Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the Cisco AsyncOS content scanner / AMP service writing files into
sensitive system directories such as /etc, /root or /boot. CVE-2026-76519 uses a relative
path traversal in AMP attachment handling so a crafted email makes the root-running scanner
write attacker-chosen files wherever it likes. Writes outside the expected spool and
Content Scanner Tools directories are the core exploitation artifact.
sensitive system directories such as /etc, /root or /boot. CVE-2026-76519 uses a relative
path traversal in AMP attachment handling so a crafted email makes the root-running scanner
write attacker-chosen files wherever it likes. Writes outside the expected spool and
Content Scanner Tools directories are the core exploitation artifact.
Detects the creation or modification of web script files (.aspx, .jsp) within common web application directories by unusual processes (such as command shells or download utilities) or by non-standard user accounts, indicating potential web shell deployment.
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device where a shell (/bin/sh, /bin/bash, etc.) is copied to a path involving /usr/bin/dbus-authd using cp or busybox, followed by changing ownership to root, and subsequently setting the SUID permission bit within a 10-minute window.
Detects the execution of reverse engineering and decompilation tools such as JADX or Blutter against Android APK files or Flutter application binaries (libapp.so), as well as the creation of their typical output artifacts and staging folders.
Detects the execution of reverse engineering and decompilation tools such as JADX or Blutter against Android APK files or Flutter application binaries (libapp.so), as well as the creation of their typical output artifacts and staging folders.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects the creation of cook.pth or cook.py in Python site-packages or dist-packages directories by package managers or interpreters, followed by a Python interpreter execution on the same device within one hour. This pattern matches the malicious supply chain behavior observed in compromised LiteLLM versions (e.g., 1.107.0) utilizing .pth auto-import chains for persistence and execution.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Performs an IOC sweep for a known XMRig cryptojacking campaign exploiting a REDCap vulnerability (CVE-2026-90817), detecting matching network connections, file hashes, and process activities across endpoints.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects the launch of bad-bpf style eBPF rootkit loaders (pidhide with --pid-to-hide, sudoadd with --username) executed via sudo or from an interactive shell parent, representing the userspace step that issues bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) before tracepoint hooks go live.
Detects commands run on an F5 BIG-IP appliance. BIG-IP terminates TLS for the
applications behind it, which means the appliance holds private keys and sees
decrypted traffic — compromise of the load balancer is compromise of everything it
fronts, and the appliance itself rarely runs any endpoint agent.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, process, commandline, processargs
applications behind it, which means the appliance holds private keys and sees
decrypted traffic — compromise of the load balancer is compromise of everything it
fronts, and the appliance itself rarely runs any endpoint agent.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, process, commandline, processargs
Detects a role being added in Centrify for Linux. Roles determine which servers an
identity can reach and what it may do there, so adding one is a durable grant of
access to Unix infrastructure that frequently sits outside the scope of Windows
centric monitoring.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, domain
identity can reach and what it may do there, so adding one is a durable grant of
access to Unix infrastructure that frequently sits outside the scope of Windows
centric monitoring.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, domain
Detects a privileged command run through Centrify on Linux. Because elevation is
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects a single account deleting a large number of files on the NAS. On shared
storage this is either ransomware working through the share, a destructive insider,
or an attacker removing backups before encrypting the primary estate.
NAS appliances rarely carry endpoint agents, so their own logs are frequently the
only place this is visible.
Onboarding: DISKSTATION-NAS is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 826).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='DISKSTATION-NAS' and action='DELETED'
| duration 10m
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
storage this is either ransomware working through the share, a destructive insider,
or an attacker removing backups before encrypting the primary estate.
NAS appliances rarely carry endpoint agents, so their own logs are frequently the
only place this is visible.
Onboarding: DISKSTATION-NAS is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 826).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='DISKSTATION-NAS' and action='DELETED'
| duration 10m
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
Detects a process launch whose command line both references a cron persistence path (crontab, /etc/cron.d/, /etc/crontab, /etc/cron.{hourly,daily,weekly,monthly}/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) and contains a download-and-execute or reverse-shell marker (curl/wget piped to a shell, /dev/tcp/ redirection, base64-decoded payload, nc -e) or installs the crontab from a file staged under /tmp/. Attackers commonly install a scheduled cron entry so a malicious command re-executes on a fixed interval, surviving reboots and process kills (T1053.003).
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