Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects ClickFix-style fileless execution patterns where PowerShell pipelines (Invoke-RestMethod/Invoke-WebRequest) directly into execution cmdlets (Invoke-Expression/IEX) to download and execute remote scripts entirely in memory. The rule monitors for common bypass flags, hidden windows, and connections to suspicious IP address patterns or non-standard ports typically associated with malicious C2 staging.
Detects creation of the 'keyroll' scheduled task used to relaunch the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain. Requires the schtasks.exe command line to both reference the 'keyroll' task name AND explicitly reference the ProgramData\keyroll path or rnpkeys.exe (ruling out unrelated tasks that happen to be named 'keyroll', e.g. legitimate key-rotation automation), and requires an INNER join corroborating an actual rnpkeys.exe relaunch from that path within 24h — a lone task-creation event with no follow-on relaunch no longer alerts.
Detects creation of the 'keyroll' scheduled task used to relaunch the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain. Requires the schtasks.exe command line to both reference the 'keyroll' task name AND explicitly reference the ProgramData\keyroll path or rnpkeys.exe (ruling out unrelated tasks that happen to be named 'keyroll', e.g. legitimate key-rotation automation), and requires an INNER join corroborating an actual rnpkeys.exe relaunch from that path within 24h — a lone task-creation event with no follow-on relaunch no longer alerts.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender antivirus preferences by adding exclusion paths or processes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass security software detection by excluding their malicious tools or staging areas from scanning.
Detects a multi-stage installation of the Level RMM agent. This rule monitors for a correlation of events including the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments, file drops in potentially spoofed vendor paths (Dell or Level), the creation of a 'Level' service, and the addition of a 'Level Watchdog' scheduled task on the same device within a 24-hour window.
Detects instances where the Internet Information Services (IIS) worker process (w3wp.exe) initiates a child process of sqlcmd.exe. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicates a post-exploitation activity where an attacker, having established a webshell or similar foothold on a web server, is using harvested credentials to query backend SQL databases directly.
Detects instances where an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) that executes a conditional file copy operation. This pattern is characteristic of an adversary creating a webshell by copying a payload to a filename that masquerades as a legitimate web application asset, such as a CSS bundle or validation script.
This rule monitors for suspicious command-line activity involving the Fortis payment processor's webhook log files. It detects when attackers use tools like 'findstr', 'cmd', or 'dir' to navigate directories containing webhook data and specifically searches for payment card fields such as CVV, primary account numbers, and expiration dates, which is a common indicator of post-compromise data exfiltration.
Detects DLL sideloading activity associated with the 'Lorem Ipsum Loader' malware. The rule monitors for specific combinations of legitimate Windows binaries loading specific DLLs from non-system directories, a common technique to execute malicious code via trusted processes.
Detects the presence of an embedded word-to-hex lookup table within a PE file. This technique is used by the Lorem Ipsum Loader to store shellcode as plaintext English words to evade entropy-based detection and static analysis tools. The rule matches a dense sequence of lowercase words frequently found in these malicious loaders.
The following analytic detects creation and removal of intermediary remediation artifacts of Windows Defender, during exploitation of ShieldCrash attacks.
Exploit abuses the race condition between file validation and its remediation performed by Windows Defender. In between these steps, ShieldCrash changes the
symbolic link to redirect the remediation process to a staging directory controlled by the attacker. This detection aims to detect creation of defender artifact,
its alternate data stream, and their subsequent removal.
Exploit abuses the race condition between file validation and its remediation performed by Windows Defender. In between these steps, ShieldCrash changes the
symbolic link to redirect the remediation process to a staging directory controlled by the attacker. This detection aims to detect creation of defender artifact,
its alternate data stream, and their subsequent removal.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources (File Events, Certificate Info, Network Events, and DNS Events) to detect known malicious indicators, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs associated with malicious activity.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching file hashes against a known list of malicious indicators and monitoring for suspicious network connections. The network monitoring includes connections to hardcoded malicious IP addresses, specific C2 URLs, and DNS queries for known fallback domains used in malicious infrastructure when the initiating process is not a recognized web browser or wallet application.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching file hashes against a known list of malicious indicators and monitoring for suspicious network connections. The network monitoring includes connections to hardcoded malicious IP addresses, specific C2 URLs, and DNS queries for known fallback domains used in malicious infrastructure when the initiating process is not a recognized web browser or wallet application.
Detects the execution of the sckit Go implant, linked to the MemTensor supply chain compromise, during its host-profiling stage. The rule monitors for the 'sckit' binary being executed with 'stage0' and '--config64' command-line arguments, or being spawned by legitimate runtime interpreters like Node.js or Python, indicating an attempt to profile host information (timezone, language, privileges) and subsequent self-deletion.
Detects the loading of the 'WbElevation.dll' module associated with SectopRAT, followed by suspicious access to browser, email, or cryptocurrency wallet credential stores within a 10-minute window on the same device.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
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