and a identically-named, extensionless, encrypted archive file in the same directory within a short time window. This approach identifies the underlying packaging strategy rather than relying on static file names or known paths.
Detects .ps1-named files dropped to disk that are never actually executed by a PowerShell interpreter (powershell.exe / pwsh.exe) within a short window afterward. NeedyMantis's second-stage loader (e.g. encryptbase64.ps1) is raw x64 shellcode, not a real script -- it's read and executed directly by the dropping process, so no genuine PowerShell host process ever references the file by name. Replaces an earlier version of this rule that watched DeviceImageLoadEvents for a .ps1 extension: Windows can only emit an image-load event for a file with a valid PE header loaded via the OS loader, and raw shellcode has no PE header and is never mapped that way, so that approach would not have fired on this malware. Caveat: legitimate deployment tooling that stages a script for delayed or remote execution can also produce this create/execute mismatch; tune the window and add known-good deployment-tool exclusions for your environment.
Detects potential exfiltration staging by copying files from Windows mounts (/mnt/) into the WSL Linux filesystem using wsl.exe -e cp/mv
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-55040 on Microsoft SharePoint Server. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass authentication by sending a malformed JSON Web Token (JWT) with an 'alg: none' header or an empty signature. The SharePoint server incorrectly trusts the provided token, enabling unauthorized access to sensitive API and SOAP endpoints.
Detects post-exploitation indicators of CVE-2026-62911, an authentication-bypass-by-capture-replay vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange. The rule identifies anomalous behavior following a potential bypass: either the assignment of the ApplicationImpersonation management role or a single impersonation session accessing an abnormally high number of distinct mailboxes (FolderBind, MessageBind, or SendAs).
This rule detects potential persistence via scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate network components (e.g., 'System Health Monitor'), as well as abnormal use of WebDav via rundll32.exe or net.exe in the context of the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for task creation/updates, schtasks command lines, registry artifacts related to task scheduling, and suspicious WebDav network utility usage, while excluding common security tool processes.
This rule detects activities associated with the Star Blizzard (also known as APT28 or Callisto) group's CosmicPulse malware, specifically the downloader and Python-based backdoor. It monitors for suspicious CPL file execution via UNC paths by rundll32.exe or control.exe, unauthorized modifications to the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key used for COM hijacking, and anomalous spawning of Python executables from control host processes in user-writable directories.
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources (File Events, Certificate Info, Network Events, and DNS Events) to detect known malicious indicators, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs associated with malicious activity.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
Correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within 90 minutes: LSASS memory access consistent with credential dumping, followed by remote service or WMI-based lateral movement, and finishing with mass file renames or modifications characteristic of ransomware encryption.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
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