Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects access to Chrome or Chromium-based browser Local State files (which contain encrypted keys) by a non-browser process that correlates temporally with a PowerShell process exhibiting ClickFix-style staging characteristics (hidden window, bypass execution policy, and containing a URL).
Detects the execution of Salat Stealer C2-pushed scripts involving the disabling of recovery environment via reagentc.exe and UAC disabling via registry modification on the same device within one hour.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "edputil.dll"
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by "SystemResetPlatform.exe" located in a non-default location.
Detects uncommon network connections to the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) from processes not typically associated with ADWS management.
Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in the Visual Studio folder.
Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage.
Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage.
Detects the execution of fsquirt.exe spawned by INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe where fsquirt.exe subsequently loads an unsigned or untrusted DLL, indicative of a potential TechHub DLL side-loading technique.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a client IP performs a brute-force attack against WordPress login or XML-RPC endpoints followed by enumeration of the wp-json REST API.
Detects PaperCut server processes (such as pc-app.exe, pc-server.exe, or Java running PaperCut) spawning command shells or utility binaries associated with credential dumping, internal reconnaissance, or pivoting.
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, reconnaissance, and command execution originating from web server and PHP lineage processes, indicating potential webshell activity or compromised web applications.
Detects MsiExec loading a DLL and calling its DllUnregisterServer function
Detects using Rpcping.exe to send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.
Detects the execution of OpenConnect VPN clients on non-sanctioned devices followed within a 4-hour window by high-volume internal network connections across multiple ports indicative of network service discovery or pivoting activity.
Detects the staging of wmpdmc.exe and wmpdui.dll together within a ProgramData folder, as well as subsequent scheduled task creation or execution of wmpdmc.exe from ProgramData associated with the Yoba campaign.
Detects the Yoba campaign behavior involving the staging of wmpdmc.exe along with wmpdui.dll or ampdui.dll in the ProgramData\WMProcess directory, followed by execution or invocation via scheduled tasks.
Detects the correlation of two or more distinct discovery tools or artifacts (such as SharpShares, NetScan, NetExec, ShareFinder, and specific nltest.exe domain trust commands) executed on the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects post-exploitation behavior where a PaperCut server Java process spawns local account creation or administrator reset followed closely by Active Directory enumeration on the same host, indicating potential post-RCE meterpreter activity.
Detects a PaperCut server Java process spawning a local account creation or local administrators group addition, followed closely by Active Directory domain or computer enumeration from the same host within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of the ROMULUS staging script via PowerShell script block logging (Event ID 4104). The rule identifies specific indicators including the use of environment variable '__ST', '$MyInvocation.MyCommand.Path', dynamic code reconstruction via '[scriptblock]::Create', and a high comma count exceeding 200.
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