Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects DNS requests to domains known to be associated with malicious browser extensions. These extensions often perform command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activities by communicating with these domains. The rule uses a regex to match both the primary domains and their subdomains, aggregating results by host and domain to identify repetitive beaconing.
Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
Detects when a built-in utility is used to decode and decrypt a payload after a macOS disk image (DMG) is executed. Malware authors may attempt to evade detection and trick users into executing malicious code by encoding and encrypting their payload and placing it in a disk image file. This behavior is consistent with adware or malware families such as Bundlore and Shlayer.
Detects attempts to masquerade as legitimate files by adding a space to the end of the filename.
Detects cobalt strike malleable profiles patterns (URI, User-Agents, Methods).
Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
Detects macOS Gatekeeper bypass via xattr utility
Detects the creation of the specific LaunchAgent plist file ('com.vfrfeufhtjpwgray.plist') used by the macOS AppleScript dropper in the REF6598 campaign for persistence, ensuring visibility into the non-Windows infection chain.
Detects instances where the legitimate Obsidian application spawns shell or scripting interpreters (PowerShell, cmd, sh, bash, zsh). This behavior is associated with the REF6598 campaign, where attackers abuse the Obsidian "Shell Commands" community plugin to execute malicious code and deliver the PhantomPulse RAT.
Detects deletion of local audit logs
Detects attempts to enable the guest account using the sysadminctl utility
Detects the execution of "system_profiler" with specific "Data Types" that have been seen being used by threat actors and malware. It provides system hardware and software configuration information.
This process is primarily used for system information discovery. However, "system_profiler" can also be used to determine if virtualization software is being run for defense evasion purposes.
This process is primarily used for system information discovery. However, "system_profiler" can also be used to determine if virtualization software is being run for defense evasion purposes.
This rule detects when the Obsidian application (obsidian.exe) spawns common shell or scripting interpreters such as PowerShell, cmd.exe, sh, bash, zsh, or osascript. This activity could indicate malicious code execution originating from a potentially compromised or weaponized Obsidian instance, or an attempt to leverage Obsidian's capabilities for unauthorized command execution. The inclusion of 'osascript' specifically addresses observed macOS attack chains (REF6598).
Identifies the creation of a specific LaunchAgent plist file associated with the PhantomPulse macOS AppleScript dropper, indicating persistence on macOS systems.
Provides high-fidelity detection of the initial infrastructure used by the threat actor to deliver the PhantomPulse RAT. This rule specifically detects network connections to a known PhantomPulse staging server IP address.
Detects usage of base64 utility to decode arbitrary base64-encoded text
Detect file time attribute change to hide new or changes to existing files
Detects attempts to enable the root account via "dsenableroot"
Multi-layered detection for two linked March 2026 threat campaigns identified by ANY.RUN and Objective-See:
**Campaign 1 — EvilTokens (OAuth Device Code Phishing)**
Abuses Microsoft's OAuth 2.0 Device Code authentication flow to silently hijack enterprise accounts. Attackers trick users into entering a device code on Microsoft's legitimate login page, granting the attacker a valid OAuth token — no credentials stolen, no MFA bypass needed. Over 180 phishing URLs detected in a single week. Targets: Technology, Education, Manufacturing, and Government sectors (US & India focus).
**Campaign 2 — AMOS Stealer (macOS ClickFix)**
Distributed via a trojanized disk image (Clearl_AI.dmg) posing as an AI tool installer. Harvests browser credentials, macOS Keychain, cryptocurrency wallets (256 extensions), Apple Notes, and sensitive files. Deploys a persistent backdoor via ~/.mainhelper (WebSocket reverse shell) and LaunchAgent persistence (com.apple.mdworker.plist / com.apple.systemupdate). Kills security tools (Little Snitch, BlockBlock, Lulu) and validates stolen passwords against the keychain.
1. EvilTokens — Detects Device Code OAuth sign-ins from suspicious infrastructure (workers[.]dev phishing domains)
2. AMOS IOC Network Sweep — Identifies connections to known C2/payload domains (laislivon.com, rvdownloads.com)
3. AMOS Behavioral — Detects ClickFix-style base64 curl-to-shell execution, /tmp/helper payloads, and LaunchAgent persistence artifacts
4. Cross-platform IOC file hash matching across endpoints
**Campaign 1 — EvilTokens (OAuth Device Code Phishing)**
Abuses Microsoft's OAuth 2.0 Device Code authentication flow to silently hijack enterprise accounts. Attackers trick users into entering a device code on Microsoft's legitimate login page, granting the attacker a valid OAuth token — no credentials stolen, no MFA bypass needed. Over 180 phishing URLs detected in a single week. Targets: Technology, Education, Manufacturing, and Government sectors (US & India focus).
**Campaign 2 — AMOS Stealer (macOS ClickFix)**
Distributed via a trojanized disk image (Clearl_AI.dmg) posing as an AI tool installer. Harvests browser credentials, macOS Keychain, cryptocurrency wallets (256 extensions), Apple Notes, and sensitive files. Deploys a persistent backdoor via ~/.mainhelper (WebSocket reverse shell) and LaunchAgent persistence (com.apple.mdworker.plist / com.apple.systemupdate). Kills security tools (Little Snitch, BlockBlock, Lulu) and validates stolen passwords against the keychain.
1. EvilTokens — Detects Device Code OAuth sign-ins from suspicious infrastructure (workers[.]dev phishing domains)
2. AMOS IOC Network Sweep — Identifies connections to known C2/payload domains (laislivon.com, rvdownloads.com)
3. AMOS Behavioral — Detects ClickFix-style base64 curl-to-shell execution, /tmp/helper payloads, and LaunchAgent persistence artifacts
4. Cross-platform IOC file hash matching across endpoints
Detects attempts to manually remove the Apple quarantine extended
attribute using the xattr utility. This technique is often used by malware,
such as the notnullOSX stealer, to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections on
downloaded payloads.
attribute using the xattr utility. This technique is often used by malware,
such as the notnullOSX stealer, to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections on
downloaded payloads.
This rule detects the creation of directories or files related to the malicious 'plain-crypto-js' package within 'node_modules' folders. This activity is associated with the WAVESHAPER.V2 RAT, which targets developer and CI/CD systems through supply chain compromise of npm packages like Axios.
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