Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects repeated file creation or modification events involving the specific file 'bot_log.txt' in directory paths containing '\Temp\' on endpoints where 'msedge_proxy.exe' is also running. This pattern is indicative of potential data staging or logging activities by an unauthorized proxy or tunnel process.
Matches known SHA-256 hashes for the BotHelper stager (WindowsUpdate.exe) and RAT (msedge_proxy.exe)
Detects host-control and management tasks (e.g., shutdown, logoff, scheduled task modification) executed as child processes of the msedge_proxy.exe process. This behavior is indicative of the BotHelper malware implant managing infected endpoints.
Detects the execution of a .pif (Program Information File) process where the filename contains keywords suggestive of image files (e.g., 'image', 'photo', 'scan'). Adversaries often use this technique to trick users into executing malicious code by masquerading the file type.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the '/sta' command-line flag and a GUID-formatted CLSID. This technique is often used by malware (e.g., DarkME RAT) to proxy execution through COM components, which hides the actual path of the loaded DLL or payload, aiding in evasion.
This rule detects the execution of 'clspack.exe' from within the AppData\Microsoft directory. 'clspack.exe' is a legitimate Windows utility normally residing in System32 or SysWOW64. Execution from user-writable directories like AppData is a common indicator of masquerading or binary hijacking.
Detects suspicious modifications to Windows Registry keys associated with URL protocol handlers or automatic startup mechanisms. Adversaries often use custom URL schemes or registry run keys to maintain persistence or execute malicious code when a specific protocol is invoked or upon user logon.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
Detects instances where a signed executable, typically a security or trusted system binary, loads an unsigned DLL from a user-writable, non-default directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData). The rule specifically targets common system or vendor library names, indicating potential DLL search-order hijacking used to execute malicious code within a trusted process context.
Detects the use of legitimate data-transfer utilities (rclone, MEGA client, restic, WinSCP) configured to exfiltrate data to cloud storage providers. This behavior is identified as a precursor to double-extortion ransomware attacks, where attackers steal sensitive data before encrypting it.
Detects a credential stuffing attack characterized by a high volume of failed authentication attempts from a small set of source IP addresses followed by a successful authentication within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to use valid credentials obtained from infostealer logs or credential leaks to gain unauthorized access to accounts.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or MSHTA from explorer.exe with command line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as hidden windows, Base64 encoding, or command execution (IEX/Invoke-Expression). This behavior is common in fileless malware delivery and script-based initial access.
This rule detects the execution of the Cloudflare 'cloudflared' utility from non-standard directory locations. Cloudflared is often abused by threat actors to establish reverse tunnels (e.g., TryCloudflare) to gain unauthorized, persistent, and encrypted external access to a compromised host, effectively bypassing standard perimeter network security controls.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying a system that initiates SMB connections (port 445) to 5 or more unique destinations, correlated with a Windows Service installation event (Event ID 7045) on the host. This behavior is indicative of an adversary or automated tool using SMB to copy and execute binaries as a service on multiple remote systems.
This rule detects successful user logins from multiple geographical locations (impossible travel) where multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not utilized. This behavior is indicative of credential theft or account takeover attempts.
This rule detects the execution of common remote access and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) tools spawned directly from web browser processes (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox). It further monitors for subsequent suspicious child process activity such as command shell execution or file operations performed by these RMM tools, which is a common pattern in post-exploitation and initial access activities.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell, CMD, or PWSH command execution characterized by obfuscation techniques (such as Base64 encoding, decompression, or hidden command arguments) that are followed closely in time by network connections to public AI service domains (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Generative Language, Mistral, Cohere). The detection correlates process-start events with outbound network requests from processes other than standard web browsers, suggesting potentially unauthorized use of AI APIs for exfiltration or automated processing of command results.
Detects suspicious administrative activity involving privileged users performing bulk account/object deletions or stopping critical identity-related services (ADFS, Active Directory Certificate Services). The rule specifically flags events occurring outside standard business hours, involving privileged AD groups, or directly targeting identity infrastructure, indicating a potential attempt to disrupt authentication services or sabotage identity management.
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd, conhost) which are common vectors for ClickFix-style attacks, where a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt.
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