Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects OAuth application consent grants where the application requests both 'offline_access' (enabling refresh tokens for long-term access) and sensitive mailbox permission scopes (such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, or IMAP.AccessAsUser.All). This combination is indicative of consent phishing attacks designed to establish persistent, silent access to user email accounts, bypassing password resets and multi-factor authentication.
Detects modifications to federated domain authentication, identity provider trusts, or federation settings in cloud environments (e.g., Entra ID, Okta). Unauthorized changes to these configurations can be used to establish persistence, enable SAML token forgery, or bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
This rule detects instances where a user successfully activates a privileged role via Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in a cloud environment, despite the activation policy requiring approval. It flags cases where the 'Add member to role completed' event indicates that approval is required, but the 'approvalStatus' is absent, suggesting an attempt to bypass the formal approval workflow.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects the addition of a federated identity credential to an Azure AD / Entra ID application. Adversaries may use this technique to establish persistent, secretless access to an application's service principal by configuring trust with an external OIDC issuer under their control (e.g., a malicious GitHub repository or personal OIDC provider).
Detects administrative actions in Azure that disable or modify diagnostic settings, which stops the flow of logs to services like Azure Sentinel/Log Analytics, or deletes policy assignments. Such actions are often performed by adversaries to blind security operations monitoring prior to lateral movement or further malicious activity.
This rule detects administrative changes that weaken cloud identity security, specifically the disabling of Entra ID Security Defaults, per-user MFA enforcement, or tenant-wide authentication-methods policies. These actions remove critical second-factor authentication requirements, significantly increasing the risk of unauthorized access via password-spraying or credential-stuffing attacks.
This rule detects instances where a user successfully activates a privileged role via Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in a cloud environment, despite the activation policy requiring approval. It flags cases where the 'Add member to role completed' event indicates that approval is required, but the 'approvalStatus' is absent, suggesting an attempt to bypass the formal approval workflow.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects the addition of a federated identity credential to an Azure AD / Entra ID application. Adversaries may use this technique to establish persistent, secretless access to an application's service principal by configuring trust with an external OIDC issuer under their control (e.g., a malicious GitHub repository or personal OIDC provider).
Detects potential abuse of Azure Cloud Shell backing storage (acsCloudShell) to stage or persist malicious scripts following an Azure AD session compromise. Adversaries may use this storage to blend in with legitimate engineering operations while maintaining persistent access to their tooling.
Detects administrative actions in Azure that disable or modify diagnostic settings, which stops the flow of logs to services like Azure Sentinel/Log Analytics, or deletes policy assignments. Such actions are often performed by adversaries to blind security operations monitoring prior to lateral movement or further malicious activity.
Detects modifications to application secrets or certificates in Azure that are performed by a user who is not the registered owner of the application, or when a new credential is added to an application that already has credentials configured, potentially indicating persistent access establishment.
Detects the modification of an Azure Storage account configuration to enable public access (allowBlobPublicAccess: true). This activity is often associated with attackers attempting to facilitate anonymous data exfiltration by enabling public access to blobs and subsequently reading them.
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