Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Protocols
1
Detects potential supply chain or local configuration tampering involving the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The rule identifies modification of common MCP configuration files, followed by the execution of a tool runner (node, python, npx) that spawns a scripting shell, which subsequently initiates an unusual outbound network connection.
The following analytic identifies the `finger.exe` utility being spawned with a command line containing an `@` character, indicating a remote host/server was specified.
The Finger protocol utility is largely obsolete in modern environments and has been abused by adversaries as a living-off-the-land binary (LOLBIN) to retrieve encoded payloads or establish covert command-and-control communication with an attacker-controlled finger server.
This behavior is uncommon in legitimate enterprise usage and warrants investigation.
The Finger protocol utility is largely obsolete in modern environments and has been abused by adversaries as a living-off-the-land binary (LOLBIN) to retrieve encoded payloads or establish covert command-and-control communication with an attacker-controlled finger server.
This behavior is uncommon in legitimate enterprise usage and warrants investigation.
Detects a specific pattern of Windows API calls consistent with PIVOTPIPE C2 activity, involving process token impersonation (OpenProcessToken, DuplicateTokenEx, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, or SetThreadToken) followed by a RevertToSelf call. The rule correlates these events within a single process, identifies artifacts related to PIVOTPIPE loader/payloads, and ensures the sequence completes within a short time window.
Detects modifications to the .zshrc configuration file followed by shell commands interacting with the file, or the execution of commands that source the .repair-run script within a shell environment. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where an adversary modifies startup scripts to maintain access or execute malicious code upon shell initialization.
Detects a Node.js process deleting specific core application files, such as 'index.js' or 'sharedLoad.min.js', located within 'node_modules' directories. This activity may indicate malicious tampering, package integrity compromise, or an adversary attempting to disrupt application functionality.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects instances where Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) spawns cmd.exe or wscript.exe to execute batch files (.bat) or scripts with specific filenames. This behavior is often associated with malicious user activity, such as executing payloads disguised as innocuous files triggered via shell interactions.
This rule detects the execution of common remote access tools (Quick Assist, AnyDesk) on a host that does not have a prior history of using those specific tools. This is intended to identify potential hands-on-keyboard activity by adversaries following initial access via social engineering, such as vishing or email-bombing, where they attempt to establish a persistent remote access foothold.
Detects the execution of the 'rnpkeys.exe' file from the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll\' directory. The location and filename are highly atypical and could indicate unauthorized tool usage, potential persistence, or malicious activity.
Detects the exfiltration behavior of the Sauron Loader, where a process tree associated with rnpkeys.exe or its modules (rnp.dll, tdwp.dll) within the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory performs a burst of numerous small HTTPS POST requests to a single destination. This pattern is characteristic of a screenshot image being fragmented into small chunks and exfiltrated.
Detects the execution of suspected Sauron Loader components staged in C:\ProgramData\keyroll\ (rnpkeys.exe or tdwp.dll) followed by an outbound network connection from the same host within a 2-minute window. This behavior correlates the staging of malicious binaries with the loader's automated outbound registration attempt.
Detects the execution of suspected Sauron Loader components staged in C:\ProgramData\keyroll\ (rnpkeys.exe or tdwp.dll) followed by an outbound network connection from the same host within a 2-minute window. This behavior correlates the staging of malicious binaries with the loader's automated outbound registration attempt.
Detects the execution of attrib.exe spawned by known Sauron Loader process names (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.exe, or tdwp.exe). The rule flags instances where attrib.exe is executed without its typical command-line arguments (file attribute flags), suggesting it is being used as a surrogate process for injected C2-tasked shellcode.
Detects instances where the rnpkeys process (likely used for GPG-related operations) spawns common Windows living-off-the-land binaries such as rundll32, regsvr32, msiexec, cmd, powershell, or wscript. It specifically monitors for patterns indicating potential script execution from temporary folders, the bypass of PowerShell execution policies, or the installation of products via msiexec, which may indicate malicious activity following initial compromise or delivery of a malicious payload.
Detects the execution of rnpkeys.exe from a specific path, followed by the loading of expected DLLs (rnp.dll or tdwp.dll) from the same directory, and a subsequent network connection on port 443. This behavior pattern is consistent with DLL side-loading used to establish a network-based command and control channel.
Detects periodic outbound network connections from rnpkeys.exe characteristic of the Sauron Loader C2 beaconing. The rule identifies a consistent heartbeat pattern (approx. 600 seconds) between successful C2 polls to the same remote host, distinguishing it from typical user-driven browser traffic.
This rule detects Terraform CLI execution of the 'init' command correlated with network access to HashiCorp AWS registry domains, or the presence of Terraform lock files in specific sensitive or project-related directory paths. This combination often indicates infrastructure-as-code management activities or potential misuse of Terraform in a production environment.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to clipboard APIs (GetClipboardData/SetClipboardData) by non-standard, unrecognized processes. The rule specifically monitors for patterns consistent with clipper malware, which polls the clipboard for cryptocurrency address formats and replaces them with attacker-controlled addresses.
This rule monitors for suspicious process behaviors and module loads, specifically focusing on unusual explorer.exe parentage, the loading of common system DLLs (dbghelp.dll, Secur32.dll) in potentially anomalous contexts, and specific command-line strings that may indicate malicious activity or tools.
Detects the loading or installation of a driver file identified as DCRCVDrv.sys followed within 5 minutes by EDR sensor heartbeat loss or process activity, which is characteristic of attempts to tamper with security software or hide malicious activity via a kernel-mode driver.
Detects the use of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe to execute code via remote scripts, COM scriptlets, or JavaScript. This technique is often used in fileless malware or to bypass execution policies by loading scripts directly from a URL or local file.
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