Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

896 detections

Detects the ShieldCrash CVE-2026-69414 exploit PoC binary/PDB via multiple corroborating distinguishing strings and file size
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
303
Detects rapid deletion and creation cycles of the WD_SCAN object manager link, a behavioral pattern associated with a Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) exploit chain targeting Windows Defender (referenced as CVE-2026-69414). The rule monitors for at least three cycle events occurring within a 5-second window, specifically involving the 'WD_SCAN' object identifier.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
203
Detects suspicious DLL loads or file drops performed by security product processes (avp.exe, MsMpEng.exe) from directories outside of standard, trusted vendor paths. It specifically flags unsigned or invalidly signed DLLs, which is indicative of DLL sideloading techniques used to abuse security software workflows for potential privilege escalation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
8014
Detects trojanized 7z.dll loader and encrypted GRAYRABBIT payload components dropped during the UNC3569 exploit chain
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects trojanized 7z.dll loader and encrypted GRAYRABBIT payload components dropped during the UNC3569 exploit chain
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the use of PowerShell commands to add directory exclusions to Windows Defender settings. Adversaries often use this technique to exclude directories in 'AppData' from being scanned by antivirus solutions to hide malicious activity, tools, or persistence mechanisms.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
005
This rule detects the use of the LockAppHost process to execute suspicious commands associated with tampering with security configurations, including Windows Defender settings, service management (sc.exe), and task scheduling. Adversaries may abuse this process to bypass security controls, disable real-time monitoring, or maintain persistence.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
105
Detects Adblock.dll used by Docro Hijacker to bypass Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity checks and register infected browser UUID via vendralo[.]info
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
Detects Adblock.dll used by Docro Hijacker to bypass Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity checks and register infected browser UUID via vendralo[.]info
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
Detects rapid, repeated invocation of Microsoft Defender remediation processes (mpcmdrun.exe, MsMpEng.exe) occurring in conjunction with suspicious file write or rename operations in System32. This pattern is characteristic of a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, where an attacker attempts to exploit the timing gap between Defender's detection and remediation actions to replace a file with a malicious version.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
8011
Detects HVNC backdoor payload containing hardcoded AV/EDR process names combined with process enumeration APIs and a hex-suffixed mutex naming pattern, reducing false positives from generic AV name or API string matches alone
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
Detects HVNC backdoor payload containing hardcoded AV/EDR process names combined with process enumeration APIs and a hex-suffixed mutex naming pattern, reducing false positives from generic AV name or API string matches alone
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
Detects HVNC backdoor payload containing hardcoded AV/EDR process names combined with process enumeration APIs and a hex-suffixed mutex naming pattern, reducing false positives from generic AV name or API string matches alone
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects suspicious file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) initiated by MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) involving specific indicators related to ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) or 'ShieldCrash' components. These indicators often suggest tampering attempts or the presence of tools designed to interfere with Defender's security operations by targeting its configuration, staging, or protected storage locations.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects rapid deletion and creation cycles of the WD_SCAN object manager link, a behavioral pattern associated with a Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) exploit chain targeting Windows Defender (referenced as CVE-2026-69414). The rule monitors for at least three cycle events occurring within a 5-second window, specifically involving the 'WD_SCAN' object identifier.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects indicators of the ProRAM malware dropper, specifically identifying the download of 'sideload.exe' from an external IP or the presence of file artifacts related to its staging process in %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA% directories.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
005
Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
109
Detects indicators of the ProRAM malware dropper, specifically identifying the download of 'sideload.exe' from an external IP or the presence of file artifacts related to its staging process in %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA% directories.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender security settings by adding exclusion paths or processes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to whitelist malicious files or processes to evade detection by the antivirus solution.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
102
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender security settings by adding exclusion paths or processes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to whitelist malicious files or processes to evade detection by the antivirus solution.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
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