Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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A documented FileFix variant arrives as an HTML/MHTML email attachment styled to look like a Word document or PDF, displaying a fake 'file could not be rendered' prompt that leads into the address-bar paste.
Detects the creation of registry keys associated with the installation of Chrome or Edge browser extensions, specifically targeting the behavior exhibited by the CrashFix malware which masquerades as an ad blocker to achieve persistence.
Detects mshta.exe spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or reg.exe) that are characteristic of the ReverseRAT backdoor. The rule identifies common discovery commands or persistence attempts via Registry Run keys triggered from mshta.exe.
Detects the modification of AI agent configuration files (e.g., mcp.json, config.json) followed shortly by the agent spawning a child process that matches typical Model Context Protocol (MCP) server execution patterns. This behavior may indicate an attacker has modified the configuration to inject malicious server commands or tools that the AI agent will execute upon next initialization, effectively achieving persistent code execution via the agent's legitimate functionality.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or modify Discord's local storage leveldb files, which store user authentication tokens, and correlates this with suspicious network activity to Discord's API or the presence of token-stealing keywords in command-line arguments.
Detects instances where AI developer tools or IDE assistants (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor) execute data collection commands (such as directory traversal or archiving) followed by or concurrent with the bulk access of sensitive files (credentials, configuration files) or personal user data.
Detects the ChainScript RAT agent (executing as node.exe from specific masquerading directory paths) scanning for and enumerating cryptocurrency wallet files, browser-stored wallet extensions, and related sensitive configuration data.
Detects the installation of a Windows service that mimics the legitimate NVIDIA File System Filter Driver (NvFsFilter). Adversaries, such as those associated with the Rapuncel infostealer, use this technique to establish persistence and evade security controls by masquerading as a common driver component.
Detects the loading of the malicious NvFsFilter driver (a BYOVD technique often used by the Rapuncel infostealer) followed immediately by a mass burst of process terminations, indicating an attempt to disable security software.
Detects AI coding assistants and LLM agent frameworks attempting to access, read, or export sensitive credential files, registry hives, or application secrets. The rule monitors both file system operations on known secret locations and process execution patterns indicative of credential dumping or API token retrieval by these tools.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
IOC hunt across DNS, network, and file-hash telemetry for the Ledger Google Ads phishing campaign. Vercel redirect domains are matched by exact hostname (DNS query name / parsed URL host) rather than substring, eliminating false positives from unrelated strings that merely contain a look-alike domain fragment. GCS bucket and Google Sites path IOCs remain substring-matched since the bucket IDs and page slugs are already highly specific.
Detects network navigation to Google Sites pages that match patterns associated with known Ledger-impersonating phishing campaigns. These sites are often reached through redirect chains involving Google Ads, cloud storage, and rotating domains.
Detects network navigation to Google Sites pages that match patterns associated with known Ledger-impersonating phishing campaigns. These sites are often reached through redirect chains involving Google Ads, cloud storage, and rotating domains.
Detects network navigation to Google Sites pages that match patterns associated with known Ledger-impersonating phishing campaigns. These sites are often reached through redirect chains involving Google Ads, cloud storage, and rotating domains.
Detects a fake ClaudeDesktop.exe installer / tampered libcef.dll sideload chain deploying the SectopRAT .NET RAT, requiring multiple corroborating indicators and a PE anomaly consistent with DLL sideloading rather than a single generic string
Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
Detects SectopRAT (Arechclient2) .NET RAT binaries deployed via tampered libcef.dll / JetBrains helper DLL sideloading that harvest browser credentials, cookies, credit card data, and files. Tightened to require combined sideload+family+target indicators plus .NET CLR import evidence, avoiding standalone generic strings.
Detects PavokwiLoader behavior where a potentially malicious process spawns a browser or system process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) in a suspended state, followed by cross-process memory allocation and writing, and subsequent thread hijacking or execution resumption, indicating a process hollowing injection technique.
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