Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects UNION-based blind SQL injection against the WordPress REST posts item route exploiting the split_the_query bypass (CVE-2026-60137) to exfiltrate database contents.
Detects requests to WordPress plugin-install/upload or privileged user REST endpoints occurring shortly after anomalous WordPress REST API batch activity, consistent with post-exploitation follow-through in the wp2shell chain.
Detects unauthenticated POST requests to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint (/wp-json/batch/v1 or ?rest_route=/batch/v1) containing a nested requests array or an anomalous sub-request method pattern, the network entry point for the wp2shell CVE-2026-63030/CVE-2026-60137 exploit chain.
Detects anomalous server responses for WordPress REST API requests targeting /wp/v2/categories/0 where the error message 'block_cannot_read' is returned instead of the expected 'rest_term_invalid'. This behavior is indicative of attempted exploitation using the wp2shell batch-handler desync vulnerability.
Detects suspicious batch requests to the WordPress REST API (/wp-json/batch/v1) containing both a DELETE operation on category ID 0 and a POST operation to the core block-renderer, which is characteristic of attempts to exploit vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-27956 to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.
Detects the mrmustard supply-chain implant establishing persistence by writing a crontab entry that invokes the compiled stealer 'hw_probe.pyc' every 15 minutes, or direct crontab command invocation referencing the file.
Detects SLURM job-queue enumeration (squeue/sinfo/scontrol) spawned specifically from a Python parent process, narrowing generic HPC admin commands to the mrmustard stealer's recon pattern.
This rule monitors for file-level artifacts related to the ModHeader browser extension, specifically targeting folder paths and file names that match the extension's unique ID. This is typically used to identify the installation or download of this extension, which has been associated with malicious activity.
Detects network connections originating from browser processes to domains associated with ModHeader-related C2 activity, specifically 'stanfordstudies.com' and 'extensions-hub.com'. This pattern is indicative of malicious browser extensions exfiltrating data or reaching out to command and control infrastructure.
Detects the wp2shell unauthenticated SQL injection chain (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137) abusing the REST API batch-route confusion via author_exclude/author__not_in parameters against wp-json/wp/v2/posts or wp-json/batch/v1, where the extraction result reflects the WordPress 6.9 $wp$2y$ bcrypt-over-HMAC-SHA384 hash marker in the request query or response body. Requires both the specific unauthenticated REST SQLi vector AND the hash-format marker to fire, excluding legitimate authenticated admin export/reporting tools that reference wp_users through normal means.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting WordPress sites, specifically identifying unauthenticated REST API batch requests that attempt to forge posts with post_status 'parse' and post_type 'request' while including self-referential post_parent cycles. This pattern is associated with recent vulnerabilities enabling remote code execution.
Detects attempts to perform error-based SQL injection against WordPress instances associated with the wp2shell exploit chain. The rule monitors for the use of MySQL functions EXTRACTVALUE or UPDATEXML within query parameters that are typically targeted by the exploit (author_exclude, author__not_in) or when interacting with the batch REST endpoint.
Detects a web server process (apache2/httpd/nginx/php-fpm) spawning a shell interpreter from a WordPress wp-content working directory, the durable behavioral signature of successful wp2shell exploitation regardless of entry vector.
Detects [embed] shortcode content submitted to WordPress that references invalid or anonymous local post IDs, used in the wp2shell chain to forge oEmbed cache database rows as a render-time write primitive.
This rule detects file-level activity associated with the known malicious version of the ModHeader browser extension (Extension ID: idgpnmonknjnojddfkpgkljpfnnfcklj). It flags the presence of specific indexedDB LevelDB files and temporary directories that are characteristic of the malicious update, which was used for unauthorized data access and browser-based persistence.
The aim of this query is detect SSH connections attempts where the external sources are specifying babeld (Network Protocol) or Conker (Network Conf. Manager) as parameters to establish a connection, is detect suspicious activity such as:
Unauthorized SSH connections.
Malicious use of SSH for lateral movement within a network.
Exfiltration attempts via SSH tunneling.
Unauthorized SSH connections.
Malicious use of SSH for lateral movement within a network.
Exfiltration attempts via SSH tunneling.
Detects execution, chmod, or invocation of the fuckaliyun.sh script used to disable Alibaba Cloud's Cloud Shield/Yundun host security monitoring agent, plus the associated iptables install added by JadeProx's modified variant of the script. Requires an actual execution context (direct invocation, chmod +x, or a bash/sh interpreter with the script as an argument or parent process) rather than any incidental string reference to 'fuckaliyun'.
Detects cred_exec/token_run command tokens within the TAG-195 WebSocket C2 message schema, used for credential/token-backed lateral movement.
Detects instances where the 'claude' or 'claude-code' process initiates network connections to more than 20 distinct destination IP addresses within a short 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a tool performing automated network scanning or discovery activities.
Detects a single Python process sequentially accessing all three sandbox/container-detection artifacts (.dockerenv, .containerenv, /proc/1/cgroup), the environment-fingerprinting technique used by the mrmustard stealer before executing its payload.
Detects AWS credentials or config file reads by scripting engines (Python/Node/Ruby/etc.) excluding known AWS tooling, matching the mrmustard stealer's credential-theft behavior.
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