Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,276 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,348
1,086
505
478
472
Contributors
1,824
1,622
874
505
300
Categories
3,034
2,545
1,076
1,051
932
Platforms
39,970
7,276
6,539
3,868
3,652
Products / Services
1,331
1,114
992
658
494
MITRE Techniques
2,273
1,337
1,319
905
886
CVEs
66
65
33
32
28
IDS Classtypes
81
80
56
27
10
IDS Protocols
149
98
6
5
4
Matches known RedTail malware payloads and staging scripts by exact SHA-256 hash equality
Matches known RedTail malware payloads and staging scripts by exact SHA-256 hash equality
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single host within a 1-hour window, indicative of an adversary establishing a foothold and preparing for malicious activity. The pattern involves: 1) System architecture discovery, 2) Downloading files from an external IP address, 3) Changing permissions of files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), and 4) Executing files directly from those same temporary directories.
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single host within a 1-hour window, indicative of an adversary establishing a foothold and preparing for malicious activity. The pattern involves: 1) System architecture discovery, 2) Downloading files from an external IP address, 3) Changing permissions of files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), and 4) Executing files directly from those same temporary directories.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events on a Linux host: first, the 'iptables' firewall rules are flushed (-F), followed by the creation of an inbound TCP listener on a high port (>1024) and the activation of that port via iptables, finally correlating this with a network listener process residing in temporary or suspicious directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm. This behavior is indicative of a potential backdoor installation or temporary listener setup for unauthorized access.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events on a Linux host: first, the 'iptables' firewall rules are flushed (-F), followed by the creation of an inbound TCP listener on a high port (>1024) and the activation of that port via iptables, finally correlating this with a network listener process residing in temporary or suspicious directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm. This behavior is indicative of a potential backdoor installation or temporary listener setup for unauthorized access.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
Detects specific suspicious processes (identified by hash or path) initiating a listening network connection on non-standard ports typically associated with honeypot captures, specifically referencing Cowrie-related paths or known malicious samples.
Detects rapid enumeration of sensitive system information files (CPU info, command line, device ID, node data) by processes executing from transient or commonly abused directories like /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm, as well as processes identified with specific malware naming patterns. This behavior often indicates an initial discovery phase by a threat actor or automated malicious agent.
Detects rapid enumeration of sensitive system information files (CPU info, command line, device ID, node data) by processes executing from transient or commonly abused directories like /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm, as well as processes identified with specific malware naming patterns. This behavior often indicates an initial discovery phase by a threat actor or automated malicious agent.
Detects rapid enumeration of sensitive system information files (CPU info, command line, device ID, node data) by processes executing from transient or commonly abused directories like /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm, as well as processes identified with specific malware naming patterns. This behavior often indicates an initial discovery phase by a threat actor or automated malicious agent.
Detects anomalous SSH sessions originating from potentially suspicious IP addresses that utilize an 'SSH-2.0-Go' banner and immediately perform file creation operations associated with the RedTail botnet (e.g., shell scripts or architecture-specific binaries).
Detects anomalous SSH sessions originating from potentially suspicious IP addresses that utilize an 'SSH-2.0-Go' banner and immediately perform file creation operations associated with the RedTail botnet (e.g., shell scripts or architecture-specific binaries).
Detects network connections to command-and-control infrastructure associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer malicious browser extension. The rule triggers on connections to known malicious domains or IPs, as well as specific API endpoints on ambiguous domains that are used for exfiltrating Twitch OAuth tokens.
Detects network connections to command-and-control infrastructure associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer malicious browser extension. The rule triggers on connections to known malicious domains or IPs, as well as specific API endpoints on ambiguous domains that are used for exfiltrating Twitch OAuth tokens.
Detects network connections to command-and-control infrastructure associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer malicious browser extension. The rule triggers on connections to known malicious domains or IPs, as well as specific API endpoints on ambiguous domains that are used for exfiltrating Twitch OAuth tokens.
Detects network connections to known JeetBot infrastructure domains and IP addresses. The rule specifically identifies potential exfiltration of Twitch OAuth tokens via URL parameters or interaction with known token-collection proxy endpoints, which are associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer credential harvesting campaign.
Detects network connections to command-and-control infrastructure associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer malicious browser extension. The rule triggers on connections to known malicious domains or IPs, as well as specific API endpoints on ambiguous domains that are used for exfiltrating Twitch OAuth tokens.
Detects network connections to JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer malicious browser extension infrastructure exfiltrating Twitch OAuth tokens. Apex domains (jeetbot.cc, api.jeetbot.cc) are gated on a token-forwarding indicator to avoid false positives.
This rule detects activities related to Tampermonkey (a popular browser extension for userscripts) or interactions with paste.sh, often used for hosting scripts or payloads. The rule monitors both process-level executions and network requests for these indicators, which may be associated with malicious script execution or browser-based credential or session theft.
This rule detects potential web skimmer activity where a user's browser performs a network connection to known payload delivery hosts (e.g., paste.sh or Google Sheets API) followed by a clipboard modification event on the same device within a one-hour window. This behavior is consistent with malicious scripts attempting to replace copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with an attacker-controlled address.
Page 116 of 347