Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects command-line execution of tools (route, netsh, sysctl) intended to modify host routing tables or enable IP forwarding. Such activity on workstation endpoints may indicate an attempt to bridge network segments, bypass network security boundaries, or facilitate lateral movement/C2 communications.
This rule detects attempts to modify file or directory permissions (e.g., using icacls, takeown, chmod, or chown) on paths associated with known security products. Such activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to tamper with, disable, or exclude security tools from logging or inspection.
This rule monitors network traffic from internal devices and security logs for communication with a curated list of known malicious or suspicious scanner IP addresses, indicating potential reconnaissance or probing activity by external actors.
This rule monitors network traffic from internal devices and security logs for communication with a curated list of known malicious or suspicious scanner IP addresses, indicating potential reconnaissance or probing activity by external actors.
Detects cached malicious dlp.sh/dlp-docker.sh Terraform module artifacts served from the compromised registry.coder.com infrastructure
Detects the PoisonedRefresh implant's UNIX domain socket backdoor by (1) file activity on the uniquely-named /run/bigtlog.pipe socket initiated by an Apache/httpd process, and (2) process command lines containing the implant's hardcoded authentication token. Removed the earlier generic 'bash spawned by httpd' heuristic, which fired on legitimate CGI/mod_php/admin automation that shells out from the web server and was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects JFrog Artifactory access-token issuance events on/after the suspected compromise window (2026-08-28) where the token is tied to the anonymous identity, granted administrator scope, or has no attributable initiating user, per Fastly's remediation guidance.
Detects JFrog Artifactory access-token issuance events on/after the suspected compromise window (2026-08-28) where the token is tied to the anonymous identity, granted administrator scope, or has no attributable initiating user, per Fastly's remediation guidance.
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
This rule detects the creation of a .groovy file within a plugin directory related to JFrog Artifactory, followed by the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., shell, curl, wget) by the Artifactory process within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to achieve remote code execution by deploying a malicious plugin.
Detects network communication with Google Sheets API endpoints that contain specific indicators of C2 behavior, such as suspicious User-Agents, specific spreadsheet cell references, or input options characteristic of automated data exfiltration or command retrieval.
Detects rapid ICMP (ping) traffic directed towards specific internal and external hosts, characteristic of the RedTail Linux malware attempting to perform network discovery or validate connectivity to command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects RedTail malware samples: UPX-packed, statically linked ELF executables across multiple architectures (x86_64, ARM, ARM64, i686, RISC-V). Requires UPX packing signature to co-occur with RedTail-specific filename strings to reduce false positives on generic UPX-packed binaries.
Detects RedTail malware samples: UPX-packed, statically linked ELF executables across multiple architectures (x86_64, ARM, ARM64, i686, RISC-V). Requires UPX packing signature to co-occur with RedTail-specific filename strings to reduce false positives on generic UPX-packed binaries.
Detects rapid, repeated execution of process control utilities (kill, strace, inotifywait, timeout) directed at monitored processes, often used by malware (such as 'redtail') to disable security monitoring, debugging, or auditing tools on Linux systems.
Detects rapid, repeated execution of process control utilities (kill, strace, inotifywait, timeout) directed at monitored processes, often used by malware (such as 'redtail') to disable security monitoring, debugging, or auditing tools on Linux systems.
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