Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,750 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,544
328
307
253
149
Contributors
953
720
641
297
173
Categories
1,245
994
880
773
476
Platforms
2,850
1,449
1,229
356
73
Products / Services
10,683
9,759
6,695
4,421
3,750
MITRE Techniques
1,096
989
950
912
820
CVEs
17
6
2
1
1
IDS Classtypes
9
4
3
2
2
IDS Protocols
21
1
Detects the presence of the 'x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential' cookie in requests directed to 'login.microsoftonline.com' originating from a client that does not identify as Windows. This behavioral pattern is associated with session hijacking techniques where an attacker uses a tool (e.g., Device Code Lab) to inject a session cookie into a browser, allowing for unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services.
Detects Microsoft Graph API requests that perform bulk enumeration of email messages across multiple folders. The rule specifically identifies API queries that request sender (From) and recipient (To, CC, BCC) fields, a behavior consistent with mailbox address harvesting or reconnaissance by an Address Extractor module.
Detects high frequency administrative modifications, such as user creation/deletion, password resets, or group membership changes, performed by service accounts associated with Azure AD Connect or Microsoft Entra Connect. This behavior may indicate account compromise where a service principal is being abused to perform bulk identity management operations.
This rule detects when a user or administrator grants consent to an Azure AD or Office 365 application for permissions that provide significant access to mail, files, contacts, or directory data. This activity is a common vector for illicit OAuth consent attacks, where adversaries gain persistent access to sensitive data without requiring direct user credentials.
Detects successful assignment of highly privileged roles (Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Security Administrator, Exchange Administrator) to a user in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). This is often a sign of privilege escalation or persistence establishment by an attacker.
This rule identifies potential mass phishing campaigns by monitoring O365 email activity for high-volume outbound mail from newly registered or observed domains. It specifically flags senders that have no prior historical activity in the last 90 days, have a domain age of less than 30 days, and exhibit a low variation in email subjects across a large volume of recipients, which is characteristic of automated bulk phishing.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules via PowerShell, specifically targeting cmdlets commonly used by attackers to hide phishing indicator emails, security alerts, or C2 communications by moving or deleting them into folders like Junk, Deleted Items, or Archive. The rule monitors for both direct usage on the endpoint and remote administration patterns via Exchange Online/EWS remoting.
Detects browser-initiated DNS queries to bing.com during an active Microsoft 365 Copilot session within the same process storyline. This pattern is indicative of a potential SearchLeak HTML rendering race condition (CVE-2026-42824), where a malicious streamed <img> tag triggers an outbound request to Bing before Content Security Policy (CSP) sanitization is applied, potentially exfiltrating sensitive Copilot-retrieved mailbox data.
This rule detects potential reconnaissance activity in Microsoft 365 environments by monitoring Graph API requests. It specifically looks for large-scale user enumeration patterns or queries containing keywords associated with HR, payroll, or sensitive financial information, often indicative of an adversary attempting to identify high-value targets. The detection focuses on both standard 'List' operations and specific URI patterns used for bulk data extraction.
Detects a high volume of file uploads (greater than 50) to OneDrive or SharePoint by a single user within a 5-minute window, potentially indicating bulk exfiltration of data.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
Detects when an application or service principal is assigned an app role containing sensitive permissions in Azure AD/Microsoft Entra ID. Such assignments can grant an application elevated access to mail, directory, or user management, which is a common tactic for persistence and privilege escalation in cloud environments.
This rule detects potential phishing emails originating from the gasparinutrition.com domain. It identifies suspicious email delivery patterns involving the use of Google Workspace relay (gappssmtp.com) combined with DKIM misalignment and DMARC failures, indicating possible domain spoofing or unauthorized relay usage.
Detects the SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) attack chain targeting M365 Copilot. The rule monitors for a three-stage sequence within 1 minute: (1) A user accessing a crafted Enterprise Search URL with an injected prompt in the query string; (2) Evidence of bulk data access (MailItemsAccessed or FileAccessed, 5+ events); and (3) An outbound HTTP request to a Bing image search endpoint containing exfiltrated data encoded within a long (>500 chars) 'imgurl' parameter, indicating a potential SSRF/CSP bypass exfiltration path.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
Detects incoming emails where a single URL contains indicators of two or more distinct security vendor rewriting services. This technique is used by adversaries to create multi-layered redirect chains to bypass automated scanners and deliver malicious content, as seen in Tycoon2FA and Sneaky2FA campaigns.
This rule detects emails containing multiple obfuscated URLs from common URL shortening services (bit.ly, tinyurl, short.link) originating from external senders. It specifically looks for emails with 3 or more such URLs within a one-hour window from the same sender.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails with URLs that originate from outside the internal company domain (@company.com). It specifically looks for emails where the subject line contains keywords like 'click', 'confirm', or 'update', and where multiple such emails (3 or more) are sent from the same external sender to the same recipient.
Detects instances where a guest user or an external account (identified by the #EXT# suffix) performs an operation to add a new member to a Microsoft 365 Group. This behavior can be indicative of a guest account being compromised or misused to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access by modifying group memberships.
This rule detects when sharing inheritance settings are modified in SharePoint. This could indicate an attempt to broaden access to sensitive information, a misconfiguration, or an attacker attempting to maintain access or exfiltrate data.
This rule detects potentially malicious reconnaissance or enumeration activity by identifying a high volume of Microsoft Graph API requests (GET requests) to sensitive directory endpoints (users, groups, directoryRoles, servicePrincipals) from a single application identity (AppId) and IP address within a short time window.
Page 102 of 179