Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
507 detections
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Detects suspicious WinRM SOAPAction headers indicating potential lateral movement or remote command execution (e.g., shell command, process creation, or WMI operations) over WinRM HTTP ports 5985 and 5986.
Detects various pre-execution and environment fingerprinting behaviors indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan. This includes WMI-based security product enumeration, execution of unsigned payloads from suspicious AppData paths, detection of security analysis/debugging tools, virtualization environment checks, and C2 communication attempts via geolocation services.
Detects the creation or manipulation of WMI event subscriptions using wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or mofcomp.exe. These tools are commonly abused by adversaries to establish persistence by triggering malicious code execution via WMI event filters, consumers, and bindings.
Detects the creation or modification of WMI event subscriptions via EventID 5861 from the Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity log. This activity, involving EventFilters, EventConsumers, or FilterToConsumerBindings, is a well-known technique used by adversaries to establish persistence and achieve execution triggered by system events, often resulting in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
Detects the use of WMI (via WmiPrvSE.exe or wmic.exe) to enumerate or terminate PowerShell processes. This behavior is indicative of the Amadey/StealC delivery chain, where a JScript dropper uses WMI to clean up script execution artifacts after a specified timeout, aiding in defense evasion.
Detects a process interacting multiple times with VMware Tools (vmtoolsd.exe) followed by multiple interactions with WMI Restrictions registry keys within a 15-minute window. This behavioral pattern is indicative of potential privilege escalation or environment discovery techniques where an adversary attempts to modify security restrictions while masquerading or interacting with legitimate virtualization management components.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (WmiPrvSE.exe) or command-line tool (wmic.exe) initiates potentially suspicious child processes, often indicative of lateral movement or remote command execution via WMI.
Detects the enumeration of installed security and monitoring software, such as Sysmon, Filebeat, and Microsoft Defender, using common system administration tools including sc.exe, tasklist.exe, wmic.exe, PowerShell, and reg.exe. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance performed prior to disabling security features on a compromised host.
Detects reconnaissance activity where an adversary uses common administrative utilities (e.g., wmic, powershell, tasklist, sc, reg) to identify installed security software, antivirus products, or monitoring agents on a Windows system. This activity is often a precursor to defense evasion or impairment.
Detects potential persistence attempts via WMI event subscriptions. The rule monitors for the creation of WMI event consumers using 'wmic.exe' with suspicious command line arguments, or the use of 'mofcomp.exe' to compile MOF files by non-standard, non-Microsoft signed processes.
Detects execution of WMI queries against Win32_OperatingSystem and CIM_Memory classes by processes identified as associated with BeepRAT (e.g., HFY.exe or processes within TCC paths). This behavior is characteristic of post-infection system enumeration, hardware ID generation, and environmental keying used in operations such as DragonClone.
Hunting rule loosely based off of Atomic Red Team T1518.001 test "Get Windows Defender exclusion settings using WMIC". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
Detects remote LSASS memory dumping patterns associated with the lsassy tool, leveraging comsvcs.dll to create memory dumps of the LSASS process. The rule identifies suspicious command lines involving comsvcs.dll ordinal-based exports (ordinal #+000024), tasklist enumeration for PID discovery, and subsequent dump file creation within \Windows\Temp\. It monitors remote execution methods often observed in Bumblebee and Akira campaigns, such as WMI or DCOM/MMC-based process spawning.
Detects attempts to disable or impair Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate system administration tools such as PowerShell (Set-MpPreference, Add-MpPreference), WMIC, sc.exe, or net.exe. Adversaries may use these tools to bypass security controls by disabling real-time monitoring or adding unauthorized exclusion paths.
Detects Yuta/Glove Stealer malware attempting to establish persistent WMI event subscriptions for keylogging. This is identified by the execution of wmic.exe or PowerShell to register event filters, consumers, or bindings, initiated by suspicious parent processes such as winupdate.exe or processes originating from temporary/staging directories.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows administrative tools and scripts to disable or delete system recovery features, such as Volume Shadow Copies, backup catalogs, or boot recovery options. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware or destructive malware attempting to prevent system restoration.
This rule detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) using native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, WMIC, or PowerShell. Attackers commonly perform this action to inhibit system recovery and prevent the restoration of data, often as a precursor or during the impact phase of ransomware attacks.
Detects the use of wmic.exe to execute remote commands using the /node flag and the 'process call create' command string. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for lateral movement and remote code execution.
This rule detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) using native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, WMIC, or PowerShell. Attackers commonly perform this action to inhibit system recovery and prevent the restoration of data, often as a precursor or during the impact phase of ransomware attacks.
Detects long-running WScript or CScript processes executing script files (ending in .js or .jse) that perform environment enumeration via WMI queries (e.g., Win32_ComputerSystem, Win32_BIOS, Win32_VideoController). This behavior is often indicative of automated sandbox evasion and reconnaissance performed by malicious scripts or droppers.
Detects the execution of vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe with command-line arguments intended to delete or resize Volume Shadow Copies. This is a common technique used by ransomware to prevent system recovery and inhibit administrative rollback of file changes.
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