Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections to Discord's API webhooks endpoint, specifically looking for POST requests. This activity can indicate data exfiltration, command and control communications, or other malicious use of Discord webhooks by adversaries.
Detects Node.js executing the malicious setup.cjs script with the --no-warnings flag. This execution sequence is associated with the easy-day-js typosquat postinstall hook used in the Mastra npm supply chain compromise.
Detects processes attempting to read or open sensitive SSH files (keys and configuration) that are not recognized as legitimate SSH-related utilities (e.g., ssh, sshd, rsync, git). This behavior is often indicative of credential harvesting or unauthorized reconnaissance of authentication artifacts.
Detects Python or Node.js processes reading sensitive SSH private key files (id_rsa, id_ed25519) followed by an outbound network connection within a one-minute window. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and exfiltration, such as that observed in the InvisibleFerret campaign.
Detects instances where development IDEs (VS Code or Cursor) spawn suspicious child processes such as command shells (cmd, powershell, bash) or network utilities (curl, wget). The detection logic focuses on common command line patterns associated with IDE tasks or potential malicious activity.
Detects Python scripts, launched by code.exe or node.exe (common IDE-related processes), accessing SSH private key files (id_rsa, id_ed25519, id_ecdsa) followed by an outbound network connection within 60 seconds. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and potential exfiltration or lateral movement.
Detects instances where scripting processes (Python, Node.js) accessed SSH key files or configuration files and subsequently initiated an outbound network connection within 60 seconds, which may indicate potential exfiltration of credentials or unauthorized access.
Detects suspicious executions of Python interpreters or Pip package managers originating from common development tools (like VS Code or Node.js) or utilizing temporary file paths. The rule also monitors for suspicious command-line arguments that indicate obfuscation, encoded payloads, or the use of dynamic evaluation functions.
Detects the creation or modification of suspicious Launch Agent or Launch Daemon .plist files, or a hidden application support directory, masquerading as 'com.apple.accountsd' on macOS. This behavior is often indicative of persistence mechanisms used by adversaries.
Detects modification of shell profile files for command execution on login
Detects indicators of the Meow RAT malware staging collected data in the /tmp/shub_ directory, compressing it into shub_log.zip using 'ditto', and subsequently exfiltrating it to a hardcoded command and control (C2) domain 'qwqerrqwr2145qw[.]com/gate'. The rule correlates process events, network events, and file events to identify the full attack chain.
Detects network connections from Node.js or Bun runtime processes to common cloud instance metadata service IPs (AWS, Azure, GCP) or to the default HashiCorp Vault port (8200). This activity can indicate credential access attempts, especially in the context of a supply chain attack where malicious code might be injected into a Node.js/Bun application to exfiltrate sensitive information or gain further access. The rule correlates network connection events with process execution events to identify the specific runtime responsible.
Detects the obfuscated 'setup.cjs' dropper associated with the easy-day-js npm supply chain attack. The rule identifies unique obfuscated variable names, XOR-encoded marker bytes, and specific campaign-related strings, including postinstall commands, package names, second-stage payload filenames, self-deletion patterns, and TLS bypass indicators.
Detects when common developer environments (IDE processes like VS Code or Node.js-based tools) or AI coding assistant tools (e.g., Amazon Q) spawn suspicious child processes (like shells or network tools) that interact with sensitive cloud configuration files, environment variables, or initiate unauthorized network requests.
Detects outbound network connections to specific cloud storage providers (Wasabi, Tebi, I3Storage) which are commonly leveraged by adversaries for data exfiltration.
Detects network traffic to Cloudflare-hosted services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev) potentially indicative of C2 communication, especially when initiated by common scripting or proxy processes like powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, or cloudflared.exe.
This rule detects outbound network connections to common tunneling and proxy services (Cloudflare Tunnel, Cloudflare Workers, and Microsoft Dev Tunnels). These services are frequently abused by threat actors, such as the Gamaredon Group (ACTINIUM), to establish command-and-control (C2) channels and tunnel traffic to evade network-based detection systems.
This rule monitors network traffic for DNS queries directed at domains associated with known malicious browser extensions, specifically targeting Adblock for YouTube and Adblock for Chrome malicious variants. It correlates these connections with process command line evidence that matches the extension IDs of these malicious components.
This rule detects network connections and DNS requests to specific domains associated with Unistream SDK and other known BadBlocker malware infrastructure, often linked to malicious browser extensions such as Adblock for YouTube and related variants.
Detects unauthorized access to sensitive credential and configuration files associated with AI development tools (Cursor, Claude, Gemini) and cloud providers (AWS, GCP) by the Miasma worm, which seeks to steal environment configuration and authentication data.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line tools like curl, wget, or PowerShell to query OAuth/token-related endpoints (e.g., /token, oauth, access_token). The rule filters out expected parent processes (e.g., shells, IDEs, common build tools) to identify potentially malicious attempts to steal application access tokens.
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