Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects bulk reconnaissance against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, etc.) by scripting clients, correlated with a recent device registration event by the same user principal. This behavior is indicative of a Storm-2372 conditional access bypass strategy followed by rapid directory environment enumeration.
Detects anomalous Azure AD device registration events where device metadata is inconsistent, suggesting impersonation. The rule flags Linux hosts masquerading as Windows, non-Windows devices claiming AzureAD trust type, or the use of zeroed OS versions (0.0.0.0). High-frequency registrations (3+ devices per user in 30 minutes) correlate with known AADInternals-based attacks used by threat actor Storm-2372 to bypass Conditional Access policies.
Detects the use of Azure VM Run Command to execute PowerShell scripts that attempt to retrieve workload identity tokens from the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint. This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to steal credentials or escalate privileges within the Azure environment.
Detects cross-tenant service principal authentications that leverage blueprint-derived identities. This rule specifically looks for client_credentials grant types using client_assertion (JWT bearer) or client_secret targeting sensitive scopes like 'api://AzureADTokenExchange/.default' or 'AgentIdentity.CreateAsManager' from a foreign tenant service principal. This activity could indicate an attempt to establish persistence or gain unauthorized access across Azure AD tenants.
This rule detects when an application role assignment or delegated permission grant is successfully added to a service principal in Azure Active Directory, specifically looking for highly privileged permissions such as 'RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory', 'UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All', 'UserAuthMethod-TAP.ReadWrite.All', or 'User.Read.All'. This could indicate an adversary attempting to gain elevated access or persistence within the Azure AD environment.
This rule detects the creation of Azure DNS zones by callers who have no prior history of writing to DNS zones within a specified lookback period. This behavior can indicate an attempt at DNS zone takeover, as observed in campaigns like 'Borrowed Trust' or 'link99', where adversaries might create orphaned DNS zones to redirect traffic or host malicious content.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access to Azure Storage Blobs following the retrieval of storage account access keys. It correlates 'ListKeys' API events with subsequent blob access activities from either unrecognized IP addresses or via Shared Access Signature (SAS) tokens, indicating potential credential misuse.
Detects successful retrieval of storage account access keys by a user identity rather than an established deployment or backup service.
This rule detects potential XML External Entity (XXE) injection attempts by looking for specific XML-related keywords ('<?xml' or 'DOCTYPE') within the URI query string of IIS web server logs. It triggers an alert if three or more such attempts are observed from the same IP address within a one-hour window, indicating a possible automated scanning or attack.
This rule detects a high volume of web requests (20 or more within 5 minutes from a single IP address) containing keywords commonly associated with denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, performance testing, or reconnaissance activities against web applications. Keywords include 'sleep', 'benchmark', and 'loadtest' in the URI query string.
This rule detects potential open redirect attempts by monitoring W3C IIS logs for URI queries containing keywords like 'callback', 'redirect', or 'url='. It then aggregates these attempts by client IP address and time, triggering an alert if five or more such attempts are observed within an hour from a single IP. This pattern can indicate an attacker attempting to exploit an open redirect vulnerability to phish users or bypass security controls.
This rule detects a spike in successful Azure Load Balancer operations from a single caller within an hour. A count of 3 or more successful operations from the same caller within a one-hour window will trigger this alert. This could indicate automated activity or unusual configuration changes related to load balancers.
Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods where the 'hostPID' or 'hostNetwork' settings are enabled. These configurations allow a pod to share the host's process namespace or network stack, respectively, which are common vectors for container escapes and host-level privilege escalation.
Detects a successful self-service password reset for a privileged or high-value account when the initiating context does not match an approved helpdesk workflow. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain access to an account by resetting its password without proper authorization.
Detects registration of new MFA devices potentially for authentication bypass
This rule detects successful sign-ins using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code Flow. This flow is often abused in phishing attacks (device code phishing) where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application. A successful sign-in using this method could indicate a compromised account or a successful phishing attempt.
Detects successful Device Code authentication followed immediately by a new device registration, a tactic used to extend access via PRT generation. This behavior is indicative of an attacker using a stolen device code to register a new device, thereby gaining persistent access to the user's account.
Detects anomalous logins (impossible travel/session anomalies) utilizing the Kali365 Live desktop application User-Agent combined with IP shifting. This rule identifies instances where a user logs in with the 'kali365-live/1.0.0' User-Agent from an IP address different from a previous successful login by the same user within a 4-hour window, where the previous login used a different User-Agent.
Detects sign-ins utilizing the Kali365 Live desktop application User-Agent, which is associated with the EvilTokens threat actor tooling. This rule specifically looks for the User-Agent string "kali365-live/1.0.0" in sign-in logs.
Identifies an Azure Active Directory (AAD) sign-in using a session token from an anomalous location accessing Workday/ADP SSO endpoints. This rule specifically looks for non-interactive sign-ins to Workday or ADP applications where the user's sign-in locations change rapidly (multiple distinct locations within a 10-minute window), which could indicate a session cookie hijack.
Correlates a successful login from RedVDS infrastructure followed immediately by massive internal directory reconnaissance (e.g., SharpHound execution). This rule detects when an account logs in from a RedVDS IP address and then within an hour executes a process associated with BloodHound or SharpHound for Active Directory reconnaissance.
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