Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects failed attempts to elevate privileges (PIM activation) in Azure Active Directory from devices that are not designated as Privileged Access Workstations (PAW) or Secure Access Workstations (SAW). It specifically looks for messages indicating 'Add member to role completed (PIM activation)' in the sign-in logs, combined with conditions that identify non-compliant devices, unapproved IP addresses, unapproved countries, or unapproved device information. The rule is designed to flag suspicious privilege elevation attempts that originate from unauthorized or untrusted environments, which could indicate a compromised account or an attempt to bypass security controls.
This rule identifies when an admission controller is executed in Azure Kubernetes. Admission controllers intercept and potentially modify requests to the Kubernetes API server. Adversaries can leverage admission webhooks (MutatingAdmissionWebhook or ValidatingAdmissionWebhook) for persistence, such as injecting malicious containers into pods or intercepting API requests to steal credentials and sensitive information.
This rule detects when a user registers security information, which indicates a change to their authentication method. This could be an attacker adding an authentication method to a compromised account to maintain persistent access.
This rule detects sign-in attempts to Azure Active Directory from devices that are marked as non-compliant. Non-compliant devices typically lack required security configurations, updates, or policies, and their use for authentication can indicate a potential security risk, such as a compromised device or an attempt to bypass security controls.
Identifies user login with multifactor authentication failures, which might be an indication an attacker has the password for the account but can't pass the MFA challenge.
This rule monitors and alerts when a user is added to the 'Global Administrator' or 'Device Administrator' roles within Azure Active Directory. These roles grant highly elevated privileges, making this activity critical for detecting potential persistence, privilege escalation, or initial access attempts by adversaries. The detection logic specifically looks for 'Add member to role' operations within the RoleManagement category, targeting the unique identifiers for these two sensitive administrative roles.
Detects when a configuration change is made to an application's AppID URI in Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID). This change can be indicative of an adversary attempting to modify an application's identity to facilitate malicious activities such as phishing, unauthorized access, or maintaining persistence.
Detects when a user is removed from a privileged role in Azure AD. Bulk changes should be investigated as they could indicate an adversary attempting to remove legitimate administrators or clean up their tracks after gaining access.
Detects when a user successfully resets their own password within Azure Active Directory. This rule specifically looks for 'UserManagement' category events with a 'Success' status, initiated by a 'UPN' (User Principal Name) and targeting a 'UPN' with an 'ActivityType' containing 'Password reset'.
Identifies when an account in a privileged role has not signed in for a specified number of days, indicating a potentially stale or unused privileged account. Such accounts can be a security risk if compromised, as they might not be actively monitored.
This rule detects sign-in attempts to Azure AD where the authentication requirement was single-factor, the sign-in was successful (ResultType: 0), the network location details were empty (indicating an unknown or unclassified location), and the device ID was also empty (indicating an unknown or unregistered device). This combination suggests a sign-in from an unknown device and potentially an untrusted location, which could be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain initial access or maintain persistence.
Detects failed attempts to sign in to disabled accounts within Azure Active Directory. This could indicate an attacker attempting to use compromised credentials for an account that has been deactivated, or an attempt to bypass security controls by targeting dormant accounts.
This rule detects unusual authentication interruptions in Azure Active Directory sign-in logs. Specifically, it looks for three types of ResultType and ResultDescription combinations: '50097 - Device authentication is required', '50155 - DeviceAuthenticationFailed', and '50158 - ExternalSecurityChallenge - External security challenge was not satisfied'. These events indicate that an authentication attempt was interrupted or failed due to device-related issues or an unmet external security challenge, which could be indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass authentication mechanisms or encountering unexpected security controls.
This rule detects successful user authentications from your Azure AD tenant to other Azure AD tenants. This activity can indicate an attacker attempting to maintain access or escalate privileges by leveraging existing user accounts to access resources in external tenants, or it could be a legitimate business-to-business (B2B) collaboration that needs to be approved.
This rule detects successful user authentications originating from geographic locations (countries) that are not designated as operational areas for the organization. This helps identify potential unauthorized access attempts or compromised accounts being used from unexpected locations.
This rule detects sign-in failures in Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID) that are specifically due to Conditional Access policies not being met. It identifies attempts where a user or service tried to authenticate but was blocked because the Conditional Access requirements were not satisfied. This could indicate an attacker attempting to bypass security controls, or legitimate users/services failing to meet policy requirements.
Detects failed sign-in attempts for privileged roles where the user does not meet expected security controls, such as signing in from an unapproved country, IP address, or device. This rule helps identify potential unauthorized access attempts to administrative accounts.
Detects when a user is added to a privileged role in Azure AD. This could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or establish persistence within the cloud environment.
Identifies when the same privilege role has multiple activations by the same user, which could indicate an attempt to bypass time-based access restrictions or an adversary repeatedly activating a role for malicious purposes. This alert is triggered by the 'sequentialActivationRenewalsAlertIncident' risk event type in Azure PIM.
This rule identifies an event where the number of accounts assigned the Global Administrator role in Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID) exceeds a predefined threshold. This is detected by monitoring the 'tooManyGlobalAdminsAssignedToTenantAlertIncident' risk event type from Azure PIM (Privileged Identity Management). A high number of Global Administrators can increase the attack surface and risk of privilege abuse or compromise.
Detects when user access has been blocked by Azure Conditional Access policies. This indicates that token issuance was denied, which could be a sign of unauthorized login attempts to valid accounts.
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