Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,866 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,525
525
299
218
131
Contributors
999
706
554
263
188
Categories
1,449
1,199
1,091
792
575
Platforms
39,936
7,266
6,537
3,866
3,647
Products / Services
1,755
1,449
1,121
438
406
MITRE Techniques
1,889
1,392
913
814
727
CVEs
12
5
4
3
2
IDS Classtypes
10
7
6
6
5
IDS Protocols
37
2
1
This rule detects potentially malicious activities involving Microsoft Copilot and Microsoft Graph, specifically focusing on unauthorized mailbox access via non-interactive sessions and patterns indicative of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) during search operations. It monitors for anomalous interaction with the Graph API, specific Copilot search parameters, and suspicious image search requests.
Detects SMS pumping attacks via bulk SMS API requests
Detects creation of new Azure AD accounts which may be used for persistence
Detects bulk AWS or Azure API command execution via CLI tools
Detects brute-force tools (Hydra, NLBrute) originating from known RedVDS infrastructure IP ranges/ASNs, indicating cybercriminal VDI abuse.
Detects broad assignments of administrative roles or specific deletion permissions for cloud storage buckets in GCP, AWS, and Azure. This includes granting 'storage.admin', 'storage.objectAdmin', or 'storage.buckets.delete' in GCP, 's3:DeleteBucket' in AWS IAM policies, or 'Storage Account Contributor'/'Owner' roles in Azure. Such assignments to service accounts or non-administrative identities could enable 'Universal Bucket Hijacking' or unauthorized data deletion.
Detects an account granting offline access, mail, files, directory, or user impersonation permissions shortly after anomalous authentication. This rule is designed to identify potential persistence mechanisms established by adversaries leveraging OAuth applications, as seen in campaigns like Tycoon 2FA AITM.
Detects network connections from Node.js or Bun runtime processes to common cloud instance metadata service IPs (AWS, Azure, GCP) or to the default HashiCorp Vault port (8200). This activity can indicate credential access attempts, especially in the context of a supply chain attack where malicious code might be injected into a Node.js/Bun application to exfiltrate sensitive information or gain further access. The rule correlates network connection events with process execution events to identify the specific runtime responsible.
Detects when a user grants consent to a third-party application via the OAuth consent framework, specifically looking for grants that include highly privileged permissions such as Mail.ReadWrite, Contacts.Read, or offline_access. This can indicate a compromised user account being used to establish persistence or gain further access through a malicious application.
This rule detects attempts to register a new Authenticator app or phone number for multi-factor authentication (MFA) from an IP address that is not typically associated with the user's sign-in behavior. This could indicate a compromised account where an attacker is attempting to establish a new MFA method to maintain access.
Detects collection of service principals, app role assignments, delegated grants, and ownership data via Microsoft Graph API, which can identify privilege escalation paths. The rule specifically looks for a high volume of GET requests (35 or more within a 15-minute window) to URIs associated with enumerating service principals, app role assignments, oauth2 permission grants, and owned objects.
Detects attempts to modify or delete Microsoft Graph API conditional access policies. This could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls to facilitate unauthorized access or persistence.
Detects successful or failed logon attempts originating from IP addresses identified as associated with botnets, C2 infrastructure, or proxies by threat intelligence feeds. This indicates potential malicious activity or compromised accounts.
Detects potential Browser-in-the-Middle (AiTM) credential relay attacks where a user clicks a malicious phishing URL, followed shortly by a successful interactive sign-in from a different IP address and a previously unseen device.
Detects instances where a single authentication correlation ID is associated with multiple distinct IP addresses within a 10-minute window, followed by high-risk administrative or data-access actions within 30 minutes. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking or post-authentication account compromise, where an adversary uses stolen session tokens to perform unauthorized activities.
Detects network connection attempts to the cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint (169.254.169.254) initiated by processes that are not known cloud management agents or system utilities, which may indicate unauthorized credential or IAM role token theft.
Detects successful Device Code authentication followed immediately by a new device registration, a tactic used to extend access via PRT generation.
This rule detects when a non-administrative user grants an application high-privilege OAuth scopes (such as mail reading, file access, or directory management) within an Azure/Microsoft 365 environment. Such consent grants can be used by attackers to maintain persistence and bypass MFA by gaining delegated access to sensitive resources.
Detects high-impact configuration changes to Azure management groups or subscriptions (e.g., write/delete operations) that are performed by non-privileged accounts or outside of defined business change windows. This activity can indicate unauthorized privilege escalation, resource manipulation, or reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects a potential Conditional Access bypass, often associated with Storm-2372, where a device is registered and immediately followed by a PRT or deviceToken-authenticated sign-in to sensitive cloud applications within one hour. This behavior indicates the usage of non-TPM-attested 'phantom' devices to circumvent device-based security requirements.
Identifies logins from known malicious VPN/Proxy exit nodes geolocated in Canada, specifically attempting to bypass geographic conditional access rules. This rule joins location data with threat intelligence indicators to detect suspicious access patterns.
Page 109 of 185