Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) being launched by known remote access software processes like msra.exe (Microsoft Remote Assistance) or anydesk.exe. This behavior is often associated with unauthorized software installation or payload delivery via remote support tools.
Detects unpacked Sauron Loader malware samples by identifying specific embedded configuration artifacts, including a fixed magic header value (0xbaadf00d), internal marker strings, and associated test identifiers for group and build IDs.
This rule monitors package installation logs for indicators of packages potentially generated or suggested by AI tools (e.g., Copilot, code assistants) being installed in a target environment. It specifically looks for a low volume of installations (<=3) for packages that have been published within the last 14 days, which is a pattern often associated with the 'Publish Hallucinated Entities' technique in AI systems, where malicious or hallucinated code packages are introduced into the supply chain.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, wget) spawned by processes associated with public-facing appliances like Fortinet SSL-VPN, Veeam Backup & Replication, Citrix ADC, and cPanel/WHM. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation of public-facing applications (T1190) for initial access, frequently associated with ransomware actors targeting unpatched infrastructure.
This rule detects various process injection techniques (such as CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, and remote memory writes) initiated by external processes targeting high-value, commonly abused Windows system processes like svchost.exe, lsass.exe, and explorer.exe. These techniques are often used by ransomware and other malware to hide malicious code execution within trusted system memory space.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying processes spawned via WMI (e.g., wmic.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe) or PowerShell Remoting (WinRM, Invoke-Command, Enter-PSSession) that occur shortly after a successful network or remote interactive logon on the same host.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility or PowerShell cmdlets 'Clear-EventLog' and 'Remove-EventLog'. Adversaries often perform this action to remove evidence of their presence or malicious activities from a compromised system.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access sensitive Veeam Backup and Replication credentials by querying the backend SQL database or directly accessing DPAPI Master Key files. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to decrypt backup credentials stored by the Veeam service.
This rule detects the creation of new Windows services that are characteristic of lateral movement tools like PsExec. It looks for services with names typical of PsExec/PAExec, the use of administrative shares (ADMIN$) in image paths, or services with randomly generated names executing from temporary directories (e.g., Windows\Temp, Users\Public). Legitimate administrative tools such as svchost.exe or those within Program Files are excluded.
Detects the creation of files commonly associated with ransomware notes (e.g., README.txt, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt) across multiple directories, which is a strong indicator of the impact phase where files have been encrypted and the adversary is providing recovery instructions.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. This includes the execution of known credential-harvesting tools (e.g., Mimikatz, LaZagne, pypykatz), the use of system utilities like procdump and comsvcs.dll to dump process memory, and anomalous direct handle access to lsass.exe by non-system processes. This activity is associated with Storm-2570 post-compromise tradecraft.
Detects Active Directory Directory Replication Service (DRSUAPI) GetNCChanges requests originating from a principal or host that is not recognized as a Domain Controller. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized DCSync operations used to dump NTDS.dit hashes, a common technique for credential harvesting associated with ransomware actors like Qilin.
Detects scripting interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, python.exe) that perform an outbound network connection to known public Generative AI API endpoints and subsequently modify their own script file on disk. This behavior is indicative of sophisticated malware attempting to rewrite its own source code at runtime to evade signature-based detection.
Detects unauthorized data staging activities using archival utilities followed by data exfiltration to known public cloud storage providers. The rule specifically excludes hosts experiencing mass file renaming activity, focusing on extortion-only scenarios where data is stolen without encryption.
Detects high-risk domain account activity, specifically identifying either impossible-travel authentication patterns in cloud logs or rapid, multi-host interactive authentication fan-out within one hour. These detections are further correlated with subsequent RDP or WinRM session establishment, indicating potential lateral movement or compromise of legitimate accounts.
This rule detects potential process injection or process hollowing attempts by correlating Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) events indicating process memory modification permissions (such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD) with subsequent Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) events targeting the same process. This behavior is indicative of an adversary injecting malicious code into a legitimate host process (e.g., svchost.exe, explorer.exe).
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBAS) like mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, and others, when the command line includes indicators of external network retrieval (http/ftp), script execution (javascript/vbscript), or common obfuscation/decoding patterns (base64, encodedcommand). The rule excludes paths within System32 and SysWOW64 to focus on potentially suspicious locations or renamed binaries.
Detects potential credential dumping activity via DCSync, identified by a non-DC computer account performing directory replication (DRS GetNCChanges), correlated with subsequent suspicious Kerberos ticket requests (Event ID 4769) that utilize weak encryption (RC4 or legacy DES), which is often associated with Golden Ticket abuse.
Detects common Windows system binaries (svchost.exe, csrss.exe, lsass.exe, explorer.exe) executing from non-standard directories, which is a common indicator of process masquerading to evade detection.
Detects endpoint-based retrieval of potential malicious payloads or configurations from blockchain-hosted infrastructure (e.g., Infura, Alchemy, public RPC nodes) using web-based RPC calls, followed by the execution of a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, WScript, MSHTA). This pattern is characteristic of 'EtherHiding' campaigns where smart contracts are used as decentralized and takedown-resistant storage for second-stage delivery.
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