Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of common command-line utilities (net, powershell, cmd) to perform user account creation or local group membership modification, which are behaviors often associated with adversary persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the execution of discovery or credential access utilities (e.g., whoami, net, reg, ldapsearch) spawned by Java-based server processes like java.exe or tomcat.exe. This activity is often indicative of an attacker leveraging a vulnerable web application to perform reconnaissance or credential harvesting on the host system.
Detects behavioral patterns associated with the Everest ransomware loader, specifically the execution of a .NET host process from a non-standard parent, potentially indicating process injection, combined with network activity indicative of lateral movement or discovery, such as Wake-on-LAN packets or SMB scanning.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a high volume of security, backup, or antivirus services and processes are terminated on a host in a short time window, followed by extensive file modification activity. This behavior is highly indicative of pre-encryption preparations by ransomware, specifically patterns observed by the Everest group, intended to neutralize defenses and prevent restoration before encrypting files.
This rule detects typical behavior associated with infostealers targeting browser data, specifically the creation of compressed archives (.zip, .rar) in temporary directories (Temp or AppData) and the subsequent exfiltration of data via known webhook services (e.g., Discord, Telegram, Pastebin) or direct IP connections. It filters out common signed backup and synchronization software to minimize noise.
Detects potential lateral movement by identifying NTLM authentication (Logon Type 3) to administrative network shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) or high-frequency access to multiple hosts by the same user, which may indicate credential abuse or lateral movement attempts.
Detects the abuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute processes via wmic.exe or WmiPrvSE.exe, often combined with obfuscated command-line arguments such as encoded PowerShell or CMD commands.
Detects the abuse of built-in Windows binaries 'regsvr32.exe' and 'msbuild.exe' for proxy execution. Specifically, it flags 'regsvr32.exe' loading remote scriptlets via HTTP and 'msbuild.exe' processing project files containing inline tasks, which are common techniques used to execute arbitrary malicious code while bypassing security controls.
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) enrollment events (4886/4887) where a request includes an enrollee-supplied Subject Alternative Name (SAN). This behavior is characteristic of ESC1 certificate template abuse (e.g., using tools like Certipy or Certify) to request certificates that impersonate other users or machine accounts.
Detects anomalous lateral movement via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by identifying three high-risk patterns: rapid RDP fan-out to multiple destination hosts from a single account, RDP access to sensitive servers from unauthorized source hosts, and RDP sessions followed by the execution of known post-exploitation or credential-theft tooling on the destination host.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with arguments pointing to remote URLs or containing JavaScript. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns where attackers use fake CAPTCHA lures to trick users into executing malicious scripts via mshta.exe, often launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., from a downloaded file).
Detects the use of the built-in Windows utility rundll32.exe to execute the MiniDump functionality within comsvcs.dll against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This technique is a common method for attackers to bypass signature-based security tools and obtain sensitive credentials from memory.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity where a single user account performs NTLM Type 3 (network) authentications to three or more unique destination hosts within a 10-minute window, excluding service account activity (trailing $). This pattern is consistent with an adversary moving laterally across a network using harvested NTLM hashes.
Detects potential exploitation of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) misconfigurations (specifically ESC1, involving client-auth EKU and enrollee-supplies-subject). The rule correlates certificate issuance events (4886, 4887, 4888) involving sensitive templates or suspicious subject alternative name (SAN) mismatches with subsequent Kerberos PKINIT authentication (4768) events using the issued certificate.
Detects anomalous Kerberos TGT (4768) or TGS (4769) requests where the ticket lifetime exceeds typical domain policy (10 hours), or where the KRBTGT account is explicitly referenced as the target, both of which are high-fidelity indicators of Golden Ticket forgery attacks.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a user account authenticates via NTLM (Logon Type 3) to at least three different hosts within a 10-minute window and subsequently accesses administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) on one or more of those target systems.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring for NTLM network logons (Logon Type 3) that are associated with a blank WorkstationName, often indicating spoofing. This pattern is correlated with the assignment of special privileges (EventID 4672) to capture scenarios where stolen NTLM hashes are replayed for lateral movement into a system.
Detects a sequence of multiple RDP authentication failures (Event ID 4625, Logon Type 10) from a specific source IP, followed by a successful RDP authentication (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 10) from the same source IP. This pattern indicates a successful credential brute force or password spraying attack against RDP, which is a common initial access vector for ransomware and lateral movement.
Detects Kerberos TGS requests using RC4 encryption (0x17), which is a common indicator of Kerberoasting. By monitoring Event IDs 4768 and 4769 for this specific encryption type, this rule identifies potential attempts to offline-crack service account passwords.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698 that involve scripting interpreters (powershell, wscript, mshta, cmd) and suspicious command line arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, or network resource access, specifically when executing under the SYSTEM account context.
Detects Kerberos TGT (4768) or TGS (4769) tickets that exhibit anomalous characteristics often associated with forged tickets (e.g., Golden Ticket). The rule flags tickets using weak encryption (RC4-HMAC, legacy DES), tickets requested for stale/disabled accounts, or tickets with lifetimes exceeding standard domain policy thresholds.
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