Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects the installation and execution of a rogue ScreenConnect client by tracking msiexec executing from a temporary package file downloaded via script loaders, or ScreenConnect binaries spawned directly by script hosts or installers associated with malicious activity.
Detects processes running from the AppData directory that attempt persistence by simultaneously creating a Registry Run key (reg.exe) and a scheduled task (schtasks.exe) within a 10-minute window.
This analytic identifies the instance of rundll32.exe process loading a non-standard Windows modules file extension.
This behavior is not common and can be associated with malicious activities, such as the Gh0st RAT backdoor. This technique is to evade possible detection by security tools that monitors a suspicious dll loading activity.
This behavior is not common and can be associated with malicious activities, such as the Gh0st RAT backdoor. This technique is to evade possible detection by security tools that monitors a suspicious dll loading activity.
Detects change the the "AutodialDLL" key which could be used as a persistence method to load custom DLL via the "ws2_32" library
Detects the configuration of a new ISATAP router on a Windows host. While ISATAP is a legitimate Microsoft technology for IPv6 transition, unexpected or unauthorized ISATAP router configurations could indicate a potential IPv6 DNS Takeover attack using tools like mitm6.
In such attacks, adversaries advertise themselves as DHCPv6 servers and set malicious ISATAP routers to intercept traffic.
This detection should be correlated with network baselines and known legitimate ISATAP deployments in your environment.
In such attacks, adversaries advertise themselves as DHCPv6 servers and set malicious ISATAP routers to intercept traffic.
This detection should be correlated with network baselines and known legitimate ISATAP deployments in your environment.
Detects the use of curl with NTLM authentication and empty credentials (-u :), which can be abused to leak the currently logged-in user's NTLMv2 challenge-response to an
attacker-controlled server, enabling offline cracking or relay attacks.
When no credentials are provided, the Microsoft-shipped curl passes a NULL identity to Windows SSPI, which automatically falls back to the current user's logon session credentials
stored in LSASS — without requiring a plaintext password.
This behavior is exclusive to the curl binary shipped by Microsoft (available since Windows 10 / Windows Server 2019), which is built with SSPI support.
attacker-controlled server, enabling offline cracking or relay attacks.
When no credentials are provided, the Microsoft-shipped curl passes a NULL identity to Windows SSPI, which automatically falls back to the current user's logon session credentials
stored in LSASS — without requiring a plaintext password.
This behavior is exclusive to the curl binary shipped by Microsoft (available since Windows 10 / Windows Server 2019), which is built with SSPI support.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks targeting Microsoft 365. The rule correlates browser network events where a user lands on a non-Microsoft host showing interaction required or session information errors, followed shortly by a successful Entra ID sign-in from the same user account.
Detects the execution of the tar.exe utility extracting archive files (-xf or -x) within common temporary or public directories (such as programdata, appdata, temp, downloads, public, tmp, or dev/shm) by non-system actors, potentially indicating staging or unpacking of malicious payloads.
Detects indicators of DarkWire proxy staging by identifying the creation of a netsh firewall rule named 'ss1' or the execution of csrss.exe or vmtoolsd.exe from non-standard directory paths (often associated with SoftEther proxy staging).
Detects a multi-stage execution pattern associated with the Bitter APT group, where ftp.exe is first used to download resource files (icon.ico or res.ico), followed closely within 15 minutes by the creation of a scheduled task utilizing PowerShell/cmd or command execution referencing those resource files.
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
Detects a non-standard process accessing Swarm cryptocurrency wallet files (swarm.key or config.yaml) followed within one hour by network connections to a known C2 domain (frameworkmetrics.xyz). It filters out routine access based on baseline activity.
Detects the loading of specific malicious DLLs (slave.dll or dep.dll) into the LSASS process space, followed by the creation or renaming of an encrypted LSASS dump file (such as 1.png), characteristic of the CopperLsass / DarkWire framework.
Detects the execution of the SpikeStrip CLI (spikestrip.mjs) or legacy sprinkle_canaries.py script using Node.js, combined with specific verb and output options for injecting/removing canary tokens and generating dynamic decoys.
Detects a sequence where a process fetches a file containing 'talk.log' or 'techtalkhelp', followed within 15 minutes by the same device executing PowerShell with Base64 decoding flags.
Detects a cmd.exe one-liner that downloads a VBS file with curl into TEMP, runs it with cscript, and deletes it, matching the CVE-2026-24423 CommandMount payload. The strict regex on the full chain keeps false positives low.
Detects usage of the "ms-appinstaller" protocol handler via command line to potentially download arbitrary files via AppInstaller.EXE
The downloaded files are temporarly stored in ":\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCache\<RANDOM-8-CHAR-DIRECTORY>"
The downloaded files are temporarly stored in ":\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCache\<RANDOM-8-CHAR-DIRECTORY>"
Detects a Microsoft Office application loading taskschd.dll, which exposes COM interfaces for managing Windows Scheduled Tasks.
This load is an early precursor to scheduled task creation or modification and has been frequently observed in macro-enabled
malicious documents attempting to establish persistence.
This load is an early precursor to scheduled task creation or modification and has been frequently observed in macro-enabled
malicious documents attempting to establish persistence.
Detects suspicious commands executed via the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) by correlating RunMRU registry updates with the originating process. This hunt is intended to identify user-driven execution techniques commonly observed in ClickFix, FileFix, fake CAPTCHA, and other social engineering attacks.
Detects the presence and activity of autonomous AI agents, coding agents, and agent frameworks (such as OpenClaw, AutoGPT, CrewAI, Aider, Claude Code, etc.) across process execution, file creation/modification, and network connection telemetry to maintain inventory and visibility.
Detects potential Wi-Fi profile plaintext key dumping by monitoring for a sequence where a non-network-management process runs netsh to list wireless profiles followed quickly by a request to display the profile with clear keys (key=clear).
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