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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections and email URLs that match known typosquatted patterns of Microsoft domains. It aims to identify potential phishing attempts or traffic directed to infrastructure used by the 'Bulletproof Redirect Engine' masquerading as legitimate Microsoft services. The logic filters out legitimate Microsoft-related URLs to minimize false positives.
Detects instances where a guest user or an external account (identified by the #EXT# suffix) performs an operation to add a new member to a Microsoft 365 Group. This behavior can be indicative of a guest account being compromised or misused to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access by modifying group memberships.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates from geographically distant locations within a short timeframe (impossible travel) followed by sensitive privileged operations within a 4-hour window.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking by monitoring for successful multi-factor authentication (MFA) events on unmanaged or non-compliant devices, followed within 30 minutes by an API request from a geographically distant location. It includes logic to flag suspicious User-Agent strings often associated with automated AiTM tools.
Detects the transmission of potential sensitive information, such as passwords, tokens, API keys, or private keys, within Microsoft Teams chat messages by matching message content against a regular expression pattern for common credential formats.
This rule detects extortion emails that claim corporate data theft and threaten public release unless a cryptocurrency payment is made. It looks for a combination of breach-related subject lines, extortion-specific language in the email body, and indicators such as specific cryptocurrency mentions, urgent deadlines, usage of anonymous email providers, or references to attached proof of compromise.
Detects phishing emails sent from personal Gmail accounts that use URL shorteners, include urgency-based legal lures in the subject line, and pass SPF/DKIM/DMARC authentication checks. The rule looks for indicators of spearphishing attempts leveraging social engineering and common evasion techniques like BCC delivery to bypass standard security filters.
Detects high-volume Microsoft Graph API and SCIM endpoint enumeration consistent with employee directory scraping, potentially by threat groups like BlackFile/Cordial Spider. This rule identifies suspicious activity based on a high count of directory queries or distinct URIs accessed within a short time frame, originating from non-Microsoft/Google/Amazon/IBM ASNs and using common scripting/API user agents.
Detects automated Microsoft Graph API requests originating from the 'axios/1.7.9' user-agent. This specific user-agent string is associated with the Payroll Pirate campaign, where threat actors (notably Storm-2755 and Storm-2657) employ scripted tools to enumerate directory information, specifically targeting HR and payroll personnel.
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Detects malicious URLs sent via Microsoft Teams direct messages that contain known phishing TLDs, indicating potential phishing attempts or the use of Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) infrastructure. The rule specifically targets one-on-one chats and filters for a broad list of suspicious top-level domains.
Device Code Phishing Attempt
Cortex XDR
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged, non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary is trying to gain access to a user's application access token.
This rule detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Office 365 that involve email forwarding or redirection to external domains. It calculates a risk score based on whether the action occurred outside of typical business hours (08:00-18:00 local time/weekends) and whether the user is performing this action from a previously unseen IP address, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to exfiltrate or redirect emails.
This rule identifies potential mass phishing campaigns by monitoring O365 email activity for high-volume outbound mail from newly registered or observed domains. It specifically flags senders that have no prior historical activity in the last 90 days, have a domain age of less than 30 days, and exhibit a low variation in email subjects across a large volume of recipients, which is characteristic of automated bulk phishing.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
Detects attempts to exfiltrate data through Microsoft Copilot Enterprise Search by identifying URL clicks containing specific keywords ('extract', 'embed', 'img') in the query parameters. This could indicate an adversary trying to extract sensitive information or embed malicious content.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
Detects anomalous activities targeting SaaS CRM applications (Salesforce, Microsoft Dynamics 365, HubSpot), including high-volume bulk exports, off-hours access, mass API queries for sensitive objects, and suspicious OAuth token grants.
This rule detects emails containing macro-enabled documents (.docm, .xlsm, .pptm). It specifically looks for instances where a sender sends two or more such emails within an hour, which could indicate a targeted phishing attempt using malicious macros.
Detects suspicious emails with attachments originating from external senders, characterized by urgent or action-oriented subject lines, and sent in bulk (5 or more emails within an hour). This pattern is indicative of phishing attempts.
Detects a suspicious spike in Microsoft Teams external meeting or chat invitations directed at a single user within a 30-minute window. This behavior is consistent with UNC6692 tactics, where attackers impersonate internal IT helpdesk staff via Teams to perform vishing and social engineering attacks.
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