Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential credential exposure by identifying HTTP requests to IIS servers (W3CIISLog) that contain keywords like 'password' or 'token' in the URI query string, with a successful status code (200). This could indicate sensitive information being passed insecurely.
This rule detects potential file inclusion attempts by monitoring IIS web server logs for URI queries containing keywords like 'file=', 'path=', or 'input='. It then aggregates these attempts by client IP address over one-hour intervals and alerts if 10 or more such attempts are observed from a single IP within that timeframe, indicating a possible attack.
This rule detects potential XML External Entity (XXE) injection attempts by looking for specific XML-related keywords ('<?xml' or 'DOCTYPE') within the URI query string of IIS web server logs. It triggers an alert if three or more such attempts are observed from the same IP address within a one-hour window, indicating a possible automated scanning or attack.
This rule detects potential open redirect attempts by monitoring W3C IIS logs for URI queries containing keywords like 'callback', 'redirect', or 'url='. It then aggregates these attempts by client IP address and time, triggering an alert if five or more such attempts are observed within an hour from a single IP. This pattern can indicate an attacker attempting to exploit an open redirect vulnerability to phish users or bypass security controls.
Detects an unusual volume of 'Logging' or 'Monitor' operations within Azure Activity logs from a single caller within an hour. This could indicate an adversary attempting to enumerate logging configurations, monitor activities, or potentially tamper with logging settings as a precursor to other malicious activities or an attempt to cover tracks.
Detects successful Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins where the user agent indicates a Node.js-based HTTP client (e.g., node, axios, undici, node-fetch). Tycoon 2FA and other AiTM phishing kits heavily leverage these backend automated tools for token relay and renewal immediately following MFA interception.
Detects named pipe activity with remote access enabled, initiated by JsonVMAccessExtension.exe running as SYSTEM. This may indicate abuse of the Azure VM Access Extension for unauthorized remote access.
This rule detects HTTP requests to the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address (169.254.169.254) with the URI containing 'metadata/instance'. This activity indicates an attempt to discover information about the Azure virtual machine instance, which can be a legitimate administrative action or an adversary attempting to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
This rule detects potential credential abuse of service principals or applications by identifying an unusual number of activities from a single service principal or application across multiple distinct IP addresses within a one-hour window. It specifically monitors sign-in logs for applications like 'Azure CLI', 'GitHub', or 'CustomApp' where the user type is 'ServicePrincipal' or 'Application'. A threshold of more than 10 activities and more than 2 distinct IP addresses within an hour triggers an alert.
This rule detects the issuance of OAuth tokens or OAuth consent events within cloud applications. It specifically looks for these events where the client application is not 'Microsoft Teams' or 'Azure CLI'. The rule summarizes the number of grants and distinct users for each client application and token ID over hourly intervals. This can help identify potentially unauthorized or suspicious OAuth application consents.
This rule detects when a global administrator role is assigned in Azure via the Graph API. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to 'graph.microsoft.com' with 'assignLicense' in the URI.
This rule detects suspicious device enrollment attempts via Microsoft Intune Company Portal from a country not previously observed in a user's 7-day sign-in history. It identifies two primary patterns: sustained successful sign-ins from a new country, indicating a potential active session and successful device enrollment (High Severity), or Conditional Access Policy (CAP) blocked attempts from a new country, suggesting an attacker probing with stolen credentials (Medium Severity). The detection aims to identify identity theft leading to unauthorized device enrollment.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to the assignment of application roles. Specifically, it identifies when a single user principal name (UPN) performs 10 or more successful 'Add app role assignment' operations within a one-hour window. This could indicate an attacker rapidly granting themselves or other entities access to multiple applications or resources.
This rule detects suspicious Azure AD sign-in activity where a user successfully signs in from multiple unusual cities within a 24-hour period. It specifically looks for sign-ins that are not from a trusted network and are not from a compliant device, aggregating successful sign-ins by UserPrincipalName and IpAddress, and flagging if there are 5 or more distinct cities.
Detects suspicious activity related to OAuth2PermissionGrant operations, specifically looking for a high volume of successful consent grants by a single user within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain broad access to resources by granting permissions to a malicious OAuth application.
This rule detects potential tampering with Conditional Access Policies in Azure Active Directory by monitoring for multiple update, delete, or add operations on policies containing 'Conditional Access' in their display name within a one-hour window. This could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls to maintain access or bypass MFA.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to the assignment of application roles. Specifically, it identifies when a single user principal name (UPN) performs 10 or more successful 'Add app role assignment' operations within a one-hour window. This could indicate an attacker rapidly granting themselves or other entities access to multiple applications or resources.
Detects suspicious activity involving multiple password resets for different users initiated by a single user within a one-hour timeframe in Azure AD. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain control over multiple accounts.
This rule detects the creation of new service principals or the assignment of new role assignments to existing service principals in Azure Active Directory. It specifically looks for assignments that grant high-privilege roles such as "Contributor", "Owner", or "Global Admin". The rule aggregates these changes by target and time, highlighting instances where multiple changes or distinct initiators are involved.
This rule detects potential credential abuse of service principals or applications by identifying an unusual number of activities from a single service principal or application across multiple distinct IP addresses within a one-hour window. It specifically monitors sign-in logs for applications like 'Azure CLI', 'GitHub', or 'CustomApp' where the user type is 'ServicePrincipal' or 'Application'. A threshold of more than 10 activities and more than 2 distinct IP addresses within an hour triggers an alert.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
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