Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects high-volume network activity from a single device/process to public IP addresses over common ports (80, 443) or UDP protocol. This behavior is indicative of potential command and control communication, automated data exfiltration, or a scanning attempt.
Detects HTML files that employ FlipBook branding as a lure for password-gated smuggling. The detection identifies client-side JavaScript logic that uses PBKDF2 and AES-GCM to decrypt a hidden redirect URL after user interaction with a password prompt.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
This rule monitors for execution of suspicious files or processes and network communication associated with known malicious indicators (hashes, domains, and IP addresses) typically used by specific threat actors for command and control (C2) and payload delivery.
This rule detects file and process activity originating from or involving specific directories and filenames associated with 'Agta' software, including temporary files such as PowerShell scripts and XML tasks. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized use of backup or testing utilities for malicious purposes, such as script execution or task manipulation.
This rule identifies two distinct security threats on Windows systems: the execution or presence of files matching a known malicious SHA256 hash list, and modifications to the 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' registry key, which could indicate an attempt to weaken User Account Control (UAC) protections.
Detects the presence of package.json or node_modules artifacts associated with a known typosquatting campaign targeting the 'sorted-btree' npm package. The rule identifies suspicious package names or dependencies by matching against a list of known malicious packages used in the campaign, or by detecting the co-occurrence of the malicious 'indexed-btree' package alongside the legitimate 'sorted-btree' package.
Detects modifications to the Windows registry key 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' to set it to '0' (disabled). This configuration change effectively disables the secure desktop for User Account Control (UAC) prompts, which is a technique used by adversaries to facilitate UAC bypasses or simplify credential harvesting by making UAC prompts more easily spoofable or interceptable.
This rule monitors for processes masquerading as Dell-related software (e.g., 'Dell Window Guard.exe', 'Dell.Virus.Guard.exe') or processes containing the command-line argument 'AgtaBackstage'. It flags devices where multiple variations of these suspicious file names appear or where the specific 'AgtaBackstage' string is present, which is indicative of potential malicious activity or persistence mechanisms using software-related naming conventions.
Detects known AgtaBackup RAT staged installers and dropped payload via SHA-256 hash or characteristic filenames
Detects the creation of files with specific naming patterns (starting with 'agta_av_' for PowerShell scripts or 'agta_task_' for XML files) within the Windows SystemTemp directory. This behavior is indicative of potential staging of malicious scripts or scheduled task definitions by adversaries.
This rule monitors for suspicious persistence mechanisms associated with 'Agta Backup' software, specifically looking for the creation of new Windows services, the addition of scheduled tasks, and the manipulation of processes related to 'Credential Guard.exe' within Agta Backup directories. It also tracks the presence of specific file artifacts within the application's install directories, which could indicate unauthorized installation or persistence attempts.
Detects the modification of service permissions for the 'AgtaBackupAgentSvc' service using the 'sdset' command via 'sc.exe', 'cmd.exe', or 'powershell.exe'. Adversaries use this technique to hide services or modify access to them by applying a specific Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string to bypass security enumeration or maintain persistence.
Detects the 'Credential Guard.exe' process (associated with AgtaBackup RAT) accessing sensitive browser files (Login Data, Cookies, History, Bookmarks) and subsequently exfiltrating data to a specific C2 endpoint.
Detects modifications to the Windows registry key 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' to set it to '0' (disabled). This configuration change effectively disables the secure desktop for User Account Control (UAC) prompts, which is a technique used by adversaries to facilitate UAC bypasses or simplify credential harvesting by making UAC prompts more easily spoofable or interceptable.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Detects a potential ClickFix social engineering attack pattern where a user manually launches a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) from Windows Explorer followed within 30 minutes by the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe', a known indicator in installer side-load chains.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window styles and encoded commands, initiated with High Integrity (Admin) privileges. This pattern is often indicative of bypasses for User Account Control (UAC) or malicious script execution where an adversary attempts to run elevated code while minimizing user visibility.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
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