Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying suspicious PHP file creation within Magento-style product cache directories and the execution of find commands targeted at searching for PHP files in the web directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to plant a web shell and subsequently enumerating web files for further exploitation.
This rule detects a correlation between an email phishing burst (high volume of emails with a specific failed payment subject) and the subsequent creation of suspicious 'x_trace_' files in 'var/report/' directories. This pattern is indicative of a phishing campaign where a malicious attachment or link might be attempting to write local tracking or diagnostic files on a victim's host.
Detects direct unauthorized modifications to Linux crontab files or the addition of specific known malicious cron job patterns. It specifically monitors for file changes in '/var/spool/cron' and correlates them with 'crontab -e' process executions to identify manual versus automated or malicious modifications. Additionally, it checks for specific hardcoded malicious patterns commonly associated with known threat activity.
This rule detects a correlation between an email phishing burst (high volume of emails with a specific failed payment subject) and the subsequent creation of suspicious 'x_trace_' files in 'var/report/' directories. This pattern is indicative of a phishing campaign where a malicious attachment or link might be attempting to write local tracking or diagnostic files on a victim's host.
This rule detects the presence of specific file hashes known to be associated with backdoored software builds, specifically related to recent supply chain compromises affecting South Korean software vendors (e.g., HAProxy builds). It monitors device file events, process initiation, and identity logon events to identify systems that have deployed, executed, or been accessed by these malicious binaries.
Detects the creation or modification of specific files within the /tmp directory, specifically those matching naming patterns associated with 'jasper-log' files or temporary pipe files. These patterns are often associated with temporary storage or data staging activities during post-exploitation or malware execution.
Detects the loading of Linux kernel modules using insmod or modprobe from non-standard, writable directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, /home, /root, or /opt. This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to install a malicious kernel module or rootkit to gain persistence or privilege escalation, while bypassing standard package management paths.
Identifies the creation or modification of files within /etc/cron.d that exhibit suspicious naming conventions, including references to syslog, .log extensions, 59310, or known filenames such as zz-poc59310-syslog.log. The rule is intended to detect potential abuse of the cron scheduling mechanism for persistence, particularly where attackers disguise cron entries as legitimate log files to evade detection.
Detects a discrepancy between the SHA256 hash of a running process image (via /proc/<pid>/exe on Linux) and the hash of the corresponding binary file on disk. This behavior is indicative of process memory manipulation, such as fileless execution or binary replacement, where the code currently running in memory does not match the original file on disk.
This rule monitors for internal network connection attempts initiated by the 'mcp-grafana' process to destinations it has not contacted in the previous 14 days. By establishing a baseline of legitimate data source connections, the rule alerts when the process performs a rapid fan-out or discovery against multiple new internal hosts, which may indicate unauthorized network reconnaissance or lateral movement attempts by the Grafana service.
Detects instances of an mcp-grafana server responding with an HTTP 200 status code to a 'tools/call' request without an Authorization header, indicating potential unauthenticated remote tool execution on a vulnerable or misconfigured server.
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting vulnerable versions of Grafana MCP Server (versions < 1.1.0). The rule identifies requests attempting to access sensitive internal or cloud-metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254, localhost, internal subnets) via the X-Grafana-URL header.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access or attempts to copy sensitive SSH keys (e.g., id_rsa, id_ed25519) by command-line utilities (such as cat, cp, tar, scp, or curl) or when triggered by automation-related process names like 'terraform'. It monitors both process command lines and file events to identify staging or exfiltration activities.
Detects execution of Coder-related processes or scripts where sensitive configuration parameters, such as database credentials or authentication tokens, are passed via command-line arguments. This behavior can lead to the exposure of credentials to other users or processes on the system through process listing.
Detects the loading of Linux kernel modules using insmod or modprobe from non-standard, writable directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, /home, /root, or /opt. This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to install a malicious kernel module or rootkit to gain persistence or privilege escalation, while bypassing standard package management paths.
Detects the PoisonedRefresh implant's UNIX domain socket backdoor by (1) file activity on the uniquely-named /run/bigtlog.pipe socket initiated by an Apache/httpd process, and (2) process command lines containing the implant's hardcoded authentication token. Removed the earlier generic 'bash spawned by httpd' heuristic, which fired on legitimate CGI/mod_php/admin automation that shells out from the web server and was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects the disabling of host-based firewalls (Windows Filtering Platform/Advanced Firewall, iptables, or nftables) via command-line tools. The rule excludes common management tools, system accounts, and events where the firewall is re-enabled within a short timeframe, effectively filtering for potentially unauthorized attempts to impair security defenses.
Detects unauthorized modifications to critical authentication-related configuration files and registry keys. Specifically monitors changes to LSA security packages and notification packages on Windows systems, as well as PAM configuration file modifications on Linux systems, when performed by unsigned or untrusted processes outside of known installer activity.
Detects command-line execution of tools (route, netsh, sysctl) intended to modify host routing tables or enable IP forwarding. Such activity on workstation endpoints may indicate an attempt to bridge network segments, bypass network security boundaries, or facilitate lateral movement/C2 communications.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
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