Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when a new federated identity credential is successfully added to an Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) application. This activity is a common method for attackers to establish persistent access to cloud resources by bypassing password-based authentication.
Detects Azure Bastion RDP or SSH tunnel sessions initiated by users who have no history of using Bastion in the last 60 days, or by users connecting from a geographic location not observed in their recent sign-in history. This behavior may indicate account compromise and unauthorized lateral movement attempts.
This rule detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts by identifying emails containing financial keywords sent to sensitive finance/accounting roles from domains that have not been observed in the last 180 days. It then correlates this email event with subsequent device-level network activity involving banking or financial URLs initiated by the recipient user, which may indicate follow-up reconnaissance or unauthorized access.
This rule monitors for security alerts related to Azure AI services, specifically detecting credential theft attempts and LLM jailbreak attempts that have been blocked or detected by Azure's built-in content filtering mechanisms.
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged, non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of device code phishing, where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application.
Detects successful authentication events from accounts identified as service, managed, or robot accounts (e.g., svc_, sa_, msol, robot) originating from external IP addresses or exhibiting an unusually high number of distinct source IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential credential theft, token replay attacks, or unauthorized usage of service account identities.
Detects rapid, automated enumeration of Azure AD users, groups, and directory roles via the Microsoft Graph API immediately post-compromise. This rule identifies a high volume of queries (more than 50 within a 5-minute window) originating from a single account and IP address, targeting either 'Microsoft Graph' as the application or 'SearchQueryPerformed' as the action type.
Detects non-interactive Microsoft Graph OAuth2 token requests originating from unmanaged, deviceless sessions that falsely claim MFA satisfaction. The detection focuses on specific user agents known to be associated with automated token replay attacks and looks for multiple unique token identifiers per user session, which is indicative of credential or token theft rather than standard service account or application activity.
Detects inbound emails originating from 'azure-noreply@microsoft.com' with subjects that typically indicate financial transactions (e.g., 'Invoice Paid', 'Payment Reference') or system alerts (e.g., 'MemorySpike', 'DiskFull'). This pattern could be indicative of phishing attempts leveraging a seemingly legitimate sender to trick recipients.
Detects the creation or update of an Azure Sentinel analytics rule. This can indicate administrative activity related to security monitoring configuration. Monitoring these changes is crucial for detecting potential tampering with detection capabilities or the introduction of malicious rules.
This rule detects instances where a user clicks on a URL identified as potentially malicious (phishing-related) and subsequently has a risky sign-in event in Azure AD. The rule correlates URL click events from email with Azure AD sign-in logs, specifically looking for sign-ins marked as risky or originating from suspicious user agents (e.g., specific axios versions). The phishing URLs are identified by keywords such as 'azureapplicationregistration.pages.dev', 'chrnobinson.com', 'workers.dev', '.pages.dev', '.web.core.windows.net', '/oauth2/v2.0/authorize', 'client_id=', and 'scope=openid'.
Detects the addition of users to specific high-value or sensitive groups in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), which could indicate potential unauthorized privilege escalation or persistence attempts by an attacker.
Detects non-interactive OAuth2 token refresh attempts targeting Microsoft 365 services where the authentication is satisfied by a pre-existing session without MFA challenge. The rule flags instances where the sign-in originates from an IP address with a different ASN or country than the user's previous interactive session and uses specific browser user-agents identified in known Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) campaigns like the Payroll Pirate.
This rule detects Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking against Microsoft 365, specifically targeting the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit (associated with campaigns like Payroll Pirate). It correlates two distinct malicious behaviors: the initial MFA capture phase (involving specific error codes and spoofed user agents) and subsequent illicit token replay against the Microsoft Graph API from unmanaged devices.
Detects the use of the RoadTx tool to perform a Resource Owner Password Credential (ROPC) grant against Microsoft Graph while bypassing MFA. This behavior leverages CVE-2025-0309 by abusing hidden Conditional Access exclusions for specific client IDs, resulting in an authentication token issued without an MFA claim.
This rule monitors for security alerts related to Azure AI services, specifically detecting credential theft attempts and LLM jailbreak attempts that have been blocked or detected by Azure's built-in content filtering mechanisms.
Detects a specific sign-in sequence indicative of a Payroll Pirate adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack. The pattern involves a Microsoft Outlook interactive sign-in resulting in a 50199 error (Login:reprocess) followed within 10 minutes by a Cmsi:cmsi authentication attempt, both originating from the same user and the specific user-agent Firefox 142.0. This behavior is associated with 2FA proxying techniques where the attacker captures and replays session information.
Detects ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) token requests to Microsoft Graph using specific client IDs associated with Microsoft To-Do or Intune Company Portal. This activity could indicate an attempt to bypass MFA via hidden Conditional Access policy exclusions, as described in CVE-2025-0309.
This rule detects the creation of Temporary Access Passes (TAPs) via the Microsoft Graph API targeting highly privileged accounts. This activity could indicate an attacker abusing a service principal with UserAuthMethod-TAP.ReadWrite.All permissions to gain temporary access to critical accounts like Global Administrators, Privileged Role Administrators, or Security Administrators. The rule specifically looks for POST requests to the 'temporaryAccessPassMethods' endpoint in Microsoft Graph Activity Logs and correlates this with IdentityInfo to identify if the target user holds a privileged role.
This rule detects anomalous sign-in attempts to VPN or SSO services by identifying deviations from a user's established baseline of device and location combinations. It flags sign-ins where there are at least two anomalies (new country, new ASN, new device ID, new user agent), or specific critical combinations like a new country and new device, or an unmanaged device signing in from a new country or ASN. This pattern is consistent with adversaries using stolen credentials, potentially from infostealer logs, to access enterprise resources.
This rule monitors the creation of new Azure Function Apps and identifies those that receive external, non-private network requests within 48 hours of their creation. This pattern may indicate the deployment of malicious or unauthorized serverless infrastructure for command-and-control, proxying, or automated tasks.
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