Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects signs of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing where a login attempt produces a reprocess error (50199) or result code 90014, immediately followed by suspicious activity using specific Firefox user-agent versions known to be associated with Tycoon 2FA reverse proxy session token capture tools.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
Detects the addition of users to specific high-value or sensitive groups in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), which could indicate potential unauthorized privilege escalation or persistence attempts by an attacker.
This rule detects suspicious activity within Microsoft Graph API where an account is querying mailbox contents for sensitive payroll and HR-related keywords. This pattern is often observed following an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session compromise, where threat actors (such as those associated with the Payroll Pirate campaign) leverage stolen session tokens to exfiltrate sensitive employee information by searching for specific financial and payroll keywords across multiple mailboxes.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in activity consistent with the Payroll Pirate campaign. This rule monitors for successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxy ASN providers (IPRoyal, Bright Data, Oxylabs) or instances where a successful sign-in occurs with a suspicious browser fingerprint (Firefox 131.0/142.0) during a Microsoft Graph OAuth2 token request, indicating session-token replay.
Detects anomalous activity where a single user or service principal downloads more than 5 Microsoft Teams meeting recordings within a 1-hour window. This behavior potentially indicates an insider threat or compromised account performing bulk harvesting of sensitive meeting content.
Detects instances where a guest user or an external account (identified by the #EXT# suffix) performs an operation to add a new member to a Microsoft 365 Group. This behavior can be indicative of a guest account being compromised or misused to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access by modifying group memberships.
Detects users who modify their MFA settings (registration/update/delete) and subsequently perform privileged actions (such as adding role members or service principal credentials) within a short timeframe, while simultaneously observed active in communication applications like Teams, Zoom, or Webex. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary modifies authentication methods to gain persistent access, followed by privilege escalation.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of SharePoint sharing invitation creations or sharing setting modifications by a single user within an hour. This could indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate data or broadly share sensitive information.
Detects automated post-compromise activity associated with Bluekit Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) attacks. The rule identifies a pattern of a successful user login followed rapidly (within 10 minutes) by a password change and new passkey enrollment, indicating an adversary is securing their persistence after initial session hijacking.
This rule detects activities associated with the NotDoor malware used by APT28 for email-based exfiltration. It specifically monitors for the creation of staging files in temporary directories, the use of Outlook.exe to establish external SMTP connections on common mail ports, and the transmission of emails to known adversary-controlled addresses.
Detects successful ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credential) token acquisitions targeting Microsoft Graph (00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000) where Conditional Access was not applied and only single-factor authentication was satisfied. This pattern indicates abuse of hidden CA policy scope exclusions introduced by CVE-2025-0309, enabling token issuance without MFA or device compliance enforcement.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate Flows that utilize non-Microsoft domains for HTTP or webhook connectors. Adversaries may abuse Power Automate to automate exfiltration or command-and-control tasks by connecting workflows to external malicious endpoints.
This rule detects successful self-service password reset (SSPR) operations performed by users from IP addresses geolocated to a country that does not match their typical sign-in activity over the past 30 days. This behavior may indicate account takeover where an adversary has compromised credentials and is resetting the password to maintain access or gain further persistence.
Detects the invitation of an external user to the Azure AD tenant. This activity often results in the creation of a guest account with the '#EXT#' suffix in the User Principal Name (UPN). Monitoring this event is critical for identifying potential unauthorized external access or social engineering attempts aimed at gaining persistence within the environment.
Detects instances where a guest user is invited to the organization using an email address from potentially malicious TLDs (e.g., .ru, .cn, .ir, .kp) or a domain structure that is represented as an IP address. These patterns are often associated with phishing, reconnaissance, or adversary attempts to gain a foothold in an environment by inviting external identities.
Detects bulk file access, download, or sync operations by a single user account within a 30-minute window in Microsoft SharePoint Online or OneDrive for Business. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration or unauthorized mass collection of sensitive information.
Detects when an administrator explicitly disables Unified Audit Log (UAL) ingestion for Exchange Online using the Set-AdminAuditLogConfig cmdlet. This action effectively stops the generation of audit records for Exchange administration and user activity, a critical defense evasion tactic used to conceal malicious operations.
This rule detects when a user grants an OAuth application consent to access high-privilege scopes in an Azure environment. It specifically flags instances where the consent is not for all principals and the user performing the action is not a Global Administrator, which may indicate an attacker-controlled application being granted access to sensitive data or resources.
This rule detects when a user grants an OAuth application consent to access high-privilege scopes in an Azure environment. It specifically flags instances where the consent is not for all principals and the user performing the action is not a Global Administrator, which may indicate an attacker-controlled application being granted access to sensitive data or resources.
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