Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects a suspicious execution chain where explorer.exe (typically via the Run dialog) executes PowerShell, which subsequently launches msiexec.exe to silently install the PuTTY SSH client. This sequence is characteristic of the 'ClickFix' technique, which uses social engineering to trick users into running malicious commands for remote access deployment.
This rule detects the creation or modification of a DLL file within the 'ProgramData\CrossDevice' directory, or the modification of a specific COM CLSID InprocServer32 registry key associated with 'CrossDevice.Streaming.Source.dll'. This behavior is indicative of potential COM hijacking or persistence mechanisms targeting the CrossDevice streaming framework.
Detects instances where PowerShell processes initiate outbound WebDAV connections, potentially to download or stage malicious DLLs. The detection rule correlates network activity involving WebDAV indicators (e.g., DavWWWRoot) with subsequent local file creation events for DLL files within WebDAV-related folders.
Detects execution of Mimikatz or usage of its specific command-line arguments (such as sekurlsa or lsadump modules) which indicate attempted credential dumping from system memory.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry Run and RunOnce keys by processes other than standard system binaries and known management tools. Such modifications are a common method for achieving persistence by ensuring malicious code executes upon user logon.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell where the task binary path resides in suspicious directories frequently used by adversaries for staging, such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or Public folders.
Detects the creation of multiple suspicious scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters for specific task names associated with known malicious patterns and XML definition files located in a specific directory path, identifying potential automated persistence or malware installation behavior.
Detects the registration or installation of an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server or agent tool containing suspicious prompt-injection strings (e.g., instructions to ignore safety guardrails or role overrides), immediately followed by the execution of shell commands or unauthorized network connections originating from that tool.
Detects unauthorized modifications to AI agent configuration files, including system prompts, tool allow-lists, and MCP server registration files. Such changes are often performed by processes outside of approved configuration management or infrastructure-as-code pipelines, potentially allowing for persistent manipulation of AI model behavior and capabilities.
Detects outbound HTTPS connections to major generative AI inference endpoints originating from non-browser, non-development tool processes at regular intervals. This activity is indicative of beaconing behavior, where malware (specifically families like LAMEHUG) leverages LLM APIs for dynamic command generation, payload obfuscation, or C2 instruction retrieval, bypassing traditional security controls.
Detects network connections from server or workload identities (excluding SYSTEM) to known public Generative-AI inference API domains. This may indicate the use of AI services for data exfiltration, automated content generation, or C2 communication via legitimate web services.
Detects a two-stage activity: first, the potential unauthorized reading or access of LLM provider API keys from files, environment variables, or command-line arguments; and second, the subsequent use of those same credentials to authenticate to LLM provider APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Azure, Bedrock) from a different, unrecognized source IP address, indicating potential credential theft and session hijacking.
Detects potential exploitation of AI agent frameworks, such as Semantic Kernel, where plugin or tool invocation primitives are abused to execute arbitrary commands or manipulate files via path traversal. The rule monitors for AI-hosting processes (e.g., python.exe, node.exe) spawning shell child processes or file-related commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., '..\..\') paired with file operation keywords.
This rule monitors for a variety of indicators associated with malicious activity, including connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific malicious file hashes or filenames, modifications to Windows system policies (specifically Legal Notice configuration), and changes to Active Directory Group Policy Objects using specified GUIDs.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Detects the execution of command-line interpreters (cmd, powershell, mshta, etc.) directly spawned by explorer.exe. This activity is indicative of the 'ClickFix' or 'ConsentFix' attack chain, where a victim is coerced into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) after interacting with a fraudulent CAPTCHA or verification page in their browser. The rule filters out standard installer-related activity to reduce false positives.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe when spawned by powershell.exe or mshta.exe, specifically targeting DLLs located in common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, ProgramData, Downloads). This pattern is consistent with the delivery of CastleLoader shellcode loaders following ClickFix-style social engineering lures.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows system binaries (LOLBins) such as curl.exe, certutil.exe, or bitsadmin.exe to download files. These binaries are monitored when spawned directly from common entry-point processes like explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe, which is characteristic of second-stage payload retrieval in ClickFix social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of Windows Installer (.msi) files or screensaver (.scr) files that were recently downloaded and executed via a web browser. Attackers often use these file types as lures for fake updates or software installers to execute malicious code on the victim's system.
Detects registry value modifications to the Windows Explorer RunMRU key where the data contains indicators of obfuscated PowerShell commands. This pattern is commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' social-engineering campaign, where users are prompted to copy and paste a malicious PowerShell command into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects instances where a suspected malicious loader initiates process hollowing or APC injection by launching trusted Windows binaries (e.g., LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe) in a suspended state. The rule identifies suspicious post-injection behavior such as unexpected network connections or child process creation originating from these typically benign binaries, which is characteristic of the DeepLoad/ClickFix attack chain.
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