Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors the creation of new Azure Function Apps and identifies those that receive external, non-private network requests within 48 hours of their creation. This pattern may indicate the deployment of malicious or unauthorized serverless infrastructure for command-and-control, proxying, or automated tasks.
Detects high-impact configuration changes to Azure management groups or subscriptions (e.g., write/delete operations) that are performed by non-privileged accounts or outside of defined business change windows. This activity can indicate unauthorized privilege escalation, resource manipulation, or reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects suspicious OAuth application or service principal registration, or permission consent, performed by users who are not part of designated IT administrator groups. This rule flags high-privilege permission grants (e.g., Mail.Read, Directory.ReadWrite.All) or application consent events, which are common methods for establishing long-term persistence in cloud environments.
This rule detects successful administrative actions related to the creation, deletion, or modification of Azure Management Groups, Subscriptions, and resources within them. Such actions can indicate unauthorized structural changes to the environment, potential privilege escalation, or attempts to modify tenant-level governance.
This rule detects successful administrative actions related to the creation, deletion, or modification of Azure Management Groups, Subscriptions, and resources within them. Such actions can indicate unauthorized structural changes to the environment, potential privilege escalation, or attempts to modify tenant-level governance.
Detects successful non-interactive token acquisitions using specific Microsoft first-party application IDs known to bypass Entra Conditional Access Policies through Nested App Authentication (NAA/BroCI). The detection specifically targets sign-ins to the Microsoft Graph resource.
Detects outbound TCP port 445 traffic (SMB) from a host identified as PeopleSoft, WebLogic, or PIA to a public IP address. This could indicate data exfiltration or forced authentication attempts.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, or adding new service principals/applications, where the initiating IP address is identified as belonging to a proxy service. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
This rule monitors for a sequential attack chain occurring within a 15-minute window. It links a high-risk or risky user sign-in to subsequent reconnaissance (whoami, ipconfig), credential access (LSASS dumping, registry hive export), and lateral movement (network connections over port 445).
This rule monitors for a sequential attack chain occurring within a 15-minute window. It links a high-risk or risky user sign-in to subsequent reconnaissance (whoami, ipconfig), credential access (LSASS dumping, registry hive export), and lateral movement (network connections over port 445).
Correlates a successful AAD sign-in from a new IP address immediately followed by the registration of a new FIDO2 or Authenticator device, a hallmark of AiTM persistence.
Detects an AI agent (manipulated by a poisoned recommendation prompt) attempting to access internal Cloud Metadata endpoints (e.g., AWS IMDS, Azure IMDS) to steal underlying infrastructure tokens.
Detects queries extracting large contact lists or license details ($top=999 or $top=1000) via Microsoft Graph API, indicating automated data harvesting or reconnaissance activities. This behavior could be indicative of an adversary attempting to collect information about an organization's users or licensed software.
Identifies successful device code authentication followed by a high volume of file downloads within a short timeframe, which could indicate data exfiltration after an adversary has gained access through a device code phishing campaign.
Detects Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) activity followed by the deletion of authentication methods within a 1-hour window. This sequence of events can indicate an attacker attempting to maintain access or bypass multi-factor authentication after gaining initial access to an account, potentially executed by threat groups like Storm-2949.
Detects the installation or execution of ScreenConnect originating from the Azure Run Command extension context. This indicates potential unauthorized remote access tool deployment.
Detects Key Vault access policy or role changes that grant secret-reading capabilities.
Detects disabling of Conditional Access policies via Graph API
Detects deletion of a phishing-resistant authentication method followed by registration of a less secure phone or software token method for the same account.
Detects access to App Service Kudu deployment or command endpoints by an identity not normally associated with deployment operations.
Detects access to Azure App Service Kudu deployment or command endpoints by an identity not normally associated with deployment operations. This could indicate an attacker using compromised credentials to interact with the application's underlying infrastructure.
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