Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,264 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
664
209
126
82
71
Contributors
423
267
143
83
79
Categories
670
317
260
116
95
Platforms
1,247
10
5
4
4
Products / Services
10,665
9,773
6,704
4,421
3,749
1,264
MITRE Techniques
530
447
414
334
275
CVEs
5
5
4
4
4
IDS Classtypes
1
IDS Protocols
1
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
Detects attempts to install or modify the 'WMI Provider Host' (WmiPrvSE) service, which is a common technique used by adversaries for persistence or to masquerade malicious activity. The rule monitors process execution, registry modifications, and service installation events specifically targeting this service name.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the manipulation of Windows services using 'sc.exe' to stop or delete services, combined with the forceful termination of 'svchost.exe' processes via 'wmic.exe'. This pattern is often associated with adversaries attempting to disable security tools, logging agents, or other defensive mechanisms on an endpoint.
Detects scheduled task creations or modification on a suspicious schedule type
Detects the execution of a Faronics Deploy installer that has been renamed to mimic Adobe-related software. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to trick users into executing binaries that lead to the silent installation of remote monitoring tools like ScreenConnect.
Detects attempts to stop or reconfigure critical Windows security services (such as WinDefend, WscSvc, Sense, and WdNisSvc) using the Service Control Manager (sc.exe) or by modifying service registry keys via reg.exe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to disable EDR/AV solutions to evade detection.
Detects the modification of the Print Spooler (Spooler) Windows service configuration via command-line registry utilities (reg.exe or regedit.exe). This activity may indicate an attempt to restore or re-enable the Print Spooler service, which is frequently targeted for disabling as a mitigation strategy against vulnerabilities like PrintNightmare.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
Detection of sc.exe utility adding a new service with special permission which hides that service.
Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folders or files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" or "powershell.exe"
Detects the use of the native Windows utility 'wbadmin.exe' to initiate a backup procedure targeting the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) and associated registry hives (SYSTEM, SECURITY). This technique is utilized by adversaries for offline credential harvesting by extracting the directory database file. This behavior has been observed in intrusion campaigns involving ransomware actors like Akira.
Detects the use of the sc.exe utility to disable critical system, security, and database services, a technique commonly associated with Everest ransomware to prevent service restart during encryption activities.
Detects persistence and configuration activity associated with the CornFlake RAT, including the creation of malicious Windows services (e.g., 'svchost32', 'Cloud Sync Service'), registry run key modifications, and the presence of specific file artifacts like 'sync.dat' and malicious executables within AppData directories.
Detects installation of a Windows service (System EventID 7045)
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
Detects the execution of a Faronics Deploy installer that has been renamed to mimic Adobe-related software. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to trick users into executing binaries that lead to the silent installation of remote monitoring tools like ScreenConnect.
ServiceDll Hijack
Sigma
Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry.
This is often used as a method of persistence.
This is often used as a method of persistence.
Detects TWINLOOT persistence mechanisms observed in the TWINLOOT Python implant framework, including COM hijacking via a scriptlet (.sct) reference written to the TypeLib registry key for CLSID {EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B} version 1.1 (win32/win64), and the creation of a Run key value named 'UserExperienceSync' under CurrentVersion\Run for autorun persistence.
Detects attempts to impair Windows Defender protection by modifying preferences via PowerShell (Set-MpPreference/Add-MpPreference), stopping the WinDefend service using sc.exe, or altering sensitive Windows Defender registry keys. This rule monitors process execution and registry modification events, excluding known legitimate management tools like Intune and SCCM.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
Detects the execution of various command-line tools (sc, net, powershell, wmic, taskkill, systemctl, launchctl) used to stop or disable system services. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to stop security services, backup agents, or other critical infrastructure for impact, defense evasion, or prior to data destruction.
Page 14 of 61