Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Detects unauthorized execution of wermgr.exe from suspicious paths or spawned by Task Scheduler service (svchost.exe/taskeng.exe) with non-standard parent processes. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts where an unprivileged process leverages the Windows Error Reporting (WER) QueueReporting scheduled task to execute a malicious payload in the context of the SYSTEM account.
Detects execution patterns associated with the DragonReturn loader, which implements a timing delay loop using GetTickCount64 before executing secondary actions, such as deploying a Windows service via sc.exe.
Detects execution of wermgr.exe from suspicious, non-standard directories (such as temp or user-writable paths). This behavior is indicative of the 'RoguePlanet' exploit, which leverages a junction swap to replace the legitimate Windows Error Reporting binary with a malicious payload, executed via the WER QueueReporting scheduled task.
Detects the creation of Windows scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' where the executable being registered or the task itself is associated with suspicious directories like %LOCALAPPDATA%, %APPDATA%, or %TEMP%. The rule further filters for specific suspicious strings often used in malicious task configurations, indicating potential persistence or malicious command execution.
Detects persistence establishment via the Windows Package Manager (WinGet) Desired State Configuration (DSC) engine. The rule identifies instances where 'ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe' or 'WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe' spawns 'schtasks.exe' or uses PowerShell to create scheduled tasks. It correlates process execution events with Security Event ID 4698 to identify unauthorized scheduled task creation within the WinGet DSC context.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms associated with the SystemBC/Coroxy malware. It monitors for three indicators: 1) The creation of scheduled tasks via 'schtasks.exe' where the task binary is located in 'ProgramData' and uses the 'start' argument; 2) Windows Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) identifying similar task actions in 'ProgramData' with the 'start' argument; 3) The creation of Registry Run keys in 'HKCU' or 'HKLM' with values containing 'ProgramData' combined with malicious arguments such as 'start', '-windowstyle hidden', or '-ep bypass'.
Detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks by potentially malicious processes (e.g., winupdate.exe or processes running from AppData/.cache or Temp directories). The rule monitors for schtasks.exe usage that either targets specific persistence locations or creates tasks naming conventions (e.g., 'WindowsDefenderAgent') often associated with the Yuta/Glove Stealer malware family.
Detects the installation of a driver service using sc.exe from suspicious, non-standard directories (e.g., Temp, AppData) or involving common driver extensions (.sys). This behavior is indicative of the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique, often used to load vulnerable drivers to bypass or disable security products, consistent with activities attributed to various threat actors.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe using parameters often associated with malicious persistence mechanisms, such as running as SYSTEM, requiring highest privileges, or placing task actions in directories like Temp, AppData, or Public. This behavior is consistent with tactics used by various threat actors, including UNC1549/MiniJunk, to maintain persistence.
Detects the execution of common Windows system utilities (tasklist.exe, sc.exe, reg.exe, wmic.exe, powershell.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of security software, antivirus product, or system service enumeration. This activity is frequently associated with reconnaissance efforts by threat actors attempting to identify defensive capabilities.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdate' or 'MicrosoftEdge' that execute files located in non-standard directories such as ProgramData or Temp. This is a common technique used by threat actors to achieve persistence while masquerading as legitimate update services.
This rule detects the creation or configuration of a scheduled task named 'GoogleErrorReport' which references 'Fondue.exe' located in the 'C:\Users\Public' directory. This specific pattern is associated with 'Dropping Elephant' malware persistence, where the task ensures the binary executes persistently on the host.
This rule detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks using either the schtasks command or through the system's scheduled task service. It focuses on task actions originating from suspicious parent processes (such as browsers or script interpreters), tasks executing scripts from writable user directories, or tasks with persistence triggers (e.g., /SC MINUTE, /SC ONLOGON) containing encoded PowerShell commands or hidden window styles indicative of malicious activity.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe by processes that are not digitally signed by Microsoft Corporation, as well as the loading of taskschd.dll by non-standard/unsigned processes. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or unauthorized task scheduling activity.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the Windows schtasks utility where the task action points to a file located in common user-writable directories such as AppData, Temp, Users\Public, or Downloads. This behavior is frequently associated with persistence mechanisms used by malware and backdoors.
Detects the execution of batch scripts or direct command-line operations (taskkill, sc, net, powershell, wmic) specifically targeting the termination, deletion, or disabling of common endpoint security software such as Microsoft Defender, Sysmon, Filebeat, and other agent-based security tools.
Detects the BeepRAT malware establishing persistence by creating a scheduled task named 'WindowsUpdateTempFileCleanUp' via 'schtasks.exe'. The task is configured to execute a malicious loader chain using the Tiny C Compiler to run a hidden config file, often spawned from a binary named 'HFY.exe'.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks that point to executable files located in suspicious directories such as ProgramData, Temp, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of persistence mechanisms commonly employed by the The Gentlemen Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group to maintain access and execute malicious components like backdoors or ransomware binaries.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task via 'schtasks.exe' that specifically involves the 'MasterPackager.Updater' and execution of a 'script.vbs' file. This behavior is indicative of potential software deployment or persistence mechanisms utilizing VBScript within a scheduled task.
Ransomware group exploiting edge devices and managed file transfer software
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