Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,142 detections
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Detects network connections from common Linux system binaries (agetty, atd, polkitd, crond) to identified suspicious external domains. These binaries typically do not communicate with external internet services, suggesting potential process masquerading or compromise.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the /tmp directory that follow a specific naming convention (t[number]_w.pipe) by an HAProxy process. This pattern is often associated with inter-process communication or potential post-exploitation activity where HAProxy is leveraged to handle named pipes for malicious command execution or data redirection.
Detects the modification or replacement of critical Linux system daemons (crond, sshd, polkitd, etc.) followed by a service restart or reload. This behavior is indicative of potential trojanization or unauthorized tampering of system processes to establish persistence or inject malicious code.
Detects a sequence of system reconnaissance commands consistent with a Linux stager preparing to deploy a malicious cron payload. The rule identifies the combination of process enumeration (specifically targeting haproxy or cron services), privilege verification, and OS environment profiling (hostname, kernel, or distribution details) occurring within a single execution context.
Detects the modification or replacement of critical Linux system daemons (crond, sshd, polkitd, etc.) followed by a service restart or reload. This behavior is indicative of potential trojanization or unauthorized tampering of system processes to establish persistence or inject malicious code.
Detects the use of common Linux command-line utilities (sed, grep, awk, bash, sh) to perform operations on sensitive system logs or shell history files. The rule targets command strings indicative of log modification, filtering, or removal of audit trails, often associated with an attacker attempting to conceal malicious activity.
Detects a sequence of system reconnaissance commands consistent with a Linux stager preparing to deploy a malicious cron payload. The rule identifies the combination of process enumeration (specifically targeting haproxy or cron services), privilege verification, and OS environment profiling (hostname, kernel, or distribution details) occurring within a single execution context.
Detects modifications to the 'crond' daemon binary followed closely (within 5 minutes) by a restart or start command via common system management utilities. This behavior is highly indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where an adversary replaces a system binary with a malicious version.
Detects the use of common Linux command-line utilities (sed, grep, awk, bash, sh) to perform operations on sensitive system logs or shell history files. The rule targets command strings indicative of log modification, filtering, or removal of audit trails, often associated with an attacker attempting to conceal malicious activity.
This rule detects potential exploitation or unauthorized interaction with an HAProxy service. It correlates process execution on Linux systems involving the HAProxy PID file with subsequent network traffic containing the suspicious string 'writeservice_info' within a one-hour window.
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
Detects network connections from common Linux system binaries (agetty, atd, polkitd, crond) to identified suspicious external domains. These binaries typically do not communicate with external internet services, suggesting potential process masquerading or compromise.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
This rule detects the presence of specific file hashes known to be associated with backdoored software builds, specifically related to recent supply chain compromises affecting South Korean software vendors (e.g., HAProxy builds). It monitors device file events, process initiation, and identity logon events to identify systems that have deployed, executed, or been accessed by these malicious binaries.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the /tmp directory that follow a specific naming convention (t[number]_w.pipe) by an HAProxy process. This pattern is often associated with inter-process communication or potential post-exploitation activity where HAProxy is leveraged to handle named pipes for malicious command execution or data redirection.
Detects the specific execution pattern associated with CurlRAT, where common Linux daemons (crond, atd, agetty, polkitd) perform an outbound network connection and subsequently spawn an interactive shell (sh, bash, dash) as the root user within a 5-minute window.
Detects the specific execution pattern associated with CurlRAT, where common Linux daemons (crond, atd, agetty, polkitd) perform an outbound network connection and subsequently spawn an interactive shell (sh, bash, dash) as the root user within a 5-minute window.
This rule identifies a discrepancy between actual network connections processed by HAProxy and the corresponding entries in its server-side logs. Such inconsistencies can indicate the presence of a malicious backdoor compiled into or injected into the HAProxy process, designed to facilitate C2 traffic while evading standard monitoring by suppressing or omitting logging for those connections.
Detects instances where a database role initially possessing only REPLICATION privileges is elevated to a SUPERUSER role, which represents a significant escalation of privilege within a PostgreSQL environment.
Detects when the PostgreSQL service process (postgres.exe/postgres/postmaster) loads a shared library (.dll or .so) from a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, /tmp). This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-6471, where attackers attempt to load malicious plugins via unvalidated logical decoding plugin paths.
Detects potential exploitation of PostgreSQL via logical decoding plugins, specifically targeting CVE-2026-6471. The rule monitors for the PostgreSQL server process spawning suspicious shell utilities or loading modules from locations outside of the expected PostgreSQL library or plugin directories, which is a common indicator of unauthorized code execution.
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