Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,141 detections
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Detects the execution of common shell utilities, interpreters, or configuration commands initiated by QEMU or KVM processes. This often indicates the use of virtualized environments to execute payloads, bypass security controls, or hide artifacts within a host system, especially when correlated with process crashes related to hypervisor components.
Cortex XDR Process Lineage Observation
Cortex XDR
This rule monitors and retrieves process lineage information, including child process execution, parent process context, and grandparent process hierarchy for a specific host. It extracts process execution details such as image names and command lines to provide visibility into process trees for forensic investigation and behavior analysis.
Detects the deletion of files or archives associated with the SHub Stealer malware (specifically /tmp/shub_ directories or /tmp/out.zip) immediately following staging or exfiltration activity within the same process lineage, which is characteristic of anti-forensic cleanup behaviors.
Detects VS Code / Node.js extension host processes invoking command lines that reference CI/CD and repository environment variables (e.g., GITHUB_REPOSITORY, CI_PROJECT_PATH, Azure DevOps collection URI, Buildkite, CircleCI, Codespace, Gitpod), consistent with malicious Open VSX "evil twin" extensions harvesting developer and CI/CD metadata.
Detects non-git processes such as VS Code, VS Code Server, or Node.js reading .git/HEAD or .git/refs files, which may indicate a malicious editor extension harvesting git repository metadata (branch names, commit refs) as observed in the Open VSX 'evil twin' extension campaign.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
Detects the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud 2.0 "Run Copilot" secrets-laundering technique: a CI workflow step dumping toJSON(secrets) to a format-results.txt artifact, followed by GitHub Actions artifact-API downloads using scraped ghs_ runner tokens and git ref deletion used to cover tracks.
Detects the execution of npm, pnpm, or yarn commands used to install or add specific beta releases of the @joyfill/layouts and @joyfill/components packages, which are known to contain malicious code designed to deliver a multi-stage RAT.
Detects Python worker processes (e.g., dataset converters) spawning suspicious child processes (shells, network tools) or accessing sensitive filesystem paths/endpoints, such as Kubernetes service account tokens or cloud instance metadata, which are often indicative of post-exploitation activity following an SSTI or code injection vulnerability.
Threat actors are exploiting the recently Discovered WordPress Vulnerability. Vulnerability Management platform like defender not fully capable of identifying the vulnerable WordPress Core Application being installed on the organizations Servers. If you are using Defender XDR, here's the KQL to hunt for WordPress Installed Linux and Windows Servers.
Detects malicious persistence hooks in IDE configuration files (.claude/settings.json, .vscode/tasks.json) used by the ChainDrop or Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm to execute unauthorized JavaScript payloads upon opening a repository.
Detects instances where VS Code (Code.exe) or Node.js (node.exe) processes reference CI/CD-related environment variables in their command line. This behavior is often associated with build pipeline manipulation, credential harvesting from environment configurations, or post-exploitation activities within developer environments.
Detects creation of a VS Code/Open VSX extension folder whose name reuses a known legitimate vendor namespace (AMD, Azure, Salesforce, Hyperledger, LEGO Education, IOTA, US government) but is published at an implausibly low version (0.0.1 or 0.0.2), matching the 'evil twin' extension-confusion pattern.
Detects the creation of a file named 'license.tmp' within the '/var/tmp/' directory. This location and filename pattern is often associated with the staging or execution of temporary files, potential persistence mechanisms, or obfuscated payloads commonly found in Linux-based malware or adversary activity.
Detects a multi-stage exploitation chain for CVE-2026-15410 targeting SonicWall SMA 1000 appliances. It correlates web request logs containing path traversal sequences in a hotfix parameter, associated application log entries indicating removal of a hotfix referencing a temporary file, and subsequent system shutdown commands executed with root privileges, indicating successful privilege escalation and system compromise.
This rule detects when common administrative or networking tools such as bash, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl, or wget are initiated by Langflow application processes (python, uvicorn, gunicorn). This behavior is indicative of potential command injection or exploitation of the Langflow platform to execute unauthorized commands or download malicious payloads.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity by detecting two distinct patterns: first, network connections initiated by Java processes located in tomcat/catalina directories on high-risk ports; second, suspicious administrative audit actions (Add admin, Modify credential, Export device list) within N-central where the initiating user context is missing.
Detects malicious persistence hooks in IDE configuration files (.claude/settings.json, .vscode/tasks.json) used by the ChainDrop or Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm to execute unauthorized JavaScript payloads upon opening a repository.
Detects the deployment and execution of GSocket-based persistence mechanisms on Linux systems. This includes monitoring for the use of deployment scripts (gs_deploy.py, gs_persist.py), the establishment of cron jobs for periodic GSocket check-ins, the use of GSOCKET_HOST environment variables to control network behavior, and the execution of GSocket binaries staged in suspicious locations such as /tmp/.gs or web server directories.
Detects incoming web requests (via URI queries or form data) containing common OS command injection characters, shell metacharacters, or command execution patterns indicative of attempts to execute unauthorized commands on the underlying web server.
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