Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of a fake certificate-fix MSI package via msiexec.exe or the creation of CertFixer.msi, followed within one hour by the creation of a Run key persistence mechanism named 'WindowsUpdateAssist' on the same device.
This detection identifies instances where rundll32.exe is used to load a DLL from a temporary directory, such as C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Local\Temp\ or C:\Windows\Temp\. While rundll32.exe is a legitimate Windows utility used to execute functions exported from DLLs, its use to load libraries from temporary locations is highly suspicious. These directories are commonly used by malware and red team tools to stage payloads or execute code in-memory without writing it to more persistent locations. This behavior often indicates defense evasion, initial access, or privilege escalation, especially when the DLL is unsigned, recently written, or executed shortly after download. In normal user workflows, DLLs are not typically loaded from Temp paths, making this a high-fidelity indicator of potentially malicious activity. Monitoring this pattern is essential for detecting threats that attempt to blend in with native system processes while bypassing traditional application controls.
This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that uses several application tools that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script may execute suspicious code.
This rule detects outbound SSH network connections (to ports 22, 2222) to external, non-private IP addresses.
It filters out internal IP addresses, local traffic, and allows for exclusions based on approved source processes, destination IPs, source hostnames, and destination domains.
It filters out internal IP addresses, local traffic, and allows for exclusions based on approved source processes, destination IPs, source hostnames, and destination domains.
Detects behavior associated with the Bitter APT group where system reconnaissance commands are executed via command shells (powershell, cmd), staged into a local file named 'abc.pdf' using output redirection, and subsequently uploaded/exfiltrated using curl within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence where a Windows Defender exclusion is added via PowerShell or Command Prompt, followed by a silent installation of an 'app.msi' package on the same device within 30 minutes. Management agents and noisy administrative devices are filtered out to reduce false positives.
Detects an unsigned or suspicious process touching multiple credential or session stores (such as browsers, mail clients, chat applications, SSH keys, and cloud/VPN configurations) across different categories within a short time window, indicative of infostealer or credential harvesting activity.
Detects failed attempts to clear Windows event logs via the WMI NTEventLogFile ClearEventLog method.
Event 5858 in the WMI-Activity operational log is an error event, meaning it is only generated
when the WMI operation encounters an error (e.g. access denied, provider failure).
It could be an indication of an attacker attempting to clear event logs via WMI, but failing due to insufficient privileges or other issues.
Successful clearing operations will NOT produce this event; for those, correlate with
Security event 1102 or System event 104.
Event 5858 in the WMI-Activity operational log is an error event, meaning it is only generated
when the WMI operation encounters an error (e.g. access denied, provider failure).
It could be an indication of an attacker attempting to clear event logs via WMI, but failing due to insufficient privileges or other issues.
Successful clearing operations will NOT produce this event; for those, correlate with
Security event 1102 or System event 104.
The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` with the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` can be exploited to download and execute malicious files without immediate detection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to download and execute payloads, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Review parallel and child processes, especially `svchost.exe`, for associated artifacts.
The following analytic detects the modification of Windows Defender registry settings to disable antivirus and antispyware protections. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender policies. This activity is significant because disabling antivirus protections is a common tactic used by adversaries to evade detection and maintain persistence on compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to execute further malicious activities undetected, leading to potential data breaches, system compromise, and further propagation of malware within the network.
This analytic detects Cloudflare Tunnel client execution by its process name or original executable name, including renamed copies, and by command lines that create token-authenticated or Quick Tunnels.
Threat actors have used cloudflared for covert command-and-control and persistent remote access, including renamed binaries and tunnels that expose local services through Cloudflare's edge.
The command-line signatures focus on token-backed `tunnel run`, Quick Tunnel commands that publish a loopback service with `--url`, and config-backed `tunnel --config ... run` commands.
Threat actors have used cloudflared for covert command-and-control and persistent remote access, including renamed binaries and tunnels that expose local services through Cloudflare's edge.
The command-line signatures focus on token-backed `tunnel run`, Quick Tunnel commands that publish a loopback service with `--url`, and config-backed `tunnel --config ... run` commands.
The following analytic identifies malicious HTTP requests targeting the jmx-console in JBoss servers. It detects unusually long URLs, indicative of embedded payloads, by analyzing web server logs for GET or HEAD requests with specific URL patterns and lengths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit JBoss vulnerabilities, potentially leading to unauthorized remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the server, escalate privileges, and compromise sensitive data, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects execution of curl binaries from non-standard paths (outside System32, SysWOW64, and Program Files directories) using downloader flags such as insecure or retry options over HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, or SFTP protocols.
Detects the AhsayCBS backup service (cbssvcX64.exe) spawning the Windows command shell (cmd.exe /c) concurrently with the creation or modification of a JSP file within the AhsayCBS webapps directory (webapps\cbs or webapps\rps), indicating potential web shell deployment.
Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings.
Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the 'fAllowUnsolicited' or enabling RDP via 'fDenyTSConnections', etc.
Below is a list of registry keys/values that are monitored by this rule:
- Shadow: Used to enable Remote Desktop shadowing, which allows an administrator to view or control a user's session.
- DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias: Disables anti-aliasing for remote desktop sessions.
- DisableSecuritySettings: Disables certain security settings for Remote Desktop connections.
- fAllowUnsolicited: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers.
- fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers with full control.
- InitialProgram: Specifies a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
- ServiceDll: Used in RDP hijacking techniques to specify a custom DLL to be loaded by the Terminal Services service.
- SecurityLayer: Specifies the security layer used for RDP connections.
Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the 'fAllowUnsolicited' or enabling RDP via 'fDenyTSConnections', etc.
Below is a list of registry keys/values that are monitored by this rule:
- Shadow: Used to enable Remote Desktop shadowing, which allows an administrator to view or control a user's session.
- DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias: Disables anti-aliasing for remote desktop sessions.
- DisableSecuritySettings: Disables certain security settings for Remote Desktop connections.
- fAllowUnsolicited: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers.
- fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers with full control.
- InitialProgram: Specifies a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
- ServiceDll: Used in RDP hijacking techniques to specify a custom DLL to be loaded by the Terminal Services service.
- SecurityLayer: Specifies the security layer used for RDP connections.
Detects a sequence where an account executes PowerShell to enumerate Exchange ApplicationImpersonation role assignments via Get-ManagementRoleAssignment, followed within 1 hour by granting FullAccess permissions to a mailbox using Add-MailboxPermission on the same device.
Detects executables located in user-writable directories (such as Downloads, AppData, Temp, or ProgramData) that use decoy naming conventions resembling PDF or GlobalProtect installers. These processes drop both a document/installer and a separate executable on the same device, indicative of malware staging or user execution techniques.
This rule performs a software inventory search to identify devices running specific versions of Nginx within a targeted range (1.9.5 up to 1.30.7, or 1.31.0 up to 1.31.9). This is typically used for vulnerability management and asset discovery.
Detects network connections, file creations with specific SHA256 hashes, and email URL hits associated with known Forg365 threat actor infrastructure and indicators.
Detects NetSupport RAT (client32.exe) executing from common user-writable paths and performing outbound C2 communications or beaconing behavior, excluding established baseline/sanctioned deployments.
Detects when a script host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) launches msiexec.exe to silently install ScreenConnect from a temporary installer in the Temp folder, or configures the ScreenConnect service via service control utilities.
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