Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections, email activity, URL clicks, and Teams messages that involve domains commonly used by threat actor group Scattered Spider. It specifically looks for domains containing '-servicedesk.', '-okta.', '-sso.', '-cms.', '-helpdesk.', or 'oktalogin-'. The rule aims to identify potential phishing attempts or suspicious activity targeting SSO/helpdesk credentials by monitoring interactions with these specific domain patterns across multiple data sources.
This detection identifies when a one-on-one Microsoft Teams chat is initiated with an external domain that has not been observed in previous Teams chats (past 90 days) or recent email communications (past 15 days). This may indicate a new, potentially unsolicited or suspicious contact attempting to engage with an internal user, which could represent a social engineering attempt or early-stage reconnaissance.
This analytic detects the creation or modification of mailbox rules in Office 365, a technique commonly used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks to hide malicious emails. It uses a scoring mechanism based on attributes like rule name entropy, name length, 'MarkAsRead' action, and 'MoveToFolder' destination to identify suspicious rules. A high score indicates a potential attacker has gained access to the account and is attempting to conceal their activities or exfiltrate information.
No description available.
This rule detects inbound emails containing URLs that are commonly used for OAuth consent phishing, where an attacker attempts to trick users into granting permissions to a malicious application.
This detection identifies when a Microsoft Teams message containing a URL associated with a known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool was sent and subsequently clicked by the intended recipient or the original sender. The domain is not part of the organization's approved RMM solutions, indicating a potential use of Living-off-the-Land RMM (LOLRMM) techniques often employed in initial access or persistence stages by threat actors.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
SPL Query
This detection identifies when Microsoft Teams applications send messages to groups / users in your organization's tenant. It utilizes the 'BotAddedToTeam' and 'AppInstalled' action types from CloudAppEvents to collect all Teams applications created in the specified timeframe and then joins on MessageEvents, matching events where SenderObjectId equals AppGuid.
This activity is significant as it may uncover unverified applications being added to teams channels and communicating with users in your tenant. Teams application security, compliance, and permissions can be reviewed in the Microsoft Teams Admin portal -
https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/policies/manage-apps/
This activity is significant as it may uncover unverified applications being added to teams channels and communicating with users in your tenant. Teams application security, compliance, and permissions can be reviewed in the Microsoft Teams Admin portal -
https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/policies/manage-apps/
This rule detects when an application consent operation occurs in Azure Active Directory, specifically looking for broad consent types such as 'AllPrincipals' or when an administrator has granted consent. This can indicate a malicious application gaining wide permissions within the Azure AD tenant.
No description available.
A user inadvertently granted consent to an external, unverified OAuth application. Exploiting the high-level permissions obtained, a threat actor initiated an attack targeting the tenant’s environment via Microsoft Graph.
DefenderXDR Custom Detection
This query identifies when a suspicious SVG file, linked to known threat intelligence, is downloaded via a browser. This technique is often used for SVG smuggling, where attackers embed malicious JavaScript or links within the SVG's structure to bypass traditional content filters or sandboxing. Once rendered in the browser, the embedded content may redirect the victim to a malicious site or initiate further malicious activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious sign-in attempts that occur shortly after a user clicks on a URL, especially when the sign-in originates from a different IP address or subnet than the URL click. It specifically looks for risky sign-ins to Microsoft first-party applications. The logic aims to identify scenarios where a user might be phished (e.g., via a malicious link) and then their credentials are used to sign in from an attacker-controlled location.
This rule detects potential spearphishing attempts where the sender's email address is from Gmail, there are no attachments or URLs, and the subject line of the email matches the recipient's first name. This pattern is often used in highly targeted social engineering attacks to appear legitimate and bypass traditional email security controls.
This search will find all inbound emails with attachments with filenames ending .lnk, indicative of a Windows Shortcut file.
This has been observed in the Serpentin#Cloud campaign
This has been observed in the Serpentin#Cloud campaign
This query visualises total emails with Spam detections summarizing the data by email sender IP address (SenderIPv4, SenderIPv6).
This rule detects emails containing a URL to a suspicious domain. It also checks if any of these suspicious URLs were subsequently clicked by a user, indicating potential compromise or successful phishing.
This rule detects phishing attempts that leverage Google redirect links. It identifies emails where the URL contains 'google.' and '/url?' and the URL domain is 'google', but the extracted domain is not 'com'. This indicates a potential malicious redirect through Google's services, often used to obscure the final malicious destination. The rule then joins this URL information with email event data to provide context such as sender, recipient, subject, and delivery location, focusing on emails delivered to the Inbox or Junk folder but not quarantined.
This query helps calculate overall efficacy of MDO based on threats blocked pre-delivery, post-delivery cleanups, or were uncaught.
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