Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of processes that use file names mimicking legitimate security or system services, such as 'Credential Guard.exe' or 'Window Security Health Services.exe'. These names are often used by adversaries for masquerading to evade detection by blending in with legitimate system activity.
Detects anomalous child process execution (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe) by the Microsoft Exchange IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) or the creation of .aspx files in Exchange web directories. This behavior is highly indicative of post-exploitation activity, such as web shell deployment, frequently observed in attacks targeting vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyLogon.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
Detects the execution of PowerShell from processes associated with legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (such as ScreenConnect or LogMeIn) running under the SYSTEM account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker who has gained access to an RMM tenant and is using an interactive session to execute commands, perform reconnaissance, or deploy further malicious payloads.
Detects the AgtaBackup RAT keylogger process, which masks itself as a legitimate Windows service ('Window Security Health Services.exe'), running with SYSTEM privileges and lacking a valid digital signature.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Detects the execution of search-ms or search protocol URIs that contain a 'crumb' parameter combined with either a 'displayname' parameter or remote path indicators (such as WebDAV/UNC paths). This technique is commonly used by adversaries to redirect Windows Search to a remote, malicious location while masking the source by spoofing the displayed name or path to trick users.
Comprehensive IOC sweep across endpoint file/process/network telemetry for the full set of known SilkParasite/SpiceRAT/NodeEdgeRAT/NomadRAT/BloodAlchemy infrastructure indicators reported by Hunt.io and Security Affairs: all listed C2/decoy/certificate-hosting IPs, all listed spoofed/infrastructure domains, and known file/certificate hashes (SHA256, SHA1).
Detects network, HTTP, and DNS activity associated with the known three-tier delivery infrastructure (phishing sites, relay/dispatcher servers, and payload hosts) used by the threat actor UNC6671/SilverFox/Aurora. The rule distinguishes between high-confidence confirmed connections and low-confidence DNS-only events.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with RMMCRAT, where the Windows SmartScreen process (smartscreen.exe) spawns cmd.exe, which subsequently launches PowerShell with specific parameters for piped input/output. This behavior is characteristic of malicious code injection and command-and-control activity.
Detects the disabling of the built-in 'Administrator' account initiated by a system-level process (e.g., service or background task), which is characteristic of GPO enforcement or malicious tampering.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe. This activity is a common indicator of ransomware or other destructive attacks attempting to inhibit system recovery.
Detects execution of common Windows utilities used by adversaries post-encryption to hinder system recovery and clear forensic evidence. This includes disabling the Windows Recovery Environment (ReAgentC), wiping disk free space (Cipher), clearing DNS caches, and clearing Windows Event Logs via Wevtutil or PowerShell.
Detects the creation of new Group Policy Objects (GPOs), linking of GPOs at the domain root level, or modifications to existing GPOs that include 'Firewall' in their configuration settings. These activities are common precursors or indicators of persistence mechanisms and defensive bypass attempts by adversaries seeking to weaken security controls or maintain unauthorized access.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where a non-browser process downloads a specific payload file from a suspicious domain ('easyllms.xyz') and is subsequently linked to process activity involving the discovery of system or user information (e.g., GetComputerNameA, GetUserNameA). This pattern is characteristic of a dropper or stage-one malware attempting to profile the compromised host.
Detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the BotHelper malware. The rule correlates a process downloading files or DLL plugins from specific C2 URL paths ('/uploads/Files/' or '/uploads/Plugins/') with a subsequent report of task execution status ('task_run.php' or 'task_failed.php') originating from the same process within a 10-minute window.
Detects usage of Crowdstrike Real Time Response (RTR) to execute a "runscript" command.
This can be used by malicious actors with access to the Crowdstrike Dashboard to execute commands on remote managed hosts.
This can be used by malicious actors with access to the Crowdstrike Dashboard to execute commands on remote managed hosts.
This rule monitors for known malicious indicators, including a specific file hash, a C2 IP address, a remote URL associated with potential malicious activity (anydesk.exe), and a domain associated with C3Pool crypto-mining activity, across device processes, network events, and file operations.
This rule monitors for known malicious indicators, including a specific file hash, a C2 IP address, a remote URL associated with potential malicious activity (anydesk.exe), and a domain associated with C3Pool crypto-mining activity, across device processes, network events, and file operations.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where an adversary tricks a user into using the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) to execute msiexec.exe, downloading and installing a remote MSI package. This is frequently associated with malware delivery, such as Psychedelic Stealer, where users are prompted to copy and paste malicious commands under the guise of fake error messages or CAPTCHAs.
This rule detects instances where the WMI Provider Host process (wmiprvse.exe) initiates a child process. While WMI is a legitimate administrative tool, it is frequently abused by attackers for lateral movement, remote code execution, and persistent event subscriptions. Monitoring for child processes spawned by wmiprvse.exe can highlight potentially malicious activity triggered via WMI.
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