Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the installation of a new VS Code extension occurring in close temporal proximity to network communication with the official VS Code marketplace or unpkg domains. This pattern is designed to surface potential supply chain compromises where malicious extensions may be deployed to developers' machines.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the "sudoers.d" directory on Linux systems.
Such activity may indicate an attempt to establish or maintain privilege escalation by granting specific users elevated permissions.
Unauthorized changes to sudoers files are a common technique used by attackers to persist administrative access.
Such activity may indicate an attempt to establish or maintain privilege escalation by granting specific users elevated permissions.
Unauthorized changes to sudoers files are a common technique used by attackers to persist administrative access.
Detects the execution of administrative or system-modifying tools (e.g., bash, sh, chroot, mount) or suspicious command lines involving root-level path manipulation or capability inspection (capsh) initiated by office applications, sandbox host processes, or specialized Excel engines. This behavior is indicative of a potential container breakout, privilege escalation, or post-exploitation activity originating from an initial access vector.
This rule detects potential attempts to exploit kernel vulnerabilities related to the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) within a containerized environment, followed by suspicious file creation activity in sensitive system directories (e.g., /root/). It correlates logs showing SCTP socket configuration activity with subsequent filesystem modifications within a short 5-minute window.
Detects attempts to clear or manipulate the shell command history (e.g., bash) using specific commands often utilized by attackers to conceal their activities. The detection monitors for commands such as deleting specific history entries, redirecting history output to /dev/null, or using escape sequences to clear the terminal buffer.
Detects an unsigned/unexpected PAM module written into the su/sudo authentication stack, correlated with non-package-manager modification of /etc/pam.d/ configuration and subsequent su/sudo activity — the technique Jewelbug's Linux tooling uses to steal credentials.
This rule identifies network connections using deprecated, insecure TLS versions (TLS 1.0, 1.1) or weak cipher suites (RC4, 3DES, NULL). The use of these legacy cryptographic protocols is a security risk, as they are vulnerable to various attacks like man-in-the-middle, and may indicate misconfigured servers, legacy infrastructure, or attempts by an adversary to downgrade encryption to facilitate traffic interception or inspection.
This rule extracts and audits inventory information from local agents, including vendor, device name, account context, and associated process information. It is designed to provide visibility into the state and configuration of installed local agents within the environment.
KQL Query
Detects ELF binaries embedding the ClientKing implant name alongside structural indicators (Rust runtime markers or C2 configuration patterns), associated with Jewelbug espionage tooling targeting Linux servers and routers
Detects mass file rename/write events producing the distinctive .ENCRT extension used by Gunra's ChaCha20+RSA-4096 encryptor, scoped narrowly to avoid matching legitimate bulk file operations.
Detects the execution of the Bun JavaScript runtime by npm or node.js during lifecycle tasks (preinstall, postinstall, etc.). This behavior is highly indicative of the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, which uses npm lifecycle scripts to download and execute a second-stage payload using the Bun runtime.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by a process identifying itself as 'HeadlessChrome' within the User-Agent string. This behavior is indicative of a headless browser being misused as a proxy for Command and Control (C2) communication, as observed in msaRAT infections.
This rule detects suspicious process execution chains where common web application servers (gunicorn, uwsgi, celery) spawn command-line utilities (bash, sh, curl, wget, python3) containing strings indicative of Python object inspection or class pollution. This pattern is commonly associated with attempts to exploit server-side vulnerabilities for remote code execution or post-exploitation activities.
This one's the interesting bit they're using Ethereum RPC calls as a C2channel and dumping stolen secrets to attacker-owned public repos tagged "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again". Also flags Claude/VS Code config file writes dropped by the worm for lateral persistence across dev machines.
This rule detects instances where a process that is not a recognized web browser attempts to access sensitive files associated with browser credential stores, such as Login Data, Cookies, and web browser state files. Such activity is commonly associated with infostealer malware, which attempts to exfiltrate saved passwords, session cookies, and autofill information.
Detects Visual Studio Code or Node.js processes checking for common CI/CD environment variables (such as GITHUB_ACTIONS, JENKINS_HOME, or GITPOD_WORKSPACE_ID) or specifically testing for the existence of CI environments via 'process.env.CI'. This behavior is characteristic of malicious extensions attempting to identify if they are running within a sandboxed CI/CD build environment to potentially evade detection or adjust their payload delivery.
Detects execution of a 'setup.mjs' preinstall lifecycle hook, the stage-1 loader used in the
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
Detects credential and token harvesting behaviors associated with the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud 2.0 npm worm, specifically targeting CI/CD environments. The rule monitors for unauthorized access to /proc/[pid]/mem to scrape memory for workflow secrets, extraction of OIDC environment variables, and suspicious invocation of the GitHub CLI (gh) to steal authentication tokens.
Detects the execution of malicious 'node.exe' processes that invoke 'setup.mjs' or 'math_init.js' scripts from within .vscode or .claude configuration directories. This pattern is characteristic of the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, which leverages VS Code tasks or Claude Code session hooks to achieve persistent execution of dropper scripts without triggering standard npm installation flows.
Detects SSH access to the Hiware system access-control server from accounts/source IPs outside the approved PAM admin allowlist, followed by bulk password-database export, consistent with Gunra's symmetric-key theft and mass credential decryption.
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