Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious activity related to Azure AD device registration. It identifies instances where a single user principal name (UPN) performs 5 or more device registrations or adds members to groups within a one-hour window, specifically targeting device resources. This could indicate an adversary attempting to register multiple devices to bypass conditional access policies or gain persistent access.
This rule detects the issuance of OAuth tokens or OAuth consent events within cloud applications. It specifically looks for these events where the client application is not 'Microsoft Teams' or 'Azure CLI'. The rule summarizes the number of grants and distinct users for each client application and token ID over hourly intervals. This can help identify potentially unauthorized or suspicious OAuth application consents.
Detects creation of Intune device management scripts, a potential privilege abuse vector.
Detects direct connections to cloud VMs via Azure Bastion or GCP IAP
Detects suspicious Azure PIM role activation requests for temporary elevated access
Detects assignments of Intune objects (such as policies, scripts, or applications) to high-impact default groups like 'All Devices' or 'All Users'. Adversaries leverage these broad assignments to maximize the blast radius of malicious payloads or destructive wipe commands.
This rule detects attempts to access sensitive configuration or backup files on an IIS web server. It looks for requests where the URI stem contains keywords like '.env', 'config', or 'backup', which are commonly associated with files that may contain sensitive information.
This rule detects the creation of an Azure Blob Lifecycle Management rule that is configured for deletion. It specifically looks for HTTP PUT requests to blob.core.windows.net with 'managementPolicies' in the URI, indicating an attempt to define or modify lifecycle policies for Azure Blob Storage, potentially for data deletion.
This rule detects attempts to use cloud services (specifically AWS SSM or Azure Management) for internal lateral movement. It triggers when HTTP requests are made to 'ssm.amazonaws.com' or 'management.azure.com' with the URI containing 'SendCommand'. A threshold of 5 such events from the same source within 30 seconds is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects suspicious device registration operations in a tenant by identifying device names that match known automated device code phishing kit patterns. Specifically, it looks for device names that are in the format of 'DESKTOP-' followed by 6 to 8 hexadecimal characters, which deviates from typical Windows default naming conventions. This pattern is often used by attackers to register devices for persistence or to bypass MFA.
This rule detects repeated successful operations related to public access or firewall configuration changes within Azure Activity Logs. A high count (3 or more) of such operations by the same caller within an hour could indicate malicious activity, such as an attacker attempting to open up network access to compromised resources or exfiltrate data.
Detects an unusual volume of 'Logging' or 'Monitor' operations within Azure Activity logs from a single caller within an hour. This could indicate an adversary attempting to enumerate logging configurations, monitor activities, or potentially tamper with logging settings as a precursor to other malicious activities or an attempt to cover tracks.
Detects when a Network Security Group (NSG) rule is successfully deleted in Azure. This could indicate an attempt to bypass network access controls, potentially to enable unauthorized access or exfiltration.
This rule detects when a single caller successfully updates three or more SQL Server firewall rules within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to open up network access to a SQL database, potentially for data exfiltration, command and control, or further lateral movement.
Detects suspicious activity related to OAuth2PermissionGrant operations, specifically looking for a high volume of successful consent grants by a single user within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain broad access to resources by granting permissions to a malicious OAuth application.
Detects when a single user principal name (UPN) performs two or more Azure AD admin role assignments within an hour. This could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or establish persistence by assigning administrative roles to multiple accounts or to the same account multiple times.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to Azure AD device registration. It identifies instances where a single user principal name (UPN) performs 5 or more device registrations or adds members to groups within a one-hour window, specifically targeting device resources. This could indicate an adversary attempting to register multiple devices to bypass conditional access policies or gain persistent access.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a user successfully performs a multi-factor authentication (MFA) device login to Microsoft Office 365 via a browser, and within a 15-minute window, the same user either creates a new inbox rule or adds a new device. This combination of events could indicate an adversary gaining initial access and then setting up persistence (e.g., forwarding emails) or further device enrollment.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by monitoring network events for specific URL patterns and user agent strings associated with known C2 frameworks like AzureVeil and Adaptix. It identifies beaconing if multiple devices communicate with the same remote IP address using these indicators within a 15-minute window, with more than 5 beacon counts and more than 1 distinct device.
This rule detects when a user account assigns a 'Global Administrator' or 'Owner' role from multiple distinct IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate a compromised account being used to escalate privileges or establish persistence from different locations.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the creation or update of managed identities and the assignment of highly privileged roles (Contributor, Owner, User Access Administrator) to them. It specifically looks for multiple such assignments within a one-hour window to managed identities associated with automation, runbook, or function resources, indicating potential privilege escalation or malicious access.
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