Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
507 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
174
86
74
69
35
Contributors
147
94
79
60
32
Categories
377
347
319
94
91
Platforms
492
8
7
3
2
Products / Services
10,665
9,773
6,704
4,421
3,749
507
MITRE Techniques
333
272
136
127
104
CVEs
3
3
1
1
IDS Classtypes
8
3
2
1
IDS Protocols
9
5
Detects suspicious activity associated with the AdaptixC2 framework, specifically process hollowing or shellcode injection where WmiPrvSE.exe spawns or creates remote threads in WAB.exe (Windows Address Book). This pattern has been observed in Akira ransomware intrusions.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe with command-line arguments related to hardware enumeration (e.g., system, BIOS, memory, video controller information) which are commonly used by malware for sandbox evasion and VM fingerprinting. The rule specifically alerts when these commands are spawned by processes running from suspicious temporary directories or staging paths often associated with malware droppers.
Detects malicious activity associated with the Yuta/Glove Stealer malware family. The rule identifies attempts to register persistent WMI event subscriptions (using wmic, powershell, or pwsh) to trigger execution or the registration of low-level keyboard hooks (WH_KEYBOARD_LL) for keylogging, originating from suspicious process paths like winupdate.exe or PyInstaller-compiled temporary directories.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe with arguments typical for remote process creation, such as using the /node switch to execute commands on remote systems. This behavior is commonly associated with lateral movement or remote administration.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell Cmdlets, or WMI providers. These actions are common techniques for attackers to impair system defenses and remove evidence of their activities from a compromised host.
Detects the execution of common Windows system utilities (tasklist.exe, sc.exe, reg.exe, wmic.exe, powershell.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of security software, antivirus product, or system service enumeration. This activity is frequently associated with reconnaissance efforts by threat actors attempting to identify defensive capabilities.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware activity aimed at preventing system recovery.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe with specific WMI queries (Win32_ComputerSystem, Win32_PhysicalMedia, Win32_PnPEntity) commonly used for system profiling and hardware discovery by threat actors like TA4922. The rule assigns a higher risk score when the process is launched from potentially suspicious locations such as user-writable or temporary directories.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscriptions (filters, consumers, and bindings) that target potentially malicious destinations like cmd.exe, PowerShell, or files located in common user-writable directories like Temp or AppData, or multiple concurrent WMI subscription activities which may indicate persistence mechanisms.
Detects anomalous DCOM RPC bind requests on port 135 targeting WMI-related interfaces, which is a common indicator of lateral movement using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) over DCOM.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity leveraging the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol over HTTP (ports 5985/5986). It specifically monitors for POST requests to the '/wsman' URI that contain the string 'powershell' in the request body, which is indicative of remote command execution via WinRM using PowerShell.
This rule detects attempts to impair defensive mechanisms by creating or modifying Quality of Service (QoS) policies that specifically target Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) processes. Adversaries may use QoS policies to throttle network traffic for security products, hindering their ability to communicate with central management or cloud services, thus impairing their effectiveness. The rule looks for command-line arguments used to create or set QoS policies (`New-NetQosPolicy`, `Set-NetQosPolicy`) that include throttling parameters (`ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond`, `AppPathNameMatchCondition`) and target common EDR/AV process names. It also detects direct registry modifications to QoS policies (`\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QOS`) that include EDR/AV process names.
Detects the AdaptixC2 agent (AdgNsy.exe) performing process injection into the Windows Address Book (WAB.EXE). The rule specifically monitors for the creation of AdgNsy.exe, its execution under the WMI Provider Host (WmiPrvSE.exe), and subsequent cross-process access to WAB.EXE, which is a known behavior of the AdaptixC2 framework utilized during Akira ransomware intrusions.
Detects the execution of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit) used to inhibit system recovery or modify boot configuration, such as deleting shadow copies or disabling recovery features. The rule further flags these actions when executed by suspicious parent processes, processes outside of standard system paths, or via WMI/DCOM interfaces frequently associated with ransomware and lateral movement.
Detects the execution of batch scripts or direct command-line operations (taskkill, sc, net, powershell, wmic) specifically targeting the termination, deletion, or disabling of common endpoint security software such as Microsoft Defender, Sysmon, Filebeat, and other agent-based security tools.
Detects a sequence of actions where a process first enumerates security software (e.g., via WMIC, Registry, or PowerShell) followed by an attempt to stop or terminate security-related services or processes within a short timeframe (5 minutes). This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to identify and disable endpoint protection before executing further malicious activity.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (WmiPrvSE.exe) or command-line tool (wmic.exe) initiates potentially suspicious child processes, often indicative of lateral movement or remote command execution via WMI.
Detects evidence of malware, specifically TA4922 (Atlas RAT, RomulusLoader), attempting to evade sandbox or virtualization environments. The detection monitors process command lines for WMI queries or registry artifact paths related to known hypervisor technologies such as VMware, VirtualBox, and QEMU. It requires multiple occurrences within a 5-minute window to reduce potential noise.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscriptions (filters, consumers, and bindings) that target potentially malicious destinations like cmd.exe, PowerShell, or files located in common user-writable directories like Temp or AppData, or multiple concurrent WMI subscription activities which may indicate persistence mechanisms.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (WmiPrvSE.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) with command-line arguments involving standard output redirection (2>&1), often used to capture error and output streams in remote command execution scenarios. This pattern is commonly observed during lateral movement or remote administration activity.
Detects the use of administrative tools like wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe to invoke WMI event subscription components such as ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, or FilterToConsumerBinding. This behavior is a common technique for establishing persistence or elevating privileges by executing malicious code when specific system events occur.
Page 11 of 25