Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
414 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
226
76
49
34
16
Contributors
129
50
43
42
35
Categories
152
125
118
106
84
Platforms
338
155
147
27
11
Products / Services
10,665
9,758
6,692
4,418
3,749
414
MITRE Techniques
254
202
134
129
109
CVEs
1
1
1
This rule detects potential device code phishing attempts by correlating URL click events with sign-in logs using the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol. It specifically looks for successful or failed sign-ins (result types 0, 50074, 50076, 500121) that occur after a user clicks on a URL.
This rule processes Microsoft Graph Security Alerts, aggregating evidence from various Microsoft Defender products (MDE, MDI, MDCA, MDO, Entra ID Protection). It extracts and normalizes detailed evidence related to devices, users, IP addresses, processes, files, URLs, emails, mailboxes, network connections, and Azure resources, providing a comprehensive view of security incidents across the Microsoft ecosystem.
This rule detects suspicious sign-in attempts to Azure AD where Conditional Access policies were not applied, the sign-in was successful, and the user agent string indicates a bot, crawler, headless browser, or common scripting tools like curl, wget, or python. It specifically looks for multiple such logins or logins from multiple unique devices within a 5-minute window for the same user and risk detail.
This rule detects when a single user principal name (UPN) attempts five or more sign-ins from the same IP address within a one-hour window, and each sign-in is flagged with a 'RiskDetail' other than 'none' but still results in a 'Success' status. This could indicate an attacker attempting to bypass security controls or an account compromise where the attacker is repeatedly trying to access the account from a consistent location, possibly with different credentials or methods, until successful.
This rule detects when a single user principal name (UPN) attempts five or more sign-ins from the same IP address within a one-hour window, and each sign-in is flagged with a 'RiskDetail' other than 'none' but still results in a 'Success' status. This could indicate an attacker attempting to bypass security controls or an account compromise where the attacker is repeatedly trying to access the account from a consistent location, possibly with different credentials or methods, until successful.
Identifies a risky sign-in to a known O365 landing page followed shortly by the creation of an inbox rule that deletes messages or moves them to junk/trash. This pattern frequently indicates account compromise (e.g., BEC or AiTM) attempting to hide malicious activity.
Detects sign-in with properties that are unfamiliar to the user. The detection considers past sign-in history to look for anomalous sign-ins.
Identifies that users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.
Atypical Travel
Sigma
Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior.
Impossible Travel
Sigma
Identifies user activities originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it takes to travel from the first location to the second.
Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
New Country
Sigma
Detects sign-ins from new countries. The detection considers past activity locations to determine new and infrequent locations.
Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser
Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns.
This rule correlates an email URL click with a subsequent risky sign-in from the same user within a short timeframe (1 hour). This is a strong indicator of a successful Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack, such as those conducted with the Tycoon2FA kit, where a user is tricked into authenticating through a malicious site, allowing the attacker to capture their session.
Correlates an email URL click with a subsequent risky sign-in from the same user within a short timeframe. This pattern is a strong indicator of a successful Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack, such as those conducted with the Tycoon2FA kit, where a user is tricked into authenticating through a malicious site, allowing the attacker to capture their session.
Detects successful Entra ID sign-ins that exhibit characteristics of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session cookie hijack.
This activity is often associated with AiTM phishing kits like Tycoon2FA, where attackers replay stolen session cookies from unmanaged devices to bypass MFA.
This activity is often associated with AiTM phishing kits like Tycoon2FA, where attackers replay stolen session cookies from unmanaged devices to bypass MFA.
This rule detects potentially risky browser sign-ins from unmanaged devices, which aligns with account access patterns observed in AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns like those discussed in the Tycoon2FA report. It identifies sign-ins where the risk level is elevated (50 or 100), the client application used is a browser, and device trust type and device name information are empty, suggesting an unknown or untrusted device. This serves as a lead to investigate suspicious browser-based sign-ins that might indicate an AiTM compromise.
This detection identifies when a user clicks a URL in an email and shortly after, a risky sign-in is detected for the same user account. This pattern is indicative of a successful phishing attack, where a user is lured to a malicious site, enters their credentials, and the attacker uses those credentials or the session token to log in from a different location.
This query identifies users exhibiting unusual authentication behavior by combining Behavior Analytics with recent sign-in activity. It highlights high‑risk sign-ins originating from previously unseen IP addresses where the user agent or operating system has changed compared to historical patterns. The query enriches findings with historical sign-in context and Identity Info to support investigation of potentially compromised accounts.
This rule detects suspicious activity where an 'unfamiliar sign-in properties' alert occurs shortly after an administrator has changed a user's Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method. It correlates security alerts for unfamiliar sign-ins with audit logs indicating MFA method changes for the same user within a short timeframe. The rule then checks if the user's sign-in activity shows multiple IP addresses or locations, indicating a potential compromise or MFA bypass after the change.
Page 12 of 20