Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects instances where a digitally signed process loads a DLL file from a user-writeable directory (such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Users\Public). This behavior is characteristic of DLL search order hijacking or side-loading, where an attacker attempts to load malicious code into a trusted, signed application.
Detects the execution of Grixba, a reconnaissance and inventory tool used by Play ransomware operators. The tool is designed to enumerate domain accounts, security software, backup solutions, and remote systems to facilitate reconnaissance prior to deploying encryption.
Detects high-frequency access to the root of the C:\ drive using access rights typically required for directory change notification. This behavior is a heuristic proxy for processes attempting to monitor the entire file system (e.g., via ReadDirectoryChangesW), often associated with post-compromise reconnaissance or surveillance of file operations.
Detects remote thread creation (CreateRemoteThread or QueueUserAPC) into common Windows system processes (rundll32.exe or svchost.exe) originating from suspicious source processes. This activity is indicative of process injection techniques commonly utilized by Cobalt Strike beacons during post-exploitation, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment phases.
Detects registry modifications to CLSID InprocServer32 keys where the referenced DLL path resides in a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., AppData, Temp, ProgramData, Public, Recycle.Bin). This technique, known as COM Hijacking (T1546.015), is used by the Turla (also known as Snake, Secret Blizzard, Uroburos) threat group to achieve persistence by redirecting legitimate COM object references to malicious payloads.
Detects the loading of unsigned DLLs from non-system directories where the DLL filename matches common Windows system libraries. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, where adversaries use a trusted, digitally-signed application to load a malicious DLL in an attempt to bypass security controls and maintain persistence.
Detects the creation of .aspx, .ashx, or .asp files within Exchange OWA/ECP or IIS wwwroot directories by web server processes (w3wp.exe or UMWorkerProcess.exe). This pattern is consistent with web shell deployment following the exploitation of public-facing web applications, a technique often used by threat actors like APT40.
Detects the Microsoft HTML Help executable (hh.exe) spawning suspicious child processes such as command interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or scripting engines (mshta.exe, wscript.exe). This behavior is characteristic of initial access techniques used by the Kimsuky (APT43) threat group, where malicious CHM files are delivered via email attachments to execute payloads.
This rule detects network activity associated with the DarkMe RAT, specifically targeting outbound TCP connections or DNS resolutions involving known C2 domains by the rundll32.exe process. This activity is indicative of the malware's post-injection C2 registration and beaconing.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
Detects potential persistence mechanism of the Antino implant, involving the creation of a file under the directory '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Windows GatherOSStateKit\' followed by a corresponding entry in the HKCU Run registry key to maintain persistence upon user logon.
Detects instances of mshta.exe initiating network connections to cloud storage providers (CloudFront, Cloudflare R2/pages) to retrieve multiple remote files (specifically .js or .txt). This behavior is indicative of an exploit stage where mshta.exe is used as a LOLBAS to fetch orchestrator scripts and gadget payloads for memory-based deserialization attacks.
Detects mshta.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe initiating network connections to common CDN infrastructure (Cloudflare R2, CloudFront, pages.dev) to retrieve scripts (js, txt, log). This behavior is indicative of a staging phase in a malicious orchestration, often associated with subsequent deserialization attacks and DLL sideloading.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
Detects UAT-11587 Stage 1 HTA and WSF stager template: hidden/zero-sized window, fixed Cloudflare Pages tracking beacon with ?track, and WinHttp/MSXML ActiveXObject loading Stage 2 from Cloudflare R2 or CloudFront.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a common internet-facing server process (e.g., w3wp.exe, nginx.exe) spawns a potentially malicious child process (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe), followed shortly thereafter by mass file modifications on the same host, which is characteristic of ransomware behavior following initial exploitation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a common internet-facing server process (e.g., w3wp.exe, nginx.exe) spawns a potentially malicious child process (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe), followed shortly thereafter by mass file modifications on the same host, which is characteristic of ransomware behavior following initial exploitation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a common internet-facing server process (e.g., w3wp.exe, nginx.exe) spawns a potentially malicious child process (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe), followed shortly thereafter by mass file modifications on the same host, which is characteristic of ransomware behavior following initial exploitation.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
Detects credential-stuffing campaigns that employ AI/ML-tuned inter-request timing jitter to bypass traditional rate-limiting and fixed-interval bot detection, specifically flagging interactive or network logon failures on Windows hosts.
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