Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors network traffic from internal devices and security logs for communication with a curated list of known malicious or suspicious scanner IP addresses, indicating potential reconnaissance or probing activity by external actors.
Detects the PoisonedRefresh implant's UNIX domain socket backdoor by (1) file activity on the uniquely-named /run/bigtlog.pipe socket initiated by an Apache/httpd process, and (2) process command lines containing the implant's hardcoded authentication token. Removed the earlier generic 'bash spawned by httpd' heuristic, which fired on legitimate CGI/mod_php/admin automation that shells out from the web server and was the dominant false-positive source.
This rule detects processes with names commonly associated with system daemons (e.g., kworker, fc-cache, chronyd, gvfsd) that are executing from non-standard, suspicious directories such as /tmp/ or user-defined hidden folders. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate system processes to evade detection.
This rule detects processes accessing '/proc/self/status' to read the 'TracerPID' field. Malware often uses this technique to detect if it is being debugged or traced by security analysis tools, allowing the process to terminate or change behavior to avoid analysis.
Detects direct unauthorized modifications to Linux crontab files or the addition of specific known malicious cron job patterns. It specifically monitors for file changes in '/var/spool/cron' and correlates them with 'crontab -e' process executions to identify manual versus automated or malicious modifications. Additionally, it checks for specific hardcoded malicious patterns commonly associated with known threat activity.
Detects direct unauthorized modifications to Linux crontab files or the addition of specific known malicious cron job patterns. It specifically monitors for file changes in '/var/spool/cron' and correlates them with 'crontab -e' process executions to identify manual versus automated or malicious modifications. Additionally, it checks for specific hardcoded malicious patterns commonly associated with known threat activity.
Detects direct unauthorized modifications to Linux crontab files or the addition of specific known malicious cron job patterns. It specifically monitors for file changes in '/var/spool/cron' and correlates them with 'crontab -e' process executions to identify manual versus automated or malicious modifications. Additionally, it checks for specific hardcoded malicious patterns commonly associated with known threat activity.
Detects direct unauthorized modifications to Linux crontab files or the addition of specific known malicious cron job patterns. It specifically monitors for file changes in '/var/spool/cron' and correlates them with 'crontab -e' process executions to identify manual versus automated or malicious modifications. Additionally, it checks for specific hardcoded malicious patterns commonly associated with known threat activity.
This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying suspicious PHP file creation within Magento-style product cache directories and the execution of find commands targeted at searching for PHP files in the web directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to plant a web shell and subsequently enumerating web files for further exploitation.
This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying suspicious PHP file creation within Magento-style product cache directories and the execution of find commands targeted at searching for PHP files in the web directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to plant a web shell and subsequently enumerating web files for further exploitation.
This rule detects a correlation between an email phishing burst (high volume of emails with a specific failed payment subject) and the subsequent creation of suspicious 'x_trace_' files in 'var/report/' directories. This pattern is indicative of a phishing campaign where a malicious attachment or link might be attempting to write local tracking or diagnostic files on a victim's host.
This rule detects processes with names commonly associated with system daemons (e.g., kworker, fc-cache, chronyd, gvfsd) that are executing from non-standard, suspicious directories such as /tmp/ or user-defined hidden folders. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate system processes to evade detection.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms in a PostgreSQL database by identifying the creation of a new shared library file (e.g., .so or .dll) within PostgreSQL plugin directories, followed by a modification to the PostgreSQL configuration files (postgresql.conf or postgresql.auto.conf) within a short 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker registering a malicious shared library to be loaded upon database startup, a technique associated with PostGREShell-style post-exploitation.
This rule monitors for modifications to the PostgreSQL configuration file 'pg_hba.conf', specifically looking for changes that would enable 'trust' authentication, followed by successful database logins using that method within one hour. This behavior is indicative of an attacker modifying authentication rules to gain unauthorized, passwordless access to a database.
This rule monitors for modifications to the PostgreSQL configuration file 'pg_hba.conf', specifically looking for changes that would enable 'trust' authentication, followed by successful database logins using that method within one hour. This behavior is indicative of an attacker modifying authentication rules to gain unauthorized, passwordless access to a database.
This rule monitors the software inventory for outdated versions of the PostgreSQL database server. It identifies installations where the major and minor versions are below the threshold for current security releases (e.g., v18 < 6, v17 < 11, v16 < 15, v15 < 19, v14 < 24). Running outdated software increases the risk of exploitation of known vulnerabilities.
This rule monitors Syslog entries for PostgreSQL 'CREATE_REPLICATION_SLOT' commands to identify potential exploitation attempts associated with CVE-2026-6471. It detects attempts to load logical decoding plugins using suspicious path structures, including path traversal sequences ('../', '..\'), absolute paths, or UNC paths, which are not present in a known-good allowlist of plugins.
Detects suspicious behavior from database accounts with replication privileges ('rolreplication=true'). The rule monitors for logins from unauthorized IP addresses, the execution of non-replication related SQL commands by these accounts, and the use of potentially malicious plugin names (containing path traversal characters) during replication slot creation.
This rule detects network communication (via DNS queries, web logs, or device network events) with a list of known malicious domains associated with Command and Control (C2) activity.
Detects forged Citibank payment confirmation/account statement PDFs used in Phantom Deal BPC fraud to falsely demonstrate wire transfer progress; requires combination of bank branding with fraud-specific SWIFT/routing/CTA artifacts
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