Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects suspicious attempts to find credentials stored in password stores, indicating a potential attacker's effort to access sensitive login information. Password stores are critical repositories that contain valuable credentials, and unauthorized access to them can lead to significant security breaches. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized activities related to password store access, this analytic helps identify potential credential theft attempts, allowing security teams to respond promptly and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
This rule detects suspicious access to files with sensitive extensions commonly associated with email archives, database files, memory dumps, and remote desktop connection files. Monitoring access to these file types can indicate attempts at data collection, credential dumping, or lateral movement preparation by adversaries.
The following analytic identifies the execution of RAR utilities to archive files on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as threat actors, including red-teamers and malware like DarkGate, use RAR archiving to compress and exfiltrate collected data from compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information to command and control servers, posing a severe risk to data confidentiality and integrity.
Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE
Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe
Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate a persistence techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE.
Detects known sensitive file extensions via Zeek
This rule identifies DNS lookups associated with common Tor proxies and services. It detects queries for domains ending in '.onion' and various Tor gateway domains (e.g., '.hiddenservice.net', '.tor2web.com', '.tor-gateways.de'). This activity can indicate the use of the Tor network for anonymization, which adversaries may leverage for command and control, data exfiltration, or to obscure their malicious activities.
This analytic detects instances where an internal host attempts to communicate with over 500 ports on a single destination IP address. It includes filtering criteria to exclude applications performing scans over ephemeral port ranges, focusing on potential reconnaissance or scanning activities. Monitoring network traffic logs allows for timely detection and response to such behavior, enhancing network security by identifying and mitigating potential threats promptly.
This analytic detects intrusion events from known threat activity using Cisco Secure Firewall Intrusion Events. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense IntrusionEvent logs to identify cases where one or multiple Snort signatures associated with a known threat or threat actor activity have been triggered within a one-hour time window. The detection uses a lookup table (cisco_snort_ids_to_threat_mapping) to map Snort signature IDs to known threat actors and their techniques. When multiple signatures associated with the same threat actor are triggered within the time window, and the count of unique signatures matches or exceeds the expected number of signatures for that threat technique, an alert is generated. This helps identify potential coordinated threat activity in your network environment by correlating related intrusion events that occur in close temporal proximity. Currently, this detection will alert on the following threat actors or malware families as defined in the cisco_snort_ids_to_threat_mapping lookup: ArcaneDoor, Static Tundra, AgentTesla, Amadey, AsyncRAT, Chafer, DCRAT, Lumma Stealer, Nobelium, Quasar, Remcos, Snake, Xworm. To add or update threat actors, update the cisco_snort_ids_to_threat_mapping.csv lookup file with new or modified threat names and associated Snort signature IDs.
This analytic detects the configuration of TFTP services on Cisco IOS devices that could be used to exfiltrate sensitive configuration files. Threat actors like Static Tundra have been observed configuring TFTP servers to make device configuration files accessible for exfiltration after gaining initial access. The detection specifically looks for commands that expose critical configuration files such as startup-config, running-config, and other sensitive system information through TFTP. This activity is particularly concerning as it may represent an attempt to steal credentials, network topology information, and other sensitive data stored in device configurations.
This analytic detects network traffic to TCP port 4786, which is used by the Cisco Smart Install protocol. Smart Install is a plug-and-play configuration and image-management feature that helps customers to deploy Cisco switches. This protocol has been exploited via CVE-2018-0171, a vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause denial of service conditions. Recently, Cisco Talos reported that a Russian state-sponsored threat actor called "Static Tundra" has been actively exploiting this vulnerability to compromise unpatched and end-of-life network devices. Monitoring for traffic to this port can help identify potential exploitation attempts or unauthorized Smart Install activity.
Detects DNS queries to landing pages associated with the PDF Editor.exe & OneStart.
Detects network traffic to a list of known domains that are related to TamperedChef - PDF Editor.exe - C2 traffic.
Detects ERMAC V3.0 C2/panel/builder traffic using backend API routes, auth artifacts, exfil paths, injects directory indicators, and unique strings from the source leak. Emphasizes multi-indicator matches in the same event for high confidence.
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2025-32433, a remote code execution vulnerability in the Erlang/OTP SSH daemon. The exploit involves sending SSH connection protocol messages (codes >= 80) before authentication is complete.
The analytic detects when a Windows RDP client attempts to execute an RDP file from a temporary directory, downloads directory, or Outlook directories. This detection is significant as it can indicate an attempt for an adversary to deliver a .rdp file, which may be leveraged by attackers to control or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects unusual Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic on TCP/3389 by filtering out known RDP sources and destinations, focusing on atypical connections within the network. This detection leverages network traffic data to identify potentially unauthorized RDP access. Monitoring this activity is crucial for a SOC as unauthorized RDP access can indicate an attacker's attempt to control networked systems, leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further network compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data breaches or complete system and network control loss.
Detects DNS queries to a command and control (C2) domain used by the AK47C2 backdoor, which is part of the Project AK47 toolset associated with the CL-CRI-1040 (Storm-2603) threat actor.
The analytic identifies potential Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) brute force attacks by monitoring network traffic for RDP application activity. It detects potential RDP brute force attacks by identifying source IPs that have made more than 10 connection attempts to the same RDP port on a host within a one-hour window. The results are presented in a table that includes the source and destination IPs, destination port, number of attempts, and the times of the first and last connection attempts, helping to prioritize IPs based on the intensity of activity.
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