Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors email attachment events for PDF files containing specific, repetitive text patterns often associated with phishing templates or document-based social engineering. It detects attachments that include phrases like 'lorem ipsum' variations or specific professional-sounding but potentially suspicious terms like 'Investor Accounts Producer' or 'Settlement Agreement' which may indicate an attempt to entice a user into reviewing fraudulent documentation.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities involving Microsoft Copilot and Microsoft Graph, specifically focusing on unauthorized mailbox access via non-interactive sessions and patterns indicative of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) during search operations. It monitors for anomalous interaction with the Graph API, specific Copilot search parameters, and suspicious image search requests.
This rule detects potential email spoofing attempts where an email claims to originate from a specific domain ('gasparinutrition.com') or is intended for external recipients, but fails critical authentication checks. Specifically, it identifies emails with DMARC failure, SPF failure, and a suspicious DKIM signing domain associated with 'gappssmtp.com', indicating an attempt to bypass sender authentication mechanisms.
Detects suspicious app installations, custom app creation, and bot additions within Microsoft Teams. This rule identifies activities such as sideloaded app installations, which can bypass standard vetting processes and serve as a persistence mechanism for attackers. It also flags custom app creation outside of typical development teams, which could indicate the deployment of command and control (C2) bots or data exfiltration applications. Additionally, the rule looks for the addition of bots to teams and suspicious keywords in app names that might suggest impersonation or malicious tooling.
Detects rapid high-volume file and messaging operations across multiple Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams, Exchange) within a compressed 10-minute window from a single identity and IP address. This behavior can indicate data exfiltration or reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects creation of new Azure AD accounts which may be used for persistence
Detects when a user grants consent to a third-party application via the OAuth consent framework, specifically looking for grants that include highly privileged permissions such as Mail.ReadWrite, Contacts.Read, or offline_access. This can indicate a compromised user account being used to establish persistence or gain further access through a malicious application.
Detects rapid high-volume file and messaging operations across multiple Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams, Exchange) within a compressed 10-minute window. This behavior can indicate data exfiltration or collection by an adversary.
Identifies the creation of an Exchange transport rule or mailbox setting that forwards all incoming emails to an external, attacker-controlled address.
This rule detects attempts to register a new Authenticator app or phone number for multi-factor authentication (MFA) from an IP address that is not typically associated with the user's sign-in behavior. This could indicate a compromised account where an attacker is attempting to establish a new MFA method to maintain access.
Detects collection of service principals, app role assignments, delegated grants, and ownership data via Microsoft Graph API, which can identify privilege escalation paths. The rule specifically looks for a high volume of GET requests (35 or more within a 15-minute window) to URIs associated with enumerating service principals, app role assignments, oauth2 permission grants, and owned objects.
Detects attempts to modify or delete Microsoft Graph API conditional access policies. This could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls to facilitate unauthorized access or persistence.
Detects MFA authentication success from one IP address followed immediately by a session access attempt from a different IP address. This pattern is characteristic of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks, such as those using EvilProxy, Evilginx2, or similar phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platforms, where an adversary proxies the authentication flow to capture session tokens.
Detects potential Browser-in-the-Middle (AiTM) credential relay attacks where a user clicks a malicious phishing URL, followed shortly by a successful interactive sign-in from a different IP address and a previously unseen device.
Detects instances where a single authentication correlation ID is associated with multiple distinct IP addresses within a 10-minute window, followed by high-risk administrative or data-access actions within 30 minutes. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking or post-authentication account compromise, where an adversary uses stolen session tokens to perform unauthorized activities.
Detects successful Device Code authentication followed immediately by a new device registration, a tactic used to extend access via PRT generation.
This rule detects when a non-administrative user grants an application high-privilege OAuth scopes (such as mail reading, file access, or directory management) within an Azure/Microsoft 365 environment. Such consent grants can be used by attackers to maintain persistence and bypass MFA by gaining delegated access to sensitive resources.
This rule detects a potential data collection or exfiltration attempt in Microsoft Teams by identifying accounts that have accessed an abnormally high number of messages (more than 100 within a 5-minute window). This behavior may indicate an automated process or a compromised user account attempting to scrape internal communications.
Detects the threat actor creating inbox rules to delete or archive emails containing keywords like "deposit", "payroll", "HR", "Workday", or "ADP" to hide their tampering, often associated with the Storm-2755 campaign.
Detects anomalous automated enumeration of Microsoft Graph API user objects followed by keyword-based searches for sensitive HR, finance, and payroll-related information. This pattern is characteristic of post-compromise reconnaissance activities where an attacker leverages an existing session token to identify targets for further data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous, non-interactive Microsoft Graph sign-in activity consistent with the Payroll Pirate session hijacking campaign. The rule flags instances where the same user account authenticates via Microsoft Graph using the 'Firefox/131.0' user agent from multiple distinct source IP addresses within a 6-hour window, indicating potential stolen session token replay from distributed proxy infrastructure.
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