Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
539 detections
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Detects XCSSET disabling macOS SoftwareUpdate ConfigDataInstall and Rapid Security Response settings via defaults write, impairing automatic security patching, while excluding known MDM management tools.
Detects osascript executed with -e combined with a curl subprocess or parent process, matching XCSSET's fileless AppleScript execution pattern that fetches and runs code in memory without touching disk.
Detects the XCSSET fileless persistence pattern of writing/reading a Base64-encoded payload to a macOS 'defaults' preference domain and piping it directly to a shell interpreter.
Detects creation of a new com.<random-string>.plist file under ~/Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchAgents, followed by launchctl load/bootstrap referencing LaunchAgents, or an osascript-to-bash heredoc chain writing a plist into LaunchAgents, consistent with EtherHiding's macOS Launch Agent persistence mechanism.
Detects XCSSET resetting the TCC AppleEvents permission database via tccutil resetAppleEvents correlated with a subsequent fake System Settings/Xcode consent prompt, excluding known MDM tooling.
Detects XCSSET resetting the TCC AppleEvents permission database via tccutil resetAppleEvents correlated with a subsequent fake System Settings/Xcode consent prompt, excluding known MDM tooling.
Detects osascript executed with -e combined with a curl subprocess or parent process, matching XCSSET's fileless AppleScript execution pattern that fetches and runs code in memory without touching disk.
Detects the XCSSET fileless persistence pattern of writing/reading a Base64-encoded payload to a macOS 'defaults' preference domain and piping it directly to a shell interpreter.
Detects the macOS ClickFix dropper chain where curl fetches a disguised Mach-O payload (winapp.bin/ZoomSDK.bin) within a process chain that also shows an osascript decoy dialog or a self-deleting shell script, consistent with BlueNoroff's fake meeting-app installer delivery.
Detects scripted use of the macOS 'security find-generic-password' command targeting the Chrome Keychain item from a shell or unsigned temp-directory parent process, consistent with BlueNoroff's post-ClickFix Keychain master-key theft technique.
Detects suspicious execution patterns associated with the SleeperGem supply chain attack, where a compromised Gem install script (git_credential_manager-2.8.3/bin/install) spawns shell or PowerShell commands to trigger secondary malicious scripts like deploy.sh or redirects output to /dev/null.
Detects XCSSET disabling macOS SoftwareUpdate ConfigDataInstall and Rapid Security Response settings via defaults write, impairing automatic security patching, while excluding known MDM management tools.
Detects osascript process execution spawned by launchd/LaunchAgent chains where the invoked AppleScript command line contains obfuscated/encoded content, consistent with EtherHiding's Launch Agent-triggered AppleScript payloads used to query blockchain C2 infrastructure.
Detects Mach-O ARM64 payloads disguised as legitimate macOS system utilities (CamDriverUpdate.app camera driver updater, Chrome.MediaPatcher) used in the BlueNoroff ClickFix campaign
This rule detects various common methods of achieving persistence on Linux and macOS systems. It monitors file system changes to systemd unit files and macOS LaunchAgent plist files, as well as the execution of commands related to managing systemd services and user crontab entries.
Detects the use of the 'dscl' utility on macOS with the '-authonly' flag. This command is often used by adversaries or for unauthorized scripts to verify credentials against the local directory service without requiring a full login session, which is a common indicator of credential testing or brute-force attempts.
Detects the creation or modification of a file at a specific Launch Agent path commonly used for macOS persistence. Attackers often place property list (.plist) files in /Library/LaunchAgents/ to achieve persistence across system reboots or user logons.
MAL AMOS yara x
YARA
This YARA rule detects the Amos Stealer malware on macOS by matching a specific Mach-O dylib hash and entitlement hash, which are consistent markers for samples of this information stealer.
Detects macOS Mach-O binaries containing AES-GCM cipher references combined with /tmp staging paths, consistent with CrashStealer encrypting stolen data locally with AES-GCM before staging it in /tmp for exfiltration
This rule detects processes command lines containing keywords associated with anti-debugging techniques, such as 'PT_DENY_ATTACH' (a common macOS ptrace flag used to prevent debugger attachment) or generic 'ptrace' and 'sysctl' system calls often leveraged by malware for process introspection or debugger evasion.
Detects execution of security utility commands on macOS intended to unlock a login keychain by providing a password via command line arguments. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to programmatically access stored credentials, which may be a precursor to credential theft.
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